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PREFACE
This dissertation is a work in analytic metaphysics, with a little bit of metaphilosophy
and logic thrown in. It is thus an example of philosophy at its most abstract and boring.
Composed during a period of both financial and emotional stress, it was a labor of love. If
any persons outside of my committee happen to read this, I hope they see, like me, just how
interesting the boring stuff can be.
All errors in the text are unintended exercises for the edification of the reader.
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CHAPTER 1. THE CHALLENGE
PRESENTISM AND ETERNALISM

TO

THE

DEBATE

OVER

There is a debate in the philosophy of time between presentists and eternalists. Presentism
is typically stated as the view that everything is present. I will state it more fully as the view that,
with the possible exception of things existing outside of time,1 everything that exists, exists at the
present time. Eternalism is typically stated as the view that past, present, and future things exist. I
will state it more fully as the view that everything which ever did exist in the past, does exist in
the present, or will exist in the future, exists. Though most of my discussion will center around
presentism and eternalism, a third view is also worth mentioning. According to this view,
alternatively called no-futurism or the growing block theory, everything which ever did exist in the
past or does exist in the present, exists, but nothing that will exist entirely in the future, exists.
Eternalists and presentists (as of the time of writing) agree that I exist, that they exist, and
that Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton, and Donald Trump exist. Eternalists also think that dinosaurs
exist, Plato exists, that the first person (or persons) born in 2050 exists, and, perhaps, that there are
human colonies on Mars. Presentists deny the existence of all of these things. No-futurists agree
with eternalists that dinosaurs and Plato exist, and agree with presentists that the first person (or
persons) born in 2050 does not exist, and that there are no human colonies on Mars.
One might suspect someone writing at length about the debate over presentism and
eternalism would have the purpose of arguing that one view or the other is superior. However, the
question I take up in this dissertation is whether the debate is substantive at all. Some philosophers
(Lombard 1999) (Lombard 2010) (Meyer 2005) (Meyer 2013) argue that presentism and

1

When discussing presentism and eternalism, this qualification will often be kept implicit. Some philosophers
(Lombard 2010) (Tallant 2014) think there are no timeless things, but I want to leave the issue open.
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eternalism are not substantive, opposed philosophical theses, and hence that the debate over
presentism and eternalism is not substantive either. When I first encountered the basic argument
for the conclusion that presentism is not a substantive philosophical thesis, I was convinced it was
correct. My original intention for this dissertation was to show that none of the attempts in the
literature to show that the debate is substantive is successful, and that by extending the main line
of argument for the conclusion that the debate is not substantive, various supposed consequences
and problems raised for presentism and eternalism in the literature can be resolved.
Eventually, however, I became convinced that there is a way to understand presentism and
eternalism as substantive, opposed philosophical theses. My goal in this dissertation, then, is first
to show that previous attempts in the literature to establish that the debate is substantive fail, and
second, to make my own proposal for how to understand presentism and eternalism and to show
how the skeptical line of argument for the conclusion that the debate is not substantive fails. As a
former skeptic, I appreciate the force of the argument for the conclusion that the debate is not
substantive. By refuting attempts in the literature to show that the debate is substantive, I hope to
bring out the power of this argument. Ultimately, however, I hope to make a convincing case that
presentism and eternalism are substantive metaphysical theses, and that the argument for the
conclusion that they are not is fallacious. In this introductory chapter, I will give and clarify the
main argument for the conclusion that the debate over presentism and eternalism is not substantive,
and then set the course for the rest of the dissertation.
1.1

The Argument for the Conclusion that the Debate is Not Substantive
In this section I will lay out the basic line of argument for the conclusion that presentism

and eternalism are not substantive, opposed metaphysical theses. Of course, lots of metaphysical
debates, or even the whole of metaphysics itself (Carnap 1950), have been dismissed as lacking
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substance by various philosophers.2 It would be not too surprising, and also not very interesting,
if the debate over presentism and eternalism was declared non-substantive by anti-metaphysical
philosophers on the grounds that it is a debate in metaphysics, and no metaphysical debates are
substantive.
However, those philosophers who claim that presentism and eternalism are not substantive
metaphysical theses do not necessarily disregard metaphysical debates generally. Moreover, their
contention is neither based on some controversial thesis about language, such as the Verificationist
theory of meaning,3 nor is it the result of some abstruse philosophical argument. Rather, the basic
line of argument they offer is simple and straightforward: presentism and eternalism are both
ambiguous, and once clarified no substantive philosophical thesis remains.
I give the basic arguments for the conclusions that presentism and eternalism are not
substantive metaphysical theses in the following paragraphs. These arguments are based, both in
structure and content, in arguments previously developed by Lombard (1999) (2010) and Meyer
(2005) (2013).
I begin with the argument for the conclusion that presentism is not a substantive thesis,
which goes like this:
1P

Presentism, the thesis that everything that exists, exists at the present time, is
ambiguous. It could mean that everything that exists now exists at the present time.

2

A good source for recent discussion of this issue is Chalmers (2009a).
According to the verificationist theory of meaning, the meaning of a synthetic statement (a statement the truth or
falsity of which is not determined solely by the meaning of the words it contains) is the procedure by which it could
be (empirically) verified.
3

4

Or, it could mean that everything that ever did exist, does exist, or ever will exist,
exists at the present time.4
2P

The thesis that everything that exists now exists at the present time is trivially true.

3P

The thesis that everything that ever did exist or ever will exist, exists at the present
time is obviously false, and also not what presentists believe.

4P

For a thesis to be philosophically substantive it cannot be either trivially true or
obviously false.

5P

Therefore, presentism is not a philosophically substantive thesis.

I suppose that someone might believe that everything that ever did exist or will exist, exists now,
contrary 3P. I presume, however, that the presentist does not believe this.
What about eternalism? The argument for the conclusion that eternalism is not a
substantive thesis parallels the argument directed against presentism:
1E

Eternalism, the thesis that everything which ever did exist in the past, does exist in
the present, or will exist in the future, exists, is ambiguous. It could mean that
everything which ever did exist in the past, does exist in the present, or will exist in
the future, does, did, or will exist at some time or other. Or, it could mean that
everything which ever did exist in the past, does exist in the present, or will exist in
the future, exists now.

4

I suppose it could also mean everything that ever did exist, does exist, and will exist, exists at the present time. I will
not discuss this reading since the presentist is presumably not making an assertion about a particular class of things,
those which exist at all times, but about all things that exist in time. Besides, the thesis that everything that ever did
exist, does exist, and will exist, exists at the present time is trivially true, and hence not a topic for substantive
philosophical debate.

5

2E

The thesis that everything which ever did exist in the past, does exist in the present,
or will exist in the future, did, does, or will exist at some time or other is obviously
true.

3E

The thesis that everything which ever did exist in the past, does exist in the present,
or will exist in the future, exists now, is not what eternalists believe and also
obviously false.5

4E

For a thesis to be philosophically substantive it cannot be either obviously true or
obviously false.

5E

Therefore, eternalism is not a philosophically substantive thesis.

I suppose that someone might deny that there ever did exist or ever will exist things that do not
exist now, contrary to 2E. I presume, however, that the presentist does not deny this and so it does
not constitute a substantive point of dispute between the presentist and the eternalist.6
Though I will primarily focus on presentism and eternalism in this dissertation, let me
briefly give a parallel argument concerning no-futurism:
1NF

No-futurism, the thesis that everything which ever did exist or does exist, exists, but
nothing that exists entirely at some future time exists is ambiguous. The latter clause

5

It is not trivially false since it is not trivial that there used to be things which no longer exist, or that there will be
things which do not yet exist. For if there was a first moment in time, at that time it would be false that there used
to be things which no longer exist. Similarly, if there will be a last moment in time, at that time it is false that there
will be things which do not yet exist.
6
Maudlin (2007) writes that, “I believe that the past is real…. I similarly believe that there is (i.e., will be) a single
unique future. I know what it would be to believe that the past is unreal (i.e., nothing ever happened, and everything
was just created ex nihilo) and to believe that the future is unreal (i.e., all will end, I will not exist tomorrow, I have
no future).” (Maudlin 2007, 108-109). This last sentence captures one sense in which someone might believe that
everything that exists, exists at the present time. I presume it does not capture what the presentist intends to mean
by it. Of course, it is not entirely clear what the presentist means.

6

could mean nothing that exists entirely at some future time exists now. Or, it could
mean, nothing that exists entirely at some future time ever will exist.
2NF

The thesis that nothing that exists entirely at some future time exists now is trivially
true.

3NF

The thesis that nothing that exists entirely at some future time ever will exist is
obviously false and not distinctive of what no-futurists believe.

4NF

For a thesis to be philosophically substantive it cannot be either trivially true or
obviously false.

5NF

Therefore, no-futurism is not a philosophically substantive thesis.

Of course, someone might believe that this is the last moment of time, and therefore that nothing
will exist at any future time, contrary to 3NF. I presume, however, that this is not what the nofuturist believes.
It is sometimes claimed that no-futurism must be a substantive thesis because it accounts
for the openness of the future (Stoneham 2009) (Bihan 2014). Since the future does not exist, there
are no facts about what will occur tomorrow, or the next day, and so on. The skeptic will respond
in this way:
Do you mean that future things do not exist now? Surely no one disagrees with this. Do
you mean future things do not exist ever? Surely not, since presumably you think they will
exist. You have yet to tell us anything interesting, and until you do, what you tell us cannot
provide any special insight into the question of whether the future is open.
In short, we have to understand no-futurism, presentism, and eternalism as substantive theses
before we can talk about the consequences of those views with respect to whether or not the future
is open, or anything else. The claim that future tensed, contingent statements are neither true or
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false is, I grant, a philosophically substantive thesis. However, the skeptic will insist it is not the
same as the thesis that things that will exist in the future do not exist. This latter thesis is ambiguous
in a way the former is not.
Having argued for the conclusions that presentism, eternalism, and no-futurism are not
substantive metaphysical thesis, the argument for the conclusion that the debate over presentism,
eternalism, and no-futurism is not substantive is straightforward:
1S

A philosophical debate is substantive just in case it is over which of multiple (but
apparently inconsistent) philosophically substantive theses is correct.

2S

Presentism, eternalism, and no-futurism are not philosophically substantive theses.

3S

Therefore, the debate over presentism, eternalism, and no-futurism is not
substantive.

A difficult question lies in the background of this discussion: what makes a thesis philosophically
substantive? Neither those authors who argue for the conclusion that presentism and eternalism
are not substantive theses, nor those who think they are substantive, offer explicit accounts of
philosophical substance. Here I will briefly sketch a rough and messy account of what it is for a
thesis to be philosophically substantive.
I submit that a set of theses is philosophically substantive just in case each thesis in the set
is unambiguous and conceivably true, but together they are mutually inconsistent. Each thesis in
such a set is likewise philosophically substantive. What does this amount to? A substantive
philosophical thesis must be apparently possibly true. What I mean by this is that a reasonable
person, in the sense that actual philosophers are reasonable, could believe the thesis to be true after
careful reflection. Furthermore, a substantive philosophical thesis must be such that reasonable
people can disagree as to its truth after careful reflection. Whether the sum of two and two is four

8

is not a substantive philosophical thesis, since reasonable persons will not disagree that it is true.
Nor is the thesis that the sum of two and two is five a substantive philosophical thesis, since
reasonable persons will not disagree that it is false.
If a thesis is philosophically substantive, it ought to be possible for reasonable people to
disagree as to its truth after careful reflection. The point of this qualification is to exclude
disagreements that result from silly but understandable mistakes. Reasonable people might
disagree as to what the sum of two particularly large numbers is, because ordinary people
sometimes add incorrectly. On the other hand, I do not claim that for a thesis to be philosophically
substantive, it ought to be possible for reasonable to disagree as to its truth after any reflection
whatsoever. It may be the case for at least some substantive philosophical thesis, the truth of that
thesis could be decided after prolonged and ideal reflection. At least I do not wish my account of
philosophical substance to exclude this possibility.
A substantive philosophical thesis need not actually be possibly true. Plenty of
philosophical thesis have been claimed by their opponents to be ultimately contradictory, and
perhaps some of those claims are correct, but they are substantive nonetheless. For instance, some
philosophers have claimed that the thesis that this world, containing as it does a great deal of evil,
is created by an all good, all knowing, and all powerful God, is contradictory. Yet it is still a
substantive thesis, because some philosophers are inclined to think the problem is inconclusive.
Consider Goldbach’s conjecture: every even number greater than two is the sum of two
primes. To date there is no accepted proof either of the conjecture or of its negation. The claim
that Goldbach’s conjecture is true, as well as the claim that it is false, is a substantive mathematical
thesis. Yet, it would seem that either Goldbach’s conjecture or its negation is not only true, but
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necessarily true. 7 I contend similarly that a substantive philosophical thesis may in fact be
necessarily true or false. Whether a philosophical thesis is substantive depends upon whether its
truth is controversial to reasonable persons.
In other words, a thesis is philosophically substantive just in case there is an unambiguous
statement of the thesis such that philosophers could reasonably disagree as to its truth. A
substantive philosophical thesis is thus philosophically controversial. This is intended to be
understood so that the domain of philosophically controversial theses is quite wide: philosophers
are, have been, and we can reasonably surmise will be, willing to debate the truth of quite a lot.
Philosophers can reasonably disagree about a thesis just in case they can reasonably
disagree whether the arguments which may be raised for or against the thesis are conclusive. By
‘philosophers’ I have in mind either actual philosophers or hypothetical philosophers who are very
much like actual philosophers. By ‘reasonable’ I mean the way in which actual philosophers are
reasonable: capable of understanding and generating sustained arguments, but neither logically
infallible or totally free from conceptual confusions. Thus, on my proposal, for a philosophical
thesis to be substantive it must be possible in principle to state it in a way that is unambiguous, but
the arguments for or against the thesis may well be fallacious.
One consequence of making the truth of a thesis philosophically controversial just in case
it is something actual philosophers could debate about is that whether or not the truth of a thesis is
philosophically controversial is somewhat a matter of context. Were philosophers either very much
more or much less conceptually confused, what theses count as philosophically controversial might
be different.

7

This might be rejected by someone who accepts a view according to which a statement S is true only if there is a
proof of S.

10

A group of logically infallible and conceptually omniscient entities would plausibly find
many of the debates of actual philosophers to be without substance. If there is a successful a priori
argument for or against a given thesis, a logically infallible and conceptually omniscient entity
would, given enough time, be able to determine the truth of the thesis with absolutely impunity.
Perhaps for such a being some philosophical theses which are debated by actual philosophers
would be seen as either explicitly contradictory or tautological.
Of course, one might challenge the idea that philosophy is concerned purely with what can
be known a priori, by citing, for instance Quine’s (1951) challenge to the analytic-synthetic
distinction or Kripke’s (1980) claim that some necessary truths can only be known a posteriori.
We can add to this that from its beginnings down to the present, philosophy has been informed
and challenged by the science (or what we would retroactively call science) of the day. For some
recent examples, the advent of the Special and General Theories of Relativity have influenced how
philosophers conceive of time, and the development of quantum mechanics has influenced how
philosophers think about the nature of objects and of causation.8
I take no position here on whether and to what extent philosophy is a purely a priori
discipline. Actual philosophers are in fact influenced by scientific developments, and actual
philosophers engage in a priori reasoning to a significant degree. Perhaps we could try to isolate
a purely a priori component of philosophical practice, which we could uphold as pure philosophy,
and a component of philosophical practice that is not, properly speaking, part of philosophy itself.
But I will not attempt to do that here.

8

A good source on this is Maudlin (2011).
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Even if philosophy as we practice it is not purely a priori, however, logically infallible and
conceptually omniscient entities could still plausibly reject many of our philosophical debates as
being without substance. Given enough time, such entities could ascertain all the a priori knowable
facts. As a consequence, they could determine for any given thesis whether or not its truth or falsity
could be discovered a priori, as well as determine what implications any empirical discoveries
may have for the truth of the thesis. Thus, such entities could clearly distinguish what is a priori
discoverable and what is either a posteriori discoverable or not discoverable at all, and would
deem everything of the former as not philosophically controversial, and the latter as outside the
scope of philosophy.9
Hence, it seems that what theses count as philosophically controversial is relative to
context, and that, perhaps dishearteningly, logically infallible and conceptually omniscient entities
would not have much use for (at least some of) philosophy. It is enough for our purposes, however,
if we can capture what makes a thesis philosophically controversial for us. That is what I have
tried to do.
Any viable account of philosophical substance ought to yield the result that a debate can
be philosophically substantive only if the theses which are the subject of debate are themselves
philosophically substantive. Thus, we can assume that our argument (1S-3S) for the conclusion
that the debate over presentism, eternalism, and no-futurism is not substantive is valid. The
important question, then, is whether our arguments for the conclusions that presentism (1P-5P),

9

Powers (2012) distinguishes between what he calls rationality 1 and rationality 2. It is rational to believe something
on some evidence in the sense of rationality 1 just in case a reasonable person free from any conceptual confusion
would believe it on that evidence. It is rational to believe something on some evidence in the sense of rationality 2
just in case a reasonable person with some conceptual confusion would believe it on this evidence. I am claiming
that much of the reason philosophical debates are substantive is because actual philosophers are only rational 2.
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eternalism (1E-5P), and no-futurism (1NF-5NF) are not substantive philosophical theses are
sound.
In fact these arguments are not valid as stated. In order to be made valid they require an
additional premise:
There is no other way to understand presentism/eternalism/no-futurism which is
unambiguous, neither obviously true nor obviously false, and distinctive of what
presentists/eternalists/no-futurists believe.
In the chapters to follow I will consider a number of attempts to show that the debate over
presentism and eternalism is indeed substantive. Each of these proposals is effectively an attempt
to show that this hidden premise is false and hence that our original argument is unsound.
At this point I would like to offer an initial defense of this hidden premise. Any proposal
for understanding presentism (or eternalism) as a substantive thesis must satisfy either one of two
conditions. First, it could consist in a different way of understanding everything exists at the
present time without any additional theses. Second, it could combine the original thesis with some
addition. Neither option looks promising.
The idea that we can understand presentism other than as originally stated, so that it does
not turn out to be ambiguous between a thesis which is not distinctive of presentism and one which
is not philosophically controversial, is problematic. For this other thesis, whatever it is, has to be
sufficiently close to our original formulation in order to be properly considered a statement of
presentism (or eternalism). We might then worry that any alternative thesis, if it is similar enough
to the original to be considered a statement of presentism (or eternalism), will turn out to be
ambiguous in the same or a similar way.

13

Secondly, it will arguably not help us to understand presentism as a substantive thesis by
adding to it some additional clause. Either we are able to understand presentism as a substantive
thesis without this clause, or the additional clause is necessary to understand presentism as a
substantive thesis. If we can understand presentism substantively without the clause, then the
clause is irrelevant for that purpose. If the clause is required to understand presentism as a
substantive thesis, then it is really the additional clause, and not presentism itself, which is
substantive.
That suffices as an initial defense of the hidden premise. Whether that premise is in fact
true is one of the major questions of this dissertation. If it is true, then our original argument for
the conclusion that the debate over presentism and eternalism is not substantive is valid. Since all
the premises at least appear to be true, it is apparently sound.
1.2

Clarifying Remarks
Having rehearsed the main line of argument for the conclusion that presentism and

eternalism are not substantive, opposed metaphysical theses, I want to make some clarifying
remarks on the definition of presentism. This will help to clarify what the debate, if there is a
substantive debate, does and does not concern. First, I comment on the meaning of ‘thing’ and
‘exists’ in the thesis that everything exists at the present time; second, I comment on the meaning
of ‘the present time’.
1.2.1 The Meaning of ‘Thing’ and ‘Exists’
Here I want to comment on the meaning of ‘thing’ and ‘exists’ in the definition of
presentism: everything exists at the present time. It would be better if, instead of ‘thing’, we said
object, state of affairs, or event.
Instead, of ‘exists’ it would be better if we said
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exists, obtains, or occurs.
Thus, a better statement of presentism than the one given at the beginning of this chapter is:
Every object, state of affairs, or event which exists, obtains, or occurs, exists, obtains, or is
occurring at the present time.
Or, equivalently:
Every object that exists, exists at the present time; every state of affairs which obtains,
obtains at the present time; and, every event which occurs, is occurring at the present time.
That is, presentism should be understood as a thesis not just about objects, but also properties,
states of affairs, and events. By a state of affairs, I mean any particular group of objects standing
in some relation to one another and a time or times, together with any properties or relations
exhibited by those objects at all of those times. By an event I mean any particular, non-relational
change10 in an object. Each state of affairs or event is particular as opposed to universal: no state
of affairs or event can obtain or occur more than once.
The reason we want presentism to be a thesis about objects, states of affairs, and events is
that if the thesis that everything exists at the present time is taken to be a thesis specifically about
objects, then certain conceptions of what counts as an object will entail the truth of this thesis in a
different way than the presentist intends.
Suppose that presentism is understood as the thesis that every object exists at the present
time, where this is meant to exclude states of affairs and events. Consider a theory according to
which the only objects are everlasting, indivisible, Democritean atoms, which we can call simples.

10

When Theaetetus grows taller than Socrates he changes non-relationally. When Socrates goes from being taller
to being shorter than Theaetetus, Socrates only changes relationally. The distinction between a relational and a nonrelational change is worked out in Lombard (1978).
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These simples always exist, and no group of simples ever compose another object, no matter how
they might be arranged. If presentism is the view that every object exists at the present time, then
this view entails that presentism is true. For, according to this view, the only objects there ever
were or will be are simples, and all of them exist at the present time.
This conception of an object is admittedly contrary to our everyday use. But a philosopher
might come to accept it. First, this philosopher might, for whatever reason, come to believe that
the universe contains indivisible particles which cannot be further subdivided, and which can be
neither created nor destroyed (with the possible exception of the creation and destruction of the
whole universe, if the universe has a beginning or an end). That is, the universe contains simples.
Second, this philosopher might, for whatever reason,11 come to accept compositional nihilism: no
group of objects ever compose another object. These are both substantive positions a philosopher
could adopt. If he did, then restricting the application of the word ‘object’ to such simples would
make sense. Such a person could then reasonably claim that the thesis that every object which ever
did exist or ever will exist, exists at the present time, is true.
Or suppose a philosopher accepts the existence of such simples but also believes in
composite objects, such that each composite object is identified with the mereological sum of its
parts, where the mereological sum of a group of objects exists regardless of the arrangement of
those objects. On this view, a given composite object exists just in case all its parts do, regardless
of how they are arranged and what relations holds between them. Since the ultimate parts out of

11

Perhaps he is convinced by the arguments given by Unger (1979), Van Inwagen (1990), or Merricks (2001). Van
Inwagen does not quite accept unqualified compositional nihilism, since he claims that organisms exist. For his part,
Merricks thinks persons exist.
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which everything is composed are eternal, every single object exists eternally. Thus, every object
which ever did exist, or ever will exist, exists at the present time.
Consequently, we see that there are theories of objects which entail the truth of the thesis
that every object which ever did or ever will exist, exists at the present time. Yet these theories of
object are both controversial, and presentism qua presentism should not rely on any particular
theory of the nature of objects. On the first theory there are no composite objects, but presentism
qua presentism ought not to involve any outright rejection of the idea that shoes and ships and
sealing wax and cabbages and kings are all things.
On the second theory there are composite objects, but the way composite objects are
understood is inconsistent with our everyday conceptions. On our everyday conception of
composite objects, the arrangement of an object’s parts matter: rearrange the parts in the right way,
and the object will be destroyed. Also, it is part of our ordinary conception of an object that a
composite object can change at least some of its parts. This is not possible if a composite object
just is the sum of its parts. Some philosophers might accept such a view of composite objects.
However, surely presentism qua presentism should not presuppose any particular conception of
the nature of composite objects.
I propose that presentism qua presentism should not depend on any substantive conception
of what counts as an object. In order to ensure this, I will presume throughout the dissertation that
presentism is understood as a thesis about objects, states of affairs, and events without restriction.
For on a theory according to which the only objects are simples, if the arrangements of those
simples changes then there will be multiple, non-simultaneous states of affairs, and hence the
thesis that every state of affairs which ever did or will obtain, obtains at the present time comes
out as obviously false. In this way, we avoid making presentism true for the wrong reason.
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1.2.2 What is it for a Time to be Present?
I have formulated presentism as the view that everything that exists, exists at the present
time. But what is it for a time to be present? Since the beginning of the twentieth century12 there
has been a debate between advocates of the tensed and tenseless theories of time, and the
proponents of those two views give different answers to this question.
According to the tenseless theory of time, the facts about time consist in what states of
affairs obtain and what events are occurring at each moment, such changeless temporal relations
as earlier than, later than, and simultaneous with which hold between states of affairs, events, and
times, and whatever is reducible to these. According to the tensed theory of time, there is a further
fact – namely, the fact that some time is uniquely present – which is not reducible to anything
countenanced on the tenseless theory, and a still further fact – namely, the fact that which time is
present changes. Thus, according to the tensed theory of time, each state of affairs, event, and
moment successively comes to have and then ceases to have the feature being present.
By contrast, according to the tenseless theory of time, there is no metaphysical fact picking
out some time as objectively present. Rather, the purpose of indicating “the present time” in an
utterance is to pick out, depending on context, the moment of time that is simultaneous with, occurs
during, or contains said utterance. If someone speaking in the year 2016 mentions “the present

12

The explicit distinction between the tensed and tenseless theories of time has its origin in McTaggart’s (1908)
argument for the conclusion that time is unreal. Basically, McTaggart argues that time requires objective tense, and
objective tense is contradictory. Advocates of the tensed theory agree that time requires objective tense but deny that
this is genuinely contradictory, and advocates of the tenseless theory deny that time requires objective tense. However,
philosophers before the twentieth century had made claims about time which we would now recognize as expressing
the tensed or the tenseless theory. For instance, in Plato’s Timaeus (37d) we find: “Now the nature of the ideal being
was everlasting, but to bestow this attribute in its fullness upon a creature was impossible. Wherefore he resolved to
have a moving image of eternity, and when he set in order the heaven, he made this image eternal but moving according
to number, while eternity itself rests in unity, and this image we call time” (Plato and Jowett 1961, 1167). This passage
is clearly suggestive of the tensed theory.
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year,” she is indicating the year 2016, and not ascribing to it any special metaphysical feature,
being present. Objectively there is no fact as to which time, what states of affairs, and what events
are present. Rather, there are facts as to which states of affairs and events are simultaneous. Thus,
on the tensed theory of time, for a time to be present is for it to have some objective feature which
uniquely distinguishes it from other times. On the tenseless theory of time, there is no objective
feature which makes a time present, but to assert that something is present is to assert it is
simultaneous with that utterance.
I stated presentism as the view that everything that ever exists, exists at the present time,
rather than as the view that everything is present. The claim that “Everything is present” is
superficially similar to a claim like “Everything is material,” making the word ‘present’ appear to
function as a 1-place predicate. This might be taken to indicate that the word ‘present’ expresses a
property, being present, and thus presuppose the tensed theory of time. However, I would like to
remain neutral as to whether the tensed or tenseless theory of time is correct. Thus, instead of
saying that some object is present, I will say it exists at the present time, and leave the phrase ‘the
present time’ to be understood neutrally between the tensed and tenseless theories. It may turn out
that presentism, if it is a substantive thesis, presupposes either the tensed or tenseless theory of
time. We cannot presuppose this ahead of time, however.
Note that, for the purposes of our discussion, the word ‘present’ will serve to distinguish
things in time, creating a demarcation between those things which exist at the present time and
those things, if there are any, which do not. I stress this point because there are other, nonequivalent uses of ‘present’ in the history of philosophy. The medieval philosopher Boethius
(1957), for instance, claims that God observes everything from a timeless present. That sense of
‘present’ is not relevant here. After all, assuming there were and will be times other than this one,
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then from a timeless perspective there is nothing to uniquely pick out any one time from all the
others, and hence if things at any time exist from this timeless present, things that exist (or did or
will exist) at all times do as well.
1.3

Why Should We Care Whether the Debate is Substantive?
Previously I gave a line of argument for the conclusion that the debate over presentism and

eternalism is not substantive. The stated goal of this dissertation is to discover whether or not there
is a way of making sense of presentism and eternalism as substantive, opposed philosophical
theses, and thus either of vindicating or refuting this line of argument. One might inquire: why
should we care whether presentism and eternalism are substantive, opposed philosophical thesis?
I will give two answers to this question. One of these answers will be from the perspective of
metaphysics, and the metaphysics of time in particular. The other answer will be from the
perspective of metaphilosophy.
Metaphysics is that part of philosophy concerned with what the world is like,
fundamentally. If we want to discover what the world is like, fundamentally, it would be good to
know what our options are. If presentism and eternalism are substantive metaphysical theses, then
they constitute different views as to what sorts of things exist. If they are not substantive, opposed
metaphysical theses, then they do not really constitute different views as to what sorts of things
exist. In the former case, one task of the metaphysician will be to decide between these two views.
In the latter case, since there is nothing to decide, the metaphysician can safely move on to other
topics.
Since the apparent point of disagreement between presentists and eternalists concerns the
existence of things which merely did exist in the past and merely will exist in the future, we may
suspect that if the disagreement is substantive, presentism and eternalism will offer us two
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alternative ways to think about time. If correct, this means the status of the debate is important not
just for metaphysics, but for the metaphysical interpretation of physics, or at least that part of
physics which is concerned with time. Consider, for instance, the fact that pervasive empirical
evidence has led many to accept that at least on the large scale our world is described by the
General Theory of Relativity, but that accepting the General Theory of Relativity seems to require
accepting significant revisions to our ordinary conception of time. In order to understand a
revisionary theory of F, we must begin with a non-revisionary conception of F and arrive at the
revisionary theory through a process of amendments and alterations. After all, from the mere
assertion that x is a theory of F we cannot know if x is a theory of that which we already designate
by ‘F’ or a theory of something else called by the same name, unless the conceptual connection
between the revisionary and non-revisionary theory is laid out. If presentism and eternalism are,
at least initially, conceived within the pre-relativistic framework involved in our ordinary
conceptions of time, and they are substantive opposed theses, then they provide two bases from
which to try to understand relativity.
Whether presentism and eternalism are substantive, opposed philosophical theses is also
worth answering from the perspective of metaphilosophy. Metaphilosophy is that part of
philosophy concerned with philosophy itself. What is philosophy and how does it proceed? While
we are explicitly working to see if and how we can understand presentism and eternalism as
substantive, opposed philosophical theses, lurking in the background is the question of how we
can tell in general whether a thesis or debate is philosophically substantive. If we can establish
with confidence that a given debate is or is not philosophically substantive, we will then be in a
position to ask whether the procedure we used to do so can be generalized and applied to other
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philosophical debates. I will not attempt to do so explicitly in this dissertation, but I thought it
worth making the metaphilosophical relevance of this investigation explicit.
I turn next to outline the plan for the rest of the dissertation.
1.4

A Plan for Examining the Presentism-Eternalism Question
The main question I take up in this dissertation is whether presentism and eternalism are

substantive, opposed philosophical theses. While some philosophers contend that the debate is
substantive, a powerful case has been made that it is not, as we have seen. We could resolve the
puzzle about whether the debate is substantive in either of two ways. First, we could show that
there is a way of understanding presentism and eternalism as substantive, opposed philosophical
theses. This would require showing that our previous arguments for the conclusions that
presentism and eternalism are not substantive philosophical theses are fallacious. Second, we could
show that the debate is not substantive by showing that all formulations of presentism and
eternalism in fact fall to these arguments, or variants thereof.
The way I will approach trying to see if we can understand the debate over presentism and
eternalism as substantive is to consider various proposals for understanding presentism as a
substantive philosophical thesis. Either I will find a way to do this or I will not. If I find a way to
understand presentism as a substantive philosophical thesis, then I should be in a position to
understand eternalism as a substantive philosophical thesis as well, and to show where the
arguments for the conclusions that they are not really substantive philosophical theses go wrong.
Alternatively, it may turn out that each proposal I consider for how to understand
presentism and eternalism substantively fails. Since the number of ways one might try to formulate
presentism as a substantive thesis may be quite large (in principle infinite), we cannot expect to
refute all possible formulations. If, upon considering several proposals I cannot find a way to make
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sense of presentism and eternalism as substantive, opposed theses, I will take that as constituting
powerful inductive evidence that our earlier argument for the conclusion that the debate over
presentism and eternalism is not substantive is deductively valid. From the process of considering
the various proposals which have been offered for making sense of the debate, I will hopefully be
in a position to explain why some philosophers genuinely think the debate is substantive, even
though they are wrong.
It will be instructive to give a simplified example of this strategy at work. Suppose someone
does not think the following question is philosophically substantive:
For any set of objects, is there another object which has those objects as its parts?13
For example, is the Andromeda galaxy an object, and is there an object whose parts are the Eiffel
Tower and my left arm? But we need to get a clearer picture of what we are supposing.
Imagine first that a person who says that whether or not there are such objects is a matter
of convention. We can choose to say such objects exist, and we can choose to say they do not, as
Putnam (2004) thinks. This by itself does not show that the person thinks the question is not
substantive. She might think the question is substantive, while also thinking that there is no single,
objectively correct answer. This will be because she understands why reasonable persons would
be inclined to say there are such objects, and also why reasonable persons would be inclined to
think that there are not. So, let us imagine further that this person does not understand why anyone
would think there could be an objective answer to the question.

13

It may seem that this is trivially satisfied if there is a single object, the cosmos, which has everything else as its
parts. But this is not so. For even if there is such an object, it does not follow that each subset of these parts also
composes an object. For comparison, one may think that all the parts of my body compose by body, but that my left
arm and my do not compose anything.
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Adopting our strategy, we would proceed by trying to explicate the question in a way which
the person does think is substantive. We might, for instance, present various principles of
composition, and discuss possible counter-examples to them. Van Inwagen’s (1990) Material
Beings would be a useful guide here, as would Merrick’s (2001) Objects and Persons, and Unger’s
(1979) article “There are No Ordinary Things.” If we can show that some principles of composition
fail, perhaps we can get our imaginary philosopher to see that there must be objective standards
for which objects compose another object and which do not. Or, alternatively, we might find that
any standard of composition will work as good as any other for capturing the metaphysical facts.
In that case, we may be inclined to agree that the question is not philosophically substantive.
As indicated earlier, ultimately I come down on the side of those who think that presentism
and eternalism are substantive, opposed philosophical theses. As we shall see, however, I think the
attempts to establish this thesis offered in the literature are inadequate. When I examine these other
proposals, I will not presuppose that presentism and eternalism are indeed substantive, opposed
philosophical theses, but evaluate them from the perspective of the skeptic. When I first
encountered these proposals I did so believing that the skeptic was correct. I would like for the
reader to feel the force of the skeptical position just as I did. Ideally, through my discussions of
different proposals for how to understand presentism in the literature I will convince my reader
that the skeptic is correct and the debate is not substantive. Afterwards, when I make my own
proposal for how to understand presentism as a substantive thesis, I will convince even the skeptic
that presentism and eternalism are substantive after all.
1.5

Concluding Remarks and an Outline of the Rest of the Dissertation
In this chapter I have introduced presentism and eternalism, and explained why some

philosophers do not think the debate over presentism and eternalism is substantive. My main task
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in this dissertation is to either show how to understand presentism and eternalism substantively, or
to explain why some philosophers mistakenly think the debate is substantive.
In chapter 2 I will look at several proposals in the literature for how to understand
presentism as a substantive metaphysical thesis. These include the proposals that ‘exits’ in the
definition of presentism should be understood tenselessly, that existence should just be identified
with being present, that presentism should be understood as a thesis about what is real, that
presentism and eternalism should be understood as theses about class membership, and the
proposal that presentists are serious tensers. I will argue that all of these proposals fail to help us
understand presentism as a substantive metaphysical thesis.
In chapter 3, I will develop an argument for the conclusion that the debate over presentism
and eternalism must be substantive that is based on the fact that in the literature it is claimed that
presentists and eternalists disagree as to what kind of formal language is best used to describe
reality. I consider three formal languages, one which quantifies over objects existing at all times,
with a distinct domain of quantification for each time, one language with a single domain of
quantification for things at all times, and one language which quantifies over objects just as the
present time, using tense operators to express facts about what was and what will be the case. It
you adopt either of the first two languages, you seem to take on existential commitment just to
things existing at the present time. If you adopt the third formal language, you seem to take on
existential commitment to things existing at all times. I argue that the skeptic will respond that this
disagreement in ontological commitment is merely apparent, and hence that something further
must be done to establish that the debate is substantive.
In chapter 4, I consider whether we can make sense of the debate over presentism and
eternalism by comparing it to the debate over modal actualism and modal possibilism. I argue that
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the supposed analogy between these debates falls apart on inspection. There may be important
similiarties between these views, but if we do not already understand presentism and eternalism as
substantive theses, looking to actualism and possibilism will not help us.
In chapter 5, I consider whether the thesis that everything exists at the present time entails
serious presentism, the view that only things existing at the present time can exemplify properties
or stand in relations. If it does, this would show that the thesis that everything exists at the present
time must be substantive after all. I consider various arguments for the conclusion that presentism
entails serious presentism, and I argue that they are not convincing. I briefly consider and reject
trying to understand presentism as the thesis that everything that ever did or will exist, exists at the
present time, but some statement apparently about the past and future are still true. I reject this
proposal as being without support in the literature.
In chapter 6, I develop a distinction between two ways of asserting that something is the
case with respect to a time, which I call the distinction between what is the case as of a time and
what is the case at a time. I sketch the semantics of a temporal logic incorporating this distinction,
and use it to give formulations of presentism and eternalism (and no-futurism) which I take to be
substantive.
In chapter 7, I develop a pair of theses about the nature of space which I claim are analogous
to presentism and eternalism, as I think those views should be understood. Using this analogy I
argue for the conclusion that presentism and eternalism, so understood, are indeed substantive,
philosophical theses. Using the distinction between what is the case as of a time and at a time,
developed in chapter 6, I rebut the argument for the conclusion that presentism and eternalism are
not substantive, opposed philosophical theses given and defended in chapter 1.
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CHAPTER 2. SOME ATTEMPTS TO SHOW THAT PRESENTISM IS A
SUBSTANTIVE METAPHYSICAL THESIS
In chapter 1, I argued for the conclusions that presentism and eternalism are not substantive
theses, and that the debate over presentism and eternalism is not substantive. I take these arguments
to constitute a powerful initial case in favor of the skeptic. Philosophers who think the debate is
substantive are in principle obliged to respond. In this chapter and several to follow, I will consider
various ways in which someone might try to do this.
In this chapter, I am going to consider five different strategies for understanding presentism
as a substantive philosophical thesis. The first is to let ‘exists’ as it appears in the definition of
presentism be understood tenselessly. The second is Tallant’s (2014) proposal that existence is the
same as being present. The third is to formulate presentism in terms of what is real. The fourth is
to formulate presentism and eternalism as theses about class membership. The fifth is
Zimmerman’s (1998) proposal that presentists are “serious tensers”. I will argue that each of these
proposals is inadequate.
2.1

Formulating Presentism with ‘Exists’ Tenseless
An English sentence containing the word ‘are’, ‘is’, or ‘exists’ unmodified by a tensed

auxiliary verb like ‘did’ or ‘will’, is typically understood to be present-tensed and hence to indicate
what exists or is the case now. Thus, a person who says “There are over seven billion people on
the earth” would typically be understood as saying that there are over seven billion people on the
earth now.14 Consequently, if we are following the standard grammatical conventions of English,
the statement,

14

Such observations inspired A.N. Prior (1957) to advocate what he called the redundancy theory of the present,
according to which any statement “P” is equivalent to “It is now the case that P.” Later, Prior (1968) realized that
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Everything exists at the present time,
would be interpreted so that ‘exists’ is present-tensed, and hence as the trivial assertion that
Everything that now exists, exists at the present time.
Thus, presentism would be something of a grammatical truth of ordinary English.
Recognizing this, Bourne (2006) claims that the word ‘exists’ in the definition of
presentism must be understood tenselessly, writing:
The existential quantifier should be read tenselessly and need not be read any other way. It
should be read tenselessly in order for presentists to be saying something non-trivial: if
‘exists’ means ‘presently exists’, then to say that only those objects which exist are those
that presently exist is to spout an uninteresting truism. A tenseless reading is the only way
of giving us common ground between the two sides of the debate. (Bourne, A Future for
Presentism 2006, 10)
The idea here seems to be something like this. In chapter 1, I gave an argument for the conclusion
that presentism is not a substantive metaphysical thesis. According to premise 1P of that argument,
presentism must either mean “Everything that exists now, exists at the present time” or
“Everything that ever did or will exist, exists at the present time.” But this presupposes that ‘exists’
in the definition of presentism is tensed. Perhaps we can find an alternative way of understanding
presentism by understanding ‘exists’ tenselessly. Moreover, one might think that if the extension
of ‘exists’ is not restricted to present things as a matter of grammar, as it is if ‘exists’ is in the
present-tense, then presentism cannot be a trivial thesis, but will be true or false depending on the

‘now’ cannot be eliminated from statements in which it appears within the scope of other tense-indicators without
loss of meaning. However, Prior insists that such statements can be rephrased so as not to include ‘now’. I discuss
this further in a later footnote.
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metaphysical facts. 15 Of course, to assess this proposal we will have to see what it mean to
understand ‘exists’ tenselessly. Let us consider some possibilities.
English is a tensed language. This means that, at least typically, if not always,16 the form
of the verb in an English sentence expresses temporal information: compare the form of the verb
in a present-tensed sentence like “John walks” or “Dogs exist,” to that in a past-tensed sentence
like “John walked” or “Dinosaurs existed,” and finally to that in a future-tensed sentence like “John
will walk,” or “Martian outposts will exist.” As a consequence, the meaning expressed by a
particular tokening of a tensed sentence depends both upon the content of the sentence, especially
its grammatical form, and the time of the tokening. This is why the weatherperson’s
pronouncement of “It will snow tonight and all day tomorrow” will be more exciting to a schoolaged child on Sunday night than Friday night.
This suggests that a tenseless verb is one in which the grammatical form of the verb does
not contribute temporal information to sentences containing it. So, if the verb in “Paul the pot is
blue” is tenseless, then the speaker intends either to express that Paul is blue at all times, or that at
some time or other Paul is blue. Thus, if ‘is’ is tenseless, then “Paul the pot is blue” tells us nothing
about when Paul is blue. This information would need to be contributed through content, as in
“Paul the pot is blue in February of 2017.”

15

The proposal that ‘exists’ in the definition of presentism is to be understood tenselessly is also criticized by
Lombard (2010) and Meyer (2013) . Their criticisms are similar to mine.
16
Whether English contains tenseless locutions is a subject of debate among philosophers. Smart (2008) cites “two
plus two equals four” as a quintessential example of a tenseless locution in English. However, Chisholm and
Zimmerman (1997) argue that there is no strong reason against interpreting this statement as present-tensed. We
might even have occasion to use the past-tensed form of this statement: “Suppose that Hegel made egregious
mathematical errors, and that a latter-day Hegelian were trying to excuse him by pointing out that he was educated
in the 18th century. It would be natural enough to reply: “Well, two and two made four then, just as they do now!”
(Chisholm and Zimmerman 1997, 263).
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If a tenseless reading of a verb is to be understood as in the previous paragraph, so that it
expresses either that something is the case at some time or other, or that something is the case at
all times,17 then tenseless statements must contain implicit or explicit quantification over times.
Taking the verb ‘is blue’ to be tenseless, the statement “Paul the pot is blue” could be used to
express either that Paul is blue at some time or other, or that Paul is blue at all times.
In the first case we have:
∃t(at t (Paul the pot is blue)). 18
Here, ‘∃t’ is a quantifier ranging over times, which we can call a temporal quantifier. ‘Paul is blue’
predicates blueness of Paul, and ‘at t’ is an operator assigning Paul’s being blue to the time bound
by the previous temporal quantifier, t. Hence, this says that there is some time t, such Paul is blue
then.
In the second case, in which “Paul the pot is blue” is used to express that Paul is blue at all
times, we have:
∀t (at t (Paul the pot is blue)).

17

Perhaps an exception would be tenseless statements about what is the case outside of time, like “All forms
participate in the form of the Good.” Since we are not considering such statements I will put this aside.
18
I write “At t (Paul the pot is Blue)” rather than “Paul the pot is blue at t” because the latter may be misread as
“Paul is blue-at-t,” where ‘blue-at-t’ expresses a relational property, being blue relative to t. I rather want to say that
t is the time during which Paul exhibits the non-relational property being blue. In other words, ‘at t’ modifies not the
property but the instantiation of the property (Johnston 1987). It is sometimes thought that presentism and
eternalism have implications for the problem of temporary intrinsics (that is, the problem of how things can change
with respect to their intrinsic or non-relational properties). For instance, Merricks (1995) argues that eternalism
entails perdurantism (the view that physical objects have temporal parts like they have spatial parts) and presentism
entails endurantism (the views that physical objects do not have temporal parts, but each physical object wholly
exists at each moment it exists). Lombard (1999) argues that presentism is consistent with the existence of perduring
entities. Craig (1998) and Fiocco (2010) claim that the problem of temporary intrinsics does not even arise for
presentism, Francesscotti (2008) that the problem does arise, and Lombard (2006) that the problem of temporary
intrinsics is itself based on a fallacy. Endurantism, perdurantism, and the problem of temporary intrinsics are much
discussed topics in the philosophy of time which I cannot hope to do justice to here. Moreover, it would be hasty to
make any claims about the relation of presentism and eternalism to these views without first having found a
substantive construal of presentism and eternalism, if there is such.
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Here ‘at t’ functions as an operator assigning being blue to Paul the pot at all times. Thus, for any
time t, at t, Paul the pot is blue.
Let us consider tenseless assertions involving existence, like “Dinosaurs exist” and “Paul
exists and is blue.” Both of these could be used to express either of two claims. “Dinosaurs exist,”
could be used to assert either that dinosaurs exist at some time, or that dinosaurs exist at all times.
“Paul exits and is blue,” could be used to assert either that Paul exists and is blue at some time, or
that Paul exists and is blue at all times.
The statements “Dinosaurs exist at some time” and “Paul exists and is blue at some time”
can each be represented in either of two ways, depending on the scope of the existential
quantifier.19 One way we can represent “Dinosaurs exist at some time” is as follows:
∃t (at t (∃x(x is a dinosaur))).
That is, there is some time t, such that at t there exists some dinosaur. Here, ‘at t’ is an operator
assigning
∃x(x is a dinosaur)
to the time bound by the previous temporal quantifier, ‘∃t’.
The statement “Paul exists and is blue at some time” could similarly be represented as
∃t (at t (∃x(x=Paul & x is blue))).

19

Eric Hiddleston advised investigating this scope distinction. While I had been aware of it, it did not appear explicitly
in early drafts of the dissertation.
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That is, there is some time t, such that at t there is something, Paul, which is blue. On this approach,
since the existential quantifier is within the scope of ‘at t’, the quantifier ranges just over those
things which exist at time t.20
The second way to represent “Dinosaurs exist at some time” is like this:
∃x(x is a dinosaur & ∃t(at t (x exists))).
That is, there is something, a dinosaur, and there is a time t such that at t, it exists. Here, the
operator ‘at’ assigns
x exists
to the time bound by the previous temporal quantifier.
“Paul exists and is blue at some time” could be represented similarly like so:
∃x(x=Paul & ∃t( at t(x exists & x is blue))).
That is, there is something, Paul, and there is a time t such that at t, Paul exists and is blue. On
this approach, the existential quantifier ranges over things independently of the time at which they
exist.
Next, consider “Dinosaurs exist at all times” and “Paul exists and is blue at all times.”
Giving the existential quantifier small scope, “Dinosaurs exist at all times” would be represented
with
∀t (at t (∃x(x is a dinosaur))).
That is, for any time t, at t, there exists some dinosaur. “Paul exists and is blue at all times” can
similarly be represented, giving the existential quantifier small scope, as

20

What about things that exist outside of time, if any? Should we have a special timeless quantifier, especially for
them? If not, we could let each temporal quantifier range over both objects which exist at that time and outside of
time. I do not think it makes a difference which option we pick, so long as we are consistent.
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∀t(at t(∃x(x=Paul & x is blue))).
That is, for any time t, at t there is something, Paul, and it is blue.
Can we represent these statements while giving the existential quantifier large scope? We
can with “Paul exists and is blue at all times,” like so:
∃x(x=Paul & ∀t(at t(x exists & x is blue))).
That is, there is something, Paul, and for all times, it exists and is blue. We cannot, however,
represent "Dinosaurs exist at all times” while giving the existential quantifier large scope without
changing the meaning of the sentence. For consider the result when we try:
∃x(x is a dinosaur & ∀t(at t(x exists))).
That is, there is some dinosaur, and for any time t, it exists at t. This says that some particular
dinosaur exists at all times. We might be tempted to replace the existential quantifier with a
universal quantifier, giving us a statement about all dinosaurs as opposed to a statement about
some particular dinosaur. This will not work either, however, for the result is:
∀x(x is a dinosaur & ∀t(at t (x exists))).
That is, every dinosaur is such that for any time t, it exists at t. That is, every dinosaur exists at all
times.
What happens when we formulate the definition of presentism so that ‘exists’ is understood
tenselessly, on this construal? If ‘exists’ in the definition of presentism is tenseless, then if we stick
to the analysis just proposed, ‘exists’ either ranges over things which exist at some time or other,
or ‘exists’ ranges over things no matter what time they exist. Suppose that the range of the temporal
quantifier is all times. In that case, presentism could be represented in either of two ways. First,
giving the universal quantifier small scope, it can be represented like so:
∀t (at t (∀x ∃t`(t` is the present time & at t` (∃y(y=x))))).
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That is, for any time t, for everything that exists at t, that thing also exists at the present time.
Second, giving the universal quantifier large scope, it can be represented like so:
∀x ∀t((at t (x exists))

∃t`(t` is the present time & at t` (∃y(y=x)))).

That is, for anything, for any time t, if x exists at t then there is a time t` such that t` is the present
time and x is identical to something existing at t`. On both formulations, this is just a tenseless
statement of the obvious falsehood that everything that ever exists, exists at the present time.
Wuthrich (2012) objects to this way of rejecting tenseless formulations of presentism,
arguing that to infer from the claim that everything exists at the present time, where ‘exists’ is
tenseless, to the claim that everything that ever exists, exists at the present time presumes that the
tenseless ‘exists’ entails the existence of things that exist at times other than the present time,
which is precisely what the presentist denies. But how else should the tenseless ‘exists’ be
understood?
On the only other way of understanding a tenseless usage of ‘exists’ that we have yet
identified, to say that something exists tenselessly is to assert that it exists at some time or other.
Suppose the range of the temporal quantifier is some time. In that case, presentism could be
represented in either of two ways. First, giving the universal quantifier small scope, it can be
represented like so:
∃t (at t (∀x (∃t`(t` is the present time & at t` (∃y(x=y))))).
That is, there is some time t, such that everything that exists at t, exists at the present time. Second,
giving the universal quantifier large scope, it can be represented as follows:
∀x ∃t((at t (x exists))

∃t`(t` is the present time & at t`(∃y(y=x)))).

That is, for everything, there is a time t such that if something exists at t, then there is a time t`
such that t` is the present time and it is identical to something which exists at t`. On either reading,
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in other words, whatever exists at a certain time exists at the present time. There is indeed a time t
such that everything that exists at t, exists at the present time; specifically, the present time itself.
This is just a tenseless statement of the triviality that everything that exists now, exists at the present
time.
By insisting that ‘exists’ as it appears in the definition of presentism is tenseless, we
managed to escape the objection that presentism is ambiguous as to tense. We have not yet,
however, managed to escape the objection that it is either trivially true or obviously false. Indeed,
this objection simply reappears in another form. On a straightforward analysis of what it is for a
verb to be tenseless, if presentism is understood so that the word ‘exists’ in the definition is
understood tenselessly, presentism is either the trivial truth that everything which exists at the
present time exists at the present time, or the obvious falsehood that everything which exists at any
time exists at the present time.
How else might we understand the claim that ‘exists’ in the definition of presentism is
tenseless? Szabo (2006) claims that presentism should be understood as the thesis that “Everything
is present” (Szabo 2006, 400), where ‘is’ means the same as ‘is’ except that the tense is uninterpreted. It would seem, however, that if the tense is un-interpreted then the whole sentence
would lack determinant meaning. 21 Unfortunately, Szabo does not elaborate on how we are
supposed to understand this proposal.
Hestevold and Carter define presentism as the view that “Necessarily, if X existsS, then X
presently exists” (Hestevold and Carter 2002, 499) (S. H. Hestevold 2008), where “existsS”
abbreviates “exists simpliciter,” which is defined as follows:

21

This point is due to Lawrence Lombard.
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X exists simpliciter, if and only if, x is among the things that the universe includes – if and
only if X is real. That X exists simpliciter does not alone imply that X did exist, that X
presently exists, nor that X will exist. (Hestevold and Carter 2002, 499)
Putting aside the word ‘real’, which I will comment on later, this is similar to the proposal offered
by Torrengo (2012).
Torrengo writes:
Tenseless notions come in two varieties: those that contain an explicit temporal reference
to a time…, and those that do not contain any reference to a time at all, which I call simple
notions. The notion of simple existence is tenseless in this second sense. (Torrengo 2012,
127)
According to Torrengo, the presentist and eternalist disagree as to what exists simply:
This is the proposal. Although the notion of simple existence does not contain any temporal
reference, it is conceptually possible that what exists simpliciter varies over time, namely
that a claim containing an attribution of simple existence be a tensed claim. If we
understand such a use of “existence,” it becomes clear where the disagreement between the
two parties lies. Presentists think that what exists simpliciter changes over time (because
for them, only what is present exists simpliciter), whereas eternalists think that it does not
(because for them, all past and future entities exist simpliciter as well). (Torrengo 2012,
127)
Does this help us? I do not think so.
It is not clear to me that Torrengo’s simple existence is a coherent notion. It is supposed to
be conceivable that what exists simpliciter varies over time. I do not know how to express the fact
that what exists varies over time unless I can specify when things exist. The notion of simple
existence, however, is supposed to be free from any temporal reference. Let us nonetheless
consider this kind of proposal further.
In both of the following statements:
∃t (at t (∃x(x is a dinosaur)))
and
∃x ∃t (at t (x exists)),
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the quantifier ‘∃x’ considered by itself does not imply that some dinosaur did exist, presently
exists, or will exist. In sort, the quantifier lacks temporal reference. Temporal information is
contributed by the temporal quantifier ‘∃t’ and the operator ‘at t’. It would thus seem that our
previous treatment of the tenseless ‘exists’ in fact meets the requirements of existence simpliciter.
Perhaps not only ‘exists’ but the whole sentence is supposed to lack reference to time, so
that presentism is the thesis that
Everything that exists without respect to when it exists, exists at the present time.
I do not know how to understand this thesis unless it is used to express the same thesis as expressed
by
Everything that ever did exist or ever will exist, exists at the present time.
which is obviously false.22
Presumably, the idea is that there is a sense of ‘exists’ that is temporally neutral: it does
not necessarily apply to everything which ever did or will exist, but it does not, as a matter of
meaning, apply only to what exists at some particular time. Unfortunately, this just brings us back
to my original objection to the notion of simple existence. We are presuming that the presentist
does not think that everything which ever did exist or ever will exist, exists at the present time.
Hence, the presentist thinks there used to exist things which do not exist now. The presentist
therefore needs to be able to distinguish between what exists, what did exist, and what will exist.
If the sense of ‘exists’ used in the definition of presentism really has no implications at all for when
things exist, it will be impossible to express this distinction.

22

Lombard (2010) points out further that if this is taken to be the case about all times, as presumably it should,
presentism so defined implies that the very same things exist at all times.
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An alternative way of understanding a tenseless sense of ‘exists’ could be that it indicates
what exists from a timeless perspective. As I pointed out in the first chapter, however, from a
timeless perspective either no temporal things exist, or things existing at all times exist. No
particular time can have a privileged position from outside of time. Consequently, the only facts
about a given time t which hold outside of time, if any, are those facts which hold about t at any
time. But any time whatsoever is present when it is present, and there is no single time which is
present at every time. Hence, from a timeless perspective, being present does not uniquely pick
out any time at all. If the tenseless ‘exists’ means ‘exists from a timeless perspective’, then what
exists tenselessly is everything that ever exists. This would make eternalism seem obviously true.
Using the results of this section we could recast premise 1P from the argument for the
conclusion that presentism is not a substantive metaphysical thesis as follows:
1P*

Presentism, the thesis that everything exists at the present time, is ambiguous. It
could mean either of the following two tensed statements:
(i) Everything that exists now exists at the present time.
(ii) Everything that ever did, does, or will exist, exists at the present time.
Or, it could mean any of the following tenseless statements:
(iii) Everything that exists at some time or other exists at the present time.
(iv) Everything that exists at any time exists at the present time.
(v) Everything that exists, where ‘exists’ is temporally neutral, exists at the present
time.
(vi) Everything that exists from a timeless perspective exists at the present time.

The skeptic will claim that each of these either makes presentism into a trivial truth ((i), (iii)), an
obvious falsehood ((ii), (iv), (vi)), or is too unclear to be helpful ((v)).
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There may be some other way of understanding a tenseless usage of ‘exists’, perhaps one
which lets us understand presentism as a substantive thesis. Unfortunately, those philosophers who
make this proposal do very little to explain how we are supposed to understand this tenseless usage
of ‘exists’, and how it helps us make sense of presentism as a substantive thesis. An initially
compelling argument has been given for the conclusion that presentism is not a substantive thesis.
An adequate response requires more detail than simply asserting that ‘exists’ is to be understood
in a special way.
2.2

Identifying Existing with Being Present
Impressed by arguments for the conclusion that presentism is not a substantive thesis,

Tallant (2014) takes up the challenge of how to formulate the view. In order to escape the skeptical
line of argument, Tallant proposes what he calls ‘Existence presentism,’ or EP,
EP: Presence is existence (Tallant 2014, 494),23
where ‘Presence’ is the name for the property of being present. Tallant says EP is tensed but not
trivial:
EP expresses a tensed sentence. To bring this out, we might say ‘Presence is now the very
same thing as existence’. That this sentence is explicitly present-tensed brings out the fact
that we may define EP using tensed sentences. But, notice, this is not trivial. ‘Presence is
existence’ is an identity claim. And it is not an identity claim with which the eternalist can
agree. Consider, by way of example, the Battle of Hastings. If presence is existence then
by simply existing the Battle of Hastings is present. The Battle of Hastings is not present
and so eternalists cannot endorse EP. (Tallant 2014, 494)
Later on Tallant says that if we are reluctant to treat existence as a property, existence presentism
could alternatively be formulated as the view that existence and presentness are identical

23

Prior (1972) similarly says that for an event to occur is just for the event to be present, but it is unclear if Prior is
claiming that occurrence/existence is the same thing as being present, or just that they have the same extension.
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ontological categories. I will focus on the first formulation of existence presentism in my
discussion, but what I say could be applied to the category interpretation just as well.
What should we say about Tallant’s proposal? One issue is that it entails that nothing can
exist outside of time. Tallant’s response is to simply deny that it makes sense to say that something
exists outside of time:
Suppose we say, then, that ‘abstract objects existn outside time’. Of course, to existn is to
exist now and to ‘exist outside time’ is not to exist now. This statement simply makes no
sense. (Tallant 2014, 499)
Tallant just begs the question here: of course we cannot coherently say there are timeless things
using ‘existsn’, which by definition can apply only to present (and hence timely) things. But we
should want to know whether existence is just what is denoted by ‘existsn’.
Lombard (2010) argues that in worlds in which there are times, everything exists in time:
If the sentence ‘the number seven exists but does not exist now’ expresses a proposition at
all, then it expresses a proposition that we know a priori to be false. The proposition, if
any, that it expresses is not a contradiction, for there are, I suppose, possible worlds in
which there are no times. But in any possible world in which it does express a proposition,
the word ‘now’ would have to have a referent; and in any such world the proposition
expressed would be false. (Lombard 2010, 59)
If this is right, it may seem to mean that it is not a problem for Tallant’s proposal that it implies
that nothing exists outside of time. However, Lombard only claims that if time exists everything
exists in time. Tallant’s proposal has the stronger consequence that everything necessarily exists
in time. In other words, a timeless world is impossible. In any case, is Lombard right?
I do not find Lombard’s argument convincing. The statement
The number seven exists outside of time but does not exist now
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is not contradictory, as Lombard concedes. Why should the assumption that ‘now’ has a referent
make it false? Indeed, on each occasion of use ‘now’ does have a referent. Consider an occasion
in which the referent is a time t. Is the statement,
The number seven exists outside of time but does not exist at t,
false? I do not know why we should think so, unless we assume that the statement,
The number seven does not exist at t,
entails that a token of the statement,
The number seven does not exist
uttered at t is true.
There is a fallacious reason one might think that such an entailment does hold. For suppose
we agree that the number seven does not exist at t, that is
∃t at t (~∃x(x=7)).
It may seem that, if a statement of the form
∃t at t(P)
is true, then a token of
P
uttered at time t is true. If this is generally correct, then if now is the time t, we can infer
~∃x(x=7)
from the assertion that the number seven does not exist at t.
The required principle is clearly false, however, for things which exist outside of time.
Likewise, if anything exists outside of time, then to say “x exists” at a given time t does not
automatically entail that x exists at t. In any case, my primary objection to Tallant’s proposal is
not based on the fact that existence presentism entails that nothing exists outside of time.
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While it is a substantive consequence of presentism, on Tallant’s proposal, that it implies
that, necessarily, nothing exists outside of time, this does not constitute a straightforward defeater
for the view. For even if it is conceivable that something exists outside of time, it is not so
obviously correct that something exists outside of time that a metaphysical thesis which denies
this can for that reason by rejected. The bigger problem with Tallant’s proposal is that on
inspection, except for the additional thesis that necessarily nothing exists outside of time, existence
presentism does not really escape the argument for the conclusion that presentism is not a
substantive thesis.
Tallant’s response to the skeptical challenge from chapter 1 is that the statement
Presence is now the very same thing as existence
is not ambiguous as to tense, yet philosophically controversial. According to eternalism, the Battle
of Hastings exists (or better, occurs), but it is not present now. Thus, the eternalist must reject the
central thesis of existence presentism.
I think Tallant’s existence presentism appears to escape the dilemma only thanks to a
misleading formulation. I do not understand the claim that
Presence is existence
unless what this means is that
To be present24 is to exist.
This is multiply ambiguous.
First, it is ambiguous as to whether ‘to be present’ is to be understood as either

24

I note that the locution ‘to be present’ in English has two readings. On one reading, it means “to be or take place
at the present time.” On the other reading, it means “to be here,” or “to be in attendance.” Here the first reading is
intended. My thanks to Ljiljana Progovac for reminding me of this dual meaning.
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To be present now
or
To be present, to have been present, or to be going to be present.25
Second, it is ambiguous as to whether ‘to exist’ is to be understood as either
To exist now
or
To have existed, to exist now, or to be going to exist.26
This yields a total of four readings, two of which are trivially true and two of which are obviously
false.
The trivially true readings are:
To be present now is to exist now
and
To be present, to have been present, or to be going to be present is to have existed, to exist
now, or to be going to exist.
The obviously false readings are:
To be present now is to have existed, to exist now, or to be going to exist.,
and
To be present, to have been present, or to be going to be present is to exist now.
None of these readings makes existence presentism into a substantive metaphysical thesis. Tallant
has seemed to avoid the problem by nominalizing ‘to be present’ and ‘to exist’. The tense of ‘is’
in the definition of existence presentism is not relevant to the problem.

25
26

Or, to be present now, to have been present, and to be going to be present. I put this reading aside.
A third reading is that it means to have existed, to exist now, and to be going to exist. I put this reading aside.
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Surely the existence presentist thinks the Battle of Hastings did exist. Thus, the existence
presentist must not only think that presence is existence, but that
Prior presence is prior existence.
Surely the eternalist does not think the Battle of Hastings exists now, but rather in the past, and
that when the Battle of Hastings existed, it was present. Thus, it is not clear that there really is a
substantive disagreement between the eternalist and the existence presentist, other than the latter’s
insistence that nothing exists outside of time.
2.3

Formulating Presentism using ‘Real’
We noted above that Hestevold and Carter (2002) attempt to formulate presentism in terms

of what ‘exists simpliciter’, which they define using the word ‘real’. Substituting ‘real’ for ‘exists
simpliciter’ they formulate presentism as the view that
Necessarily, if X is real, then S presently exists.
Hestevold and Carter do not say much to explain why they use the word ‘real’ in their formulations
of presentism. Nor are they explicit regarding whether or not this terminological choice is meant
to have any significance at all.27 It will nonetheless be worthwhile to briefly consider whether
progress can be made understanding presentism as a substantive thesis if it is stated in terms of
what is real.
Zimmerman (1998) also formulates presentism using the word ‘real’, writing:
[T]here is only one largest class of real things, and this class contains nothing that lies
wholly in the past or future (Zimmerman 1998, 210).

27

Zimmerman (1998) offers some commentary on his formulation of presentism, which I take up in section 2.5.
However, he does not elaborate on the use of the word ‘real’.
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We should note that Zimmerman formulates his proposal in terms of class membership, whereas
Hestevold and Carter do not. I will take up the proposal that presentism be understood as a thesis
about class membership in the next section. Here I focus on trying to understand presentism as a
thesis about what is real.
Let presentism be the thesis that
Everything that is real exists at the present time.
The skeptic might argue that this is ambiguous. It could mean that
Everything that is now real exists at the present time,
or that
Everything that ever is, was, or will be real exists at the present time.
I presume here that presentists think Plato and dinosaurs were real, and hence reject the latter
statement. Does the former statement help us understand presentism as a substantive thesis?
Looking at this statement, my initial reaction is to count it as trivial. I suppose, however, that an
eternalist might claim that things which do not exist at the present time are nonetheless real at the
present time, and the presentist could deny this.
Does this help us understand presentism and eternalism as substantive, opposed theses? To
answer this question, we must consider what it means to say that something is real.
The word ‘real’ has, I think, different senses. What we might call the adjectival or kindindicating sense of ‘real’ appears in a statement like “That is/is not a real plant.” Although the
word ‘real’ function as an adjective in this statement, it does not modify the noun as would a typical
adjective. In “That is an aquatic plant” and “That is a yellow plant,” the adjectives ‘aquatic’ and
‘yellow’, respectively, indicate the kind of plant it is. If I assert that something is not an aquatic
plant, I may be asserting either that it is not a plant, or that it is a plant but it is not aquatic. On the
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other hand, if I assert that something is not a real plant, I mean that it is not a plant at all. It is not
as if there are two classes of plants, those that are real and those that are not, like the classification
of plants into those that grow on land and those that grow in water. Thus, to say that something is
not a real plant is just to say it is not a plant at all, though perhaps it may appear somewhat like a
plant: it is a floral facsimile. Likewise, to say something is a real plant is to say it is a plant. It is
not to say that it is a particular kind of plant, the real kind.
A second sense of ‘real’ can be found in statements like “Barack Obama is real” and
“Horses are real,” on the one hand, and “Bilbo Baggins is not real” and “Unicorns are not real,”
on the other. If I say “Unicorns are not real,” I do not intend to express that unicorns are such that
they lack the property of being real, as I would intend to express that cats lack the property being
reptiles with the statement “Cats are not reptiles.”
If “Unicorns are not real” had a meaning analogous to “Cats are not reptiles,” it would have
the logical form “For everything, if that thing is a unicorn then it is not real,” that is:
∀x(x is a unicorn

~ x is real).

This statement would hence be true because nothing satisfies the antecedent. But then,
∀x(x is a unicorn

x is real),

that is, “Unicorns are real,” would be true for the same reason. But obviously this latter statement
is false. The statement “Unicorns are not real” really means “There are no unicorns” (for the
moment I set aside the question of what the tense of ‘are’ is). That is
~∃x(x is a unicorn).
This might be called the existential use of ‘real’.
Is there any way of determining, in any arbitrary case, whether a given use of ‘real’ is
adjectival or existential? It is not immediately clear what criteria we might use. As examples of
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the adjectival use we have both “Sam is not a real plant” and “Sam is not real,” and as examples
of the existential use we have both “Sherlock Holmes is not a real person” and “Sherlock Homes
is not real.” The two sets of examples are, at least on the surface, parallel.
On reflection, it seems that the best way to tell in a given case whether ‘real’ is being used
adjectivally or existentially, is to determine whether the clause containing ‘real’ is intended to be
a referring expression, by which I mean an expression which introduces some external object.
Examples of referring expressions include statements containing proper names, used not as short
for descriptions, but to introduce their bearers, such as “Obama is our most recent competent
President,” and statements containing demonstratives, like “That painting is exquisite.” A
statement is not a referring expression if, for instance, its grammatical subject is a description such
that the statement will be meaningful even if nothing satisfies it.
If a clause containing ‘real’ is intended as a referring expression, then ‘real’ is likely to be
adjectival. For if a phrase is used as a referring expression, the existence of an indicated object is
presupposed. Thus, to indicate that said object exists would be redundant, and to deny this would
be incoherent. Hence, “Sam is not real,” where ‘Sam’ is the name of a certain plant, would be
adjectival, and short for “Sam is not a real plant.”
If a clause containing ‘real’ is not a referring expression, on the other hand, then ‘real’ is
likely to be existential. If someone says “Barack Obama is real,” and intends ‘real’ to be used in
the existential sense, it is reasonable to suppose that she is making this assertion in a context where
the existence of the 44th President of the United States is in question. In such a context, ‘Barack
Obama’ cannot function primarily to introduce that person, but must instead to stand for a
description which is meant to apply to such a person if he exists.
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Consider the proposal that presentism be understood as the thesis that, with the exception
of things existing outside of time, if any:
Everything that is real exists at the present time.
Either ‘real’ here is being used in the existential sense or the adjectival or kind-indicating sense. If
‘real’ is being used in the existential sense, this amounts to the thesis
Everything that exists satisfies the description x exists at the present time.
This does nothing to improve on our original formulation of presentism.
If ‘real’ is being used in the adjectival or kind-indicating sense, this amounts to the thesis
that
Out of everything that exists (or did exit or will exist?), only things which exist at the
present time are members of a certain category of things.
I am not sure what category of things which might be. The category of existing things immediately
suggests itself, but that takes us back to the existential use of ‘real’, which, as we already saw, does
not help us understand presentism as a substantive thesis.
Someone might insist that, though Aristotle clearly does not exist now, perhaps it is
debatable whether he is real now. Lombard (2010), claims everything that ever did, does, or will
exist is equally real, writing:
Clinton and Aristotle are, in some sense equally real. It is not as if Aristotle, having lived
and died many centuries ago now has some sort of shadowy existence, one that is less
substantial than the existence that Clinton now has… There aren’t two, or three, kinds of
existence for contingent things—past existence, present existence, and, perhaps, future
existence—which are such that objects that possess one of them, present existence, are
“more real” than objects that possess the others”. (Lombard 2010, 54)
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The idea seems to be that if Aristotle and Clinton are not equally real, the one must be less real
than the other. Plato famously claims that physical things are less real than Forms,28 but Lombard
and I both agree that the idea that reality comes in degrees makes no sense.
The idea that things which merely did or merely will exist are as equally real as things
which exist at the present time warrants further discussion. We can consistently deny that Aristotle
is as real as Clinton without implying that reality comes in degrees. We need only assert that (now)
Aristotle is not real at all. This may strike someone as wrong, but why?
Perhaps what is going on here is this. We want to draw a distinction between what exists
now and what does not. We also want to draw a distinction between what is fictional and what is
not.29 The word ‘real’ can play a role in both distinctions. Consider the question: “Is Aristotle
Real?” Suppose we answer affirmatively. This could be taken as meaning that Aristotle exists.
Since ‘exists’ in English is typically present-tensed this could be taken to mean that Aristotle exists
now, which is false. Suppose instead that we answer negatively. This could be taken as meaning
Aristotle is a work of fiction, perhaps dreamed up by some long-forgotten student in Plato’s
academy. This could then be taken to mean that Aristotle never did exist, which is false, or that
Aristotle existed and then became a fictional character, which is both false and bizarre.
This might help to explain why the question of whether or not things that did exist and will
exist are real appears to be substantive, but it does not show that it in fact is substantive. We do
not yet know how to understand that question clearly. Anyway, the solution to the puzzle is to

28

Why Plato thinks this is an interesting question for the history of philosophy, but I do not take it up here.
We may note here that, though I do not accept it, one could have a view according to which fictional entities do
exist, but are in some important way different than non-fictional entities. For instance, Kripke (2013) claims that
fictional entities are abstract objects.
29
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distinguish between ‘real’ as contrasts with ‘exists’, and ‘real’ as contrasts with ‘fictional’.
Aristotle is not real now in the sense that he does not exist now, but Aristotle is not now, nor was
he ever, nor will he ever be, a work of fiction.
2.4

Presentism as a Thesis About Class Membership
As we saw earlier, Zimmerman (1998) formulates presentism as a thesis about class

membership:
[T]here is only one largest class of real things, and this class contains nothing that lies
wholly in the past or future. (Zimmerman 1998, 210)
Lombard (2010) suggests that we might generate the appearance of an interesting thesis if we
characterize presentism as a thesis about the largest class of real things. Specifically, we may
suppose that the presentist adopts the following principle of class membership:
If a class S exists at a time t, then everything that is a member of S exists at t. (Lombard
2010, 58)
Lombard goes on to claim that this principle is false, suggesting that it is being confused with a
plausibly true mereological principle: no object can be a part of another object at a time if the
former object does not exist at that time. The correct principle of class membership, Lombard
suggests, is
If a class S exists at a time t, then everything that is a member of S exists at some time or
other. (Lombard 2010, 59)
If we adopt this principle and construe presentism as the thesis that the largest class of real things
contains only what exists at the present time, then presentism turns out to be false.
Perhaps this is too fast, however. Is it really so obvious that the correct principle of class
membership is
If a class S exists at a time t, then everything that is a member of S exists at some time or
other (Lombard 2010, 59),
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and that no reasonable person could think the correct principle is in fact
If a class S exists at a time t, then everything that is a member of S exists at t (Lombard
2010, 58)
instead? If there can be reasonable disagreement on this point, then perhaps we can understand
presentism and eternalism as a substantive disagreement about the nature of class membership in
general, or, more specifically, a disagreement about what is included in the class of real things.30
It seems to me, however, that neither of these can be the principle of class membership.
Generally, for an arbitrary class C, the principle of class membership for C is expressed a sentence
of the following form:
∀x(x ϵ C just in case x is P).
It seems like some sentences of this form can be satisfied by an object x even at times when x does
not exist, like:
∀x(x ϵ C just in case x was, is now, or will be a philosopher).
By contrast, other sentences of this form can only be satisfied by an object x only at times when x
exists, like
∀x(x ϵ C just in case x is now a philosopher).
If this is correct, then for some classes, something x can be a member of that class at a time t only
if x exists at t, and for other classes, something x can be a member of that class so long as x exists,
did exist, or will exist (or exists outside of time).
Furthermore, if this is correct, and if we identify presentism with the thesis that for any
class,

30

Lawrence Lombard suggested exploring this possibility.
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x can be a member of that class at a time t only if x exists at t,
presentism comes out false. After all, there are some classes such that an object can be a member
of that class at a time t even if that object does not exist at t. If we identify eternalism with the
thesis that for any class,
x can be a member of that class at a time t so long as x exists at some time or other (or
outside of time),
it too turns out false. After all, there are some classes such that an object can only be a member of
that class at a time t if the object exists at t.
A similar observation applies to the claim that presentism and eternalism are thesis about
what is included in the largest class of real things. Clearly the following sentence,
∀x(x ϵ C just in case x is real now),
can be satisfied by some object x at a time t only if x exists at that time. Just as clearly, the following
sentence,
∀x(x ϵ C just in case x was, is now, or will be real),
can be satisfied by any object x which exists at some time or other. Presentism is obviously true
on the first reading, and eternalism is obviously true on the second.
Of course, someone might insist that for some object x to be a member of an arbitrary class
C at a time t, x must exist at t. Likewise, someone might insist that for some object x to be a
member of an arbitrary class C at a time t, x need only exist at some time or other (or outside of
time). However, it is not at all obvious what would motivate either of these two positions, except,
in the first case, the belief that everything that exists, exists at the present time, and, in the second
case, the belief that whatever did, does, or will exist, exists. Those theses, of course, are just what
we are trying to understand.
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2.5

Presentist as Serious Tenser
In the previous two sections I mentioned Zimmerman’s (1998) statement of presentism:
[T]here is only one largest class of real things, and this class contains nothing that lies
wholly in the past or future. (Zimmerman 1998, 210)

Zimmerman provides some explication for this statement which I had then set aside. At this point
I want to take that explication up again. Zimmerman compares the presentist to what he calls a
serious tenser:
Just as the serious tenser thinks there is, at bottom, only one kind of truth, and that is “truthnow”; so the presentist thinks there is only one largest class of real things, and this class
contains nothing that lies wholly in the past or future. (Zimmerman 1998, 210)
What is a serious tenser?
Zimmerman says a serious tenser thinks the only kind of truth is “truth-now.” What does
this mean? Zimmerman writes:
The philosopher who takes a tensed approach to the bearers of truth regards each of them
as making a claim about what is the case now. Of course some propositions are eternally
true: in other words, there are propositions which, either necessarily, or as a matter of
contingent fact, have always been true and will always be true. ... [H]istorical propositions
expressed by tenseless statements, such as my utterance in a lecture of “Plato believes in
universals”, are examples of the latter sort. But the proponent of tensed truth-bearers will
insist that the true proposition expressed is composed of tensed propositions; it’s a
disjunction of three propositions: Either Plato (now) believes in universals, or he did, or he
will. This is a truth, but it’s made out of three other propositions, only one of which is true,
and each of which concerns what is now the case. (Zimmerman 1998, 209)

Does this help us understand presentism?
I find Zimmerman’s proposal unclear. The word ‘proposition’ is often used by
contemporary philosophers to indicate a non-linguistic entity, like an abstract state of affairs, that
is expressed by a token of a declarative sentence, and which is the primary bearer of truth or falsity.
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A proposition in this sense cannot make a claim about anything. Nor does a sentence make a claim
about anything; rather, it is the speaker of a sentence which makes a claim.
What might Zimmerman have in mind? We can distinguish between what might be called
the tenseless account and the tensed account of propositions. On the tenseless account, the
proposition expressed by a declarative sentence-token uttered at a time t includes t as a constituent.
On this view, a token of the Latin equivalent of “Caesar is crossing the Rubicon” uttered on January
10, 49 BCE expresses the proposition
On January 10, 49 BCE, Caesar crosses the Rubicon.
If this is true, as in fact it is, it is true at all times.
On the tensed account, the proposition expressed by a declarative sentence-token uttered
at a time t does not include t as a constituent. On this view, a token of the Latin equivalent of
“Caesar is crossing the Rubicon” uttered on January 10, 49 BCE expresses the proposition
Caesar crosses the Rubicon.
This is true on January 10, 49 BCE, but not at other times. Thus, on the tenseless account a
proposition is true or false eternally, whereas according to the tensed account a proposition may
be true in relation to some times and false in relation to others. I take it that when Zimmerman says
propositions make a claim about what is the case now, he is endorsing the tensed account. When
Zimmerman says that bearers of truth make a claim about what is the case now, he means when a
given time t is present, what makes a sentence or proposition true (or false) is the way things are
at t. This is because the token expressing the proposition is uttered at t, and not because t is part of
the content of the proposition expressed.
Does this help us understand presentism? Not obviously. Consider a token of “everything
exists at the present time” uttered when a certain time t is present. This token will be true or false
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depending on the way things are when t is present. However, talk of the way things are when t is
present is ambiguous. It could mean what objects exist, what states of affairs obtain, and what
events are occurring when t is present. Alternatively, it could mean what objects ever did or will
exist, what states of affairs ever did or will obtain, and what events ever did or will occur when t
is present. In the first case, “everything exists at the present time” is trivially true, in the second
case it is obviously false. Yet again, our original argument for the conclusion that presentism is
not a substantive metaphysical thesis has reappeared.
2.6

Concluding Remarks
In this chapter I have considered several attempts in the literature to elucidate presentism

as a substantive metaphysical thesis. I have argued that all of these fail. More specifically, for each
proposal I have shown that the original dilemma from the first chapter, that presentism is either
the trivial thesis that everything that exists now exists at the present time or the obviously false
thesis that everything that ever did exist or ever will exist, exists at the present time, just reappears
in a different guise. Thus, none of these attempts helps us to understand presentism as a substantive
metaphysical thesis.
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CHAPTER 3. AN ARGUMENT FOR THE CONCLUSION THAT THE
DEBATE MUST BE SUBSTANTIVE
In chapter 2, I looked at a number of ways of trying to explicate presentism as a substantive
metaphysical thesis and argued that none of them are successful. In this chapter, I want to develop
an argument for the conclusion that the debate over presentism and eternalism must be substantive,
and then offer a response to that argument on behalf of the skeptic. The basic thrust of this
argument is that we can describe the world using different languages, such that it appears by
adopting one of these languages as opposed to the others, one takes on distinctive ontological
commitments. By adopting one of these languages, you apparently take on ontological
commitment only to things that exist at the present time (or outside of time). By adopting either of
the other two languages, you apparently take on ontological commitment to things existing at any
time. I will argue that unless we already understand presentism as a substantive thesis, we ought
to interpret these languages so that they do not really disagree about ontological commitment.
3.1

Language and Ontological Commitment
Here I want to develop an argument for the conclusion that, despite what our arguments

from chapter 1 appear to show, the debate over presentism and eternalism must in fact be
substantive. I believe this line of argument involves significant conceptual confusions, but I want
to explicate it before criticizing it. Hence, in this section I present the argument as a proponent
would.
Many philosophers contend that, if you think a statement is true and that the best analysis
of that statement involves quantifying over a certain class of entities, you are committed to the
existence of members of that class of entities. This contention about ontological commitment is
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clearly expressed in Quine’s (1948) assertion that we should think there exists whatever our best
science, appropriately analyzed, says there is. The same assumption is explicit is Lewis’s (1973)
argument for the existence of possible worlds,31 and presumed in Davidson’s (2003) argument for
the claim that there are actions.32 However, there are different candidates for what kind of language
to use to represent reality. It may seem that whether we are committed to the existence of things
at times other than the present depends on what kind of language we adopt.
It has been claimed that eternalists will accept tenseless33 claims like “A dinosaur exists at
some time before this one,” and “A dinosaur exists in the year 70 million BCE,” and “A dinosaur
exists in the past,” while presentists will reject each of these statements as false and assert instead
the tensed claim that “There was a dinosaur” (Rea 2006), (Sider 2006), (Szabo 2006), (Torrengo
2013), (Torrengo 2014). It is thought that the first three statements carry existential commitment
to dinosaurs while the fourth does not. The basic idea here is that while presentists and eternalists
both agree that dinosaurs do not exist now and agree that dinosaurs did exist in the past, eternalists
think dinosaurs exist in the sense of being in the range of the existential quantifier, whereas
presentists deny this.
Let us consider this claim more fully. Take the first three statements for consideration. We
might take either of two approaches to symbolizing these statements. First, we have a single
domain consisting of all the objects which ever did, do, or will exist. On this approach, the
statement, “A dinosaur exists at some time before this one, would be symbolized as follows:

31

I discuss Lewis’s view in chapter 4.
Davidson notes that a statement like “Jones butters the toast and midnight with a knife” entails “Jones butters
the toast at midnight,” and “Jones butters the toast.” But the latter statements do not follow from the former by
principles of logic alone unless we interpret the first as quantifying over actions: “There is a buttering of toast, it
occurs at midnight, and it is performed with a knife.”
33
These sentences are arguably grammatically incorrect if we assume ‘exists’ in English is always tensed.
32
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∃x(x is a dinosaur & ∃t (t is before the present time & at t (x exists))).
That is, “There is something which is a dinosaur, and it exists at some time before the present.”
The statement, “A dinosaur exists in the year 70 million BCE” would be represented as:
∃x(x is a dinosaur & ∃t(t=70 million BCE & at t (x exists))).
That, there is something which is a dinosaur, and it exists in the year 70 million BCE. Finally, “A
dinosaur exists in the past,” would be symbolized as:
∃x(x is a dinosaur & ∃t(t is past relative to now & at t (x exists))).
That is, there is something which is a dinosaur, and it exists at some past time. Let us call this the
single domain approach.34
On the second approach, each time has its own associated domain of objects. On this
approach, the statement, “A dinosaur exists at some time before this one,” might be formally
represented as follows:
∃t (t is before the present time & at t (∃x (x is a dinosaur))).35
That is, there is a time t before the present time, and at t there is a dinosaur. The statement “A
dinosaur exists in the year 70 million BCE” would be represented:
∃t (at t ∃x(x is a dinosaur & t=70 million years BCE)).
That is, there is a time, 70 million years ago, and at that time there is a dinosaur. Finally, the
statement “A dinosaur exists in the past” could be formally construed as
∃t (at t ∃x(x is a dinosaur & t is past relative to now).

34

If we do not want to use an existence predicate, these three statements could also be symbolized as follows. First,
“∃x(x is a dinosaur & ∃t(t is before the present time & at t (∃y(y=x)))).” Second, “∃x(x is a dinosaur & ∃t(t=70 million
BCE & at t(∃y(y=x)))).” Third, “∃x(x is a dinosaur & ∃t(t is past relative to now & at t (∃y(y=x)))).”
35
For information on how to read such symbolized statements, see chapter 2 section 2.1.
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That is, there is a time which is past relative to now, and at that time there is a dinosaur. Let us
call this the variable domain approach.36
On either approach, it may seem that we have quantification over things that exist solely at
non-present times: dinosaurs. It is true that, on the variable domain approach, dinosaurs are not
members of the domain of quantification assigned to the present time. Even so, they are still within
a domain of quantification, and hence it seems that we have existential commitment to dinosaurs.
Neither approach commits us to the claim that dinosaurs exist at the present time. Although on the
single domain approach, dinosaurs are now within the domain of quantification, this is not to be
understood as indicating that dinosaurs now exist. Clearly dinosaurs do not exist now, and the
statements under consideration do not entail otherwise on either approach. For sake of
convenience, let us call any formal language that involves quantification over things that exist
now, did exist in the past, or will exist in the future, whether that involves a single domain of
quantification for all things ever or a separate domain of quantification for each time, an eternalist
formal language. We can thus distinguish between a single domain eternalist formal language and
a variable domain eternalist formal language.
By contrast to these statements, consider “There was a dinosaur.” On the kind of tense
logic developed by Prior (1957), this would be represented by placing the quantifier within the
scope of a past-tense operator, ‘P’, which stands for “It was the case that…,” that is,

36
Eric Hiddleston suggested distinguishing the single domain and variable domain approaches to representing such
statements as “A dinosaur exists in the past.” In multiple drafts of the dissertation I had only discussed the variable
domain approach. In fact, however, I had been aware of both approaches during the early stages of writing the
dissertation, and had originally put the single domain approach aside. I realized that if I adopted the single domain
approach I would still need some way of asserting the time at which an object x exists, such as a temporally
relativized existence predicate or a second, temporally relativized quantifier. Since the single domain of
quantification would have to be partitioned anyways, I decided to put it aside and focus just on the variable domain
approach. Hiddleston was right, however, that both approaches deserve discussion.
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P ∃x(x is a dinosaur).
Prior (1962a) (1962b) claims that a quantifier within the scope of such a tense operator is not
existentially committing, just as a person who sincerely utters “Sam believes that there are
unicorns” need not thereby commit herself to belief in unicorns.
Since assertions about belief can be quite complicated and involve their own distinctive
puzzles, I will instead use an analogy with modality and fiction. Someone who sincerely asserts
“It could have been the case that there are unicorns,” or “In mythology there are unicorns,” need
not thereby commit herself to belief in unicorns. In both cases the quantifier is within the scope of
a special operator which makes it so that the existential quantifier fails to have ontological
important. Letting ‘◇’ be a modal operator meaning “It is possibly the case that…” and ‘MYTH’
be a myth-operator meaning “In mythology it is the case that…,” we have
◇ ∃x(x is a unicorn)
and
MYTH ∃x(x is a unicorn).
Tense operators are similar to modal and myth operators in this respect. Thus, since the quantifier
in
P ∃x(x are dinosaurs)
is in the scope of a temporal operator, one can sincerely assert “It was the case that there are
dinosaurs” without committing oneself to the claim that dinosaurs exist. In statements about things
which do not yet exist the quantifier will be placed within the scope of a future-tense operator ‘F’
for “It will be the case that …” For convenience we can call any such formal language in which
quantifiers binding variables assigned to things at past or future times are within the scope of pasttensed or future-tense operators a presentist formal language.
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So then, the argument for the conclusion that the debate over presentism and eternalism
must be substantive goes like this. We can describe the world using either of two eternalist formal
languages or a presentist formal language. We take on certain ontological commitments depending
on which of these languages we adopt. If we adopt an eternalist formal language, we must either
say that dinosaurs exist at some time or other, or that dinosaurs never exist at all. If we adopt a
presentist formal language, we must either say that dinosaurs exist now or that it was or will be
the case that dinosaurs exist. Since we take on different ontological commitments depending on
which kind of language we adopt, it is not the case that both an eternalist formal language and a
presentist formal language can be used to correctly describe reality. It is thus a substantive question
which kind of language we should adopt for the purpose of doing metaphysics. Consequently, it is
a substantive metaphysical question whether presentism or eternalism is true.37
3.2

The Skeptic Responds
What should we say about this argument? One crucial assumption made by proponents of

this line of argument is that if I have a choice of whether to adopt one of a group of formal
languages, and I will take on different ontological commitments depending on which of those
languages I adopt, then it is not the case that both languages can be used to represent reality
accurately. This assumption is questionable. Compare a formal language in which there are
singular terms for, and variables that are allowed to range over, composite entities, and a formal
language in which there are singular terms for, and variables that are allowed to range over, only
simples. Using the first language, we might let the value of two variables x and y be a cup and a
table, and express that x is on top of y. Using the second language, we would assign variables to

37

Ludlow (1999) gives a book-length defense of presentism containing a version of this argument as a part.
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the members of two sets of simples, indicate that the simples in each set stand in various relations
to one another, and finally indicate that the simples in those sets stand in the sort of relation which
we would normally describe as this being on top of that. Does one of these languages describe the
situation more accurately with respect to metaphysics? This is a difficult question, 38 and
important,39 though we do not have space to address it here.
I want to attack the argument in a different way. Those philosophers who believe that
presentism and eternalism are not substantive, opposed metaphysical theses will object that by
adopting a presentist formal language or an eternalist formal language one is not actually choosing
between two different ontologies. At least not in any metaphysically interesting way. Those who
think the debate is not substantive will suggest that the choice of which of these formal languages
to adopt is not in fact a choice between different metaphysical pictures of the world. Rather, it is a
choice between different ways of talking about the facts. The question of whether to adopt a single
domain eternalist formal language, a variable domain eternalist formal language, or a presentist
formal language is no more metaphysically significant than the choice of whether to entertain a
metaphysical thesis in English or Spanish.
Adopting the single domain eternalist formal language, you might assert,
∃x(x is a dinosaur & ∃t(t is past relative to now & at t (x exists))).

38

For a more in depth discussion of this kind of issue, see Lecture 1 of Putnam (2004), and Chalmers (2009b).
For example, in Material Beings, Van Inwagen (1990) says that there are no ordinary objects (other than
organisms). Instead of chairs, there are simples-arranged-chair-wise. We should note that, if it is possible for there
to be composite objects then there must be some reading of “simples-arranged-F-wise” such that, if this description
is true of some set of simples, then those simples indeed compose an F. If it is also the case that there can be simplesarranged-F-wise but no F, then ‘simples-arranged-F-wise’ must be an equivocal phrase. In order to make progress in
this area, perhaps we ought to get clear on these different readings of ‘simples-arranged-F-wise’.
39
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That is, there is something which is a dinosaur, and it exists in the past. Adopting the variable
domain eternalist formal language you might assert
∃t (at t ∃x(x is a dinosaur & t is past relative to now)).
That is, in the past, there exists a dinosaur. Finally, adopting the presentist formal language, you
would instead assert
P ∃x(x are dinosaur).
That is, it was the case that there is a dinosaur. These, the skeptic avers, are just different ways of
asserting the same fact: that some dinosaur existed at some time before the present.
Consider our presentist formal language. The skeptic will suggest we should interpret the
quantifier, when not in the scope of a past or future-tensed operator, as the analogue of the presenttensed ‘exists’ of ordinary English (Meyer 2005). On this interpretation, to say that the presentist
language is only existentially committed to things which exists at the present time, is just to say
that it is only existentially committed to things which exist at the present time existing now. This
is, of course, trivial. The fact that our presentist language is not ontologically committed to things
that exist at non-present times is not really ontologically significant. It is the formal analogue of
the fact that we do not say “dinosaurs exist” (noting that ‘exists’ is in the present-tense) but instead
say “dinosaurs existed.”
Consider, on the other hand, the variable domain eternalist formal language. The claim that
one who seriously adopts this language is committed to the existence of things that exist at any
time is misleading. What we should really say is that one who seriously adopts this language is
committed to whatever exists, existed, or will exist at any particular time t, existing at t. Let us
suppose this person asserts that dinosaurs exist at past times. The skeptic who thinks the debate
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over presentism and eternalism is not substantive will insist that this is just another way of saying
there that were dinosaurs.
Finally, consider the single domain eternalist formal language. The claim that one who
seriously adopts this language is committed to the existence of things that exist at any time is
likewise misleading. As with the variable domain eternalist formal language, the person who
adopts this language is only committed to things existing at the times they did, do, or will. Of
course, everything that ever did, does, or will exist is within a single domain of quantification, but
why should we think this is of metaphysical significance? The skeptic will insist that the existential
quantifier of the single domain eternalist formal language is just a formal analogue of “exists at
some time or other.”
In effect, the basic strategy used in chapter one to argue for the conclusions that presentism
and eternalism are not substantive metaphysical theses applies here too. The presentist believes
that everything exists at the present time whereas the eternalists believes that some things that exist
at past or future times exist. Thus, it appears that presentists and eternalists disagree about what
exists. This disagreement is resolved however, by specifying the tense on ‘exists’. Here, in this
chapter, we have an argument for the conclusion that presentists and eternalists must be
disagreeing, because the eternalist adopts a formal language which quantifies over things existing
at past and future times, whereas the presentist adopts a formal language which quantifies only
over things existing at the present time (or outside of time). This apparent difference in ontological
commitment is nullified, however, as soon as we specify the range of the quantifiers.
What initially appeared to be an ontological disagreement turns out to be a difference in
choice about how to talk about when things exist. In the presentist formal language, we use a
quantifier ranging over only things that exist at the present time, and utilize tense operators to talk
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about things existing at other times. In the single domain eternalist formal language, we use a
quantifier ranging over things existing at all times there ever were or will be, and we use an ‘at’
operator together with an existence predicate to indicate more specifically when something exists.
In the variable domain eternalist formal language, we use a different quantifier for each time, using
an ‘at’ operator to assign quantifiers to times.
3.3

Responses to the Skeptic
In the previous section I explained how the skeptic would respond to the claim that we

have a choice of whether to adopt a single or variable domain eternalist language, or a presentist
formal language, and that we take on differing existential commitments depending on which of
these languages we adopt. In the following sub-sections I will consider various ways someone who
thinks that the debate over presentism and eternalism is substantive might respond, and show why
they are in adequate.
3.3.1 The Unrestricted Quantifier
Some philosophers have proposed that presentism and eternalism be understood as opposed
theses about what is to be included in the range of the most unrestricted quantifier (Sider 1999)
(Baron 2013b) (Baron 2014). On this proposal, eternalism is the thesis that everything that ever
existed, exists now, or ever will exist is within the domain of such a quantifier. Thus, to make
assertions just about present things one must place a restriction on this domain. Presentism, on this
proposal, is the view that the unrestricted quantifier ranges just over things which exist at the
present time (or outside of time).
If the single domain eternalist formal language and the presentist domain formal language
genuinely utilize the same quantifier, as would be the case if this account of presentism and
eternalism is correct, then it will genuinely be the case that by adopting one language or the other,
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one takes on differing ontological commitments. The pertinent question, then, is this: is it really
the case that the quantifier used in the single domain eternalist formal language and the quantifier
used in the presentist formal language are the same? The skeptic will answer that it is not, or at
least that we have no good reason to think it is.
To adequately respond to the skeptical argument for the conclusion that presentism and
eternalism are not substantive, opposed philosophical theses, it is not enough to insist that the
presentists and the eternalists agree on the meaning of the quantifier. One has instead to offer a
positive interpretation of that quantifier on which presentism and eternalism come out as
substantive metaphysical theses. Until such an interpretation of the quantifier is available, it is
perfectly reasonable for the skeptic to insist that the eternalist formal language (whether the single
domain or the variable domain version) and the presentist formal language are just different ways
of asserting the same class of possible facts.
Consider the claim that the quantifier in both the single domain eternalist formal language
and the presentist formal language is unrestricted. In what sense is the quantifier supposed to be
unrestricted? If it is supposed to be unrestricted with respect to time, then its domain should include
everything which ever did exist, does exist, or ever will exist. In that case, eternalism comes out
as obviously true. Perhaps the quantifier is supposed to be unrestricted with respect to what exists?
Well, do we mean that the quantifier is unrestricted with respect to what exists now, or unrestricted
with respect to what did, does, or will ever exist? Presumably neither of these is meant, but then
what is intended by the claim that the quantifier is unrestricted? The answer is not at all evident.
If the debate over presentism and eternalism is substantive, then there must be a single use
of ‘exists’, or single interpretation of the quantifier, such that presentists and eternalists disagree
as to what exists in this sense, or what is in the domain of this quantifier. However, to establish
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that the debate is substantive, it is not enough to assert that there is such a use of ‘exists’ or such
an interpretation of the quantifier. One must instead explain what that use of ‘exists’, or what that
interpretation of the quantifier, is, and show that presentists and eternalists are both using it.
An analogy might help. Suppose that someone were to insist that it is a substantive
philosophical question whether or not there are any married bachelors. Everyone he has consulted
insists that there are no married bachelors, but he thinks there are, in fact, married bachelors. In
some contexts, he admits, we use the word ‘bachelor’ so that it only applies to unmarried persons.
This, he avers, reflects a restricted use of the term. Someone responds that he is just using the word
‘bachelor’ differently than those who believe there are no married bachelors. He retorts that there
is a single, unrestricted use of the word ‘bachelor’, used by both parties to the dispute, and they
disagree as to whether or not this predicate applies to any married persons. Until some positive
construal of this use of ‘bachelor’ has been offered, we ought to assume that, despite what this
person claims, he is indeed simply using ‘bachelor’ in an idiosyncratic way.
Likewise, until some positive construal of how ‘exists’, or the quantifier, is to be
understood in the definitions of presentism and eternalism is available for consideration, we ought
to assume that presentists and eternalists are just using the quantifier in different ways.
3.3.2 Primitive Tense Operators
Some philosophers claim that the tense operators utilized in a presentist formal language
are primitive and unanalyzable (Sider 2006) (Szabo 2006) (Brogaard 2007) (Torrengo 2012). One
might conclude from this that the kinds of facts expressible in a presentist formal language cannot
be the same as the kinds of fact expressible in an eternalist formal language. For consider the
sentence
P ∃x(x is a dinosaur).
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That is, it was the case that there is some dinosaur. Suppose that this sentence expresses the same
fact as the fact expressed by
∃x(x is a dinosaur & ∃t(t is past relative to now & at t (x exists))).
That is, there is a dinosaur, and it exists in the past. If this the case, it may seem that the past-tense
operator ‘P’ is not primitive and unanalyzable after all, contrary to our initial assumption.
Someone who argues in this way for the conclusion that presentist and eternalist formal
languages cannot just be different ways of stating the same facts misunderstands what it means for
a logical operator to be primitive and unanalyzable. A logical operator is primitive in a logical
language just in case that operator cannot be defined by any other operators in the language. Any
logical language with a finite number of logical symbols must have some symbols which are
primitive in this sense, or else the analysis of its symbols will be fundamentally circular. For
instance, we might define the universal quantifier ‘∀’ by negation and the existential quantifier
‘∃’, as follows
∀P = def. ~∃~P.
It would be circular to then define the existential quantifier in terms of the universal and negation,
that is,
∃P = def. ~∀~P.
At least some of the tense operators in a presentist formal language will need to be primitive and
unanalyzable in this sense.
It does not follow from the fact that ‘P’ is primitive in this sense that a statement of the
form
PP
cannot express the same fact as a sentence of the form
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∃P ∃t(t is past relative to now & P at t).
This is not a case of giving an analysis of an operator within a single language, after all, but a case
of translating between statements of different languages.
Moreover, there is a way to give a meaning to a primitive logical operator: we specify the
way things must be in order for a sentence containing the operator to be true. Indeed, if it is not
possible to give a meaning to a logical operator in this way, then it would seem that the operator
is meaningless.40
This brings us to another way of stating the basic objection I have been trying to raise on
behalf of the skeptic throughout this chapter. If statements in the presentist formal language
containing tense operators are not meaningless, they must have some comprehensible
interpretation. At least one candidate interpretation treats the following sentences as all expressing
the same fact:
∃x(x is a dinosaur & ∃t(t is past relative to now & x exists at t)),
∃t (at t ∃x(x is a dinosaur & t is past relative to now)),
and
P ∃x(x are dinosaur).
If they do not express the same fact, those philosophers who contend the debate over presentism
and eternalism is substantive in principle owe us an alternative interpretation of the third indented
sentence so that it does not express the same fact as expressed by the first and second. It is not
enough to insist that tense operators are primitive, or that the quantifier is the same in the first and
third sentences.

40

Similarly, Fiocco (2007) criticizes versions of presentism utilizing primitive tense operators as lacking a
metaphysical base.
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3.4

Problem Cases for a Presentist Formal Language
Another way of responding to the skeptic would be to show that there are statements in one

of the formal languages which cannot be translated into the others, and that the reason for this is
that there are some conceivable facts which cannot be expressed in one of the languages. Hence,
we have a genuine metaphysical disagreement.
In fact, some kinds of statement have been proposed as resisting formulation in a language
with a quantifier ranging only over things existing at the present time, plus past and future tense
operators. In the sections to follow I will consider the sort of statements that are thought to create
problems for a presentist-friendly formal language, and argue that they do not, in fact, do so.
3.4.1 Cross-Temporal Relations
The first kind of statement that is supposed to resist formulation in a presentist-friendly
formal language are statements expressing cross-temporal relations. Cross-temporal relations
come in two varieties. The first are relations between different things exiting at different times,
such as the relation expressed by the statement “Susie admires Plato.” The second are relations
between an object and itself at an earlier or later time, as in “John is better looking now than he
was as a teenager.”
Cross-temporal relations of the first kind Ciuni and Torrengo (2013) call ontic crosstemporal relations, where an ontic cross-temporal relation is “A relation between a presently
existing entity and a non-presently existing entity.” (Ciuni and Torrengo 2013, 213) Crosstemporal relations of the second Ciuni and Torrego call factive cross-temporal relation, where a
factive cross-temporal relation is “A relation that is cross-temporal exemplified by it terms.” (Ciuni
and Torrengo 2013, 213) We can show that statements expressing ontic and factive cross-temporal
relations can both be expressed using a presentist-friendly formal language.
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Let us begin with the statement “Susie admires Plato.” Since Plato no longer exists, any
quantifier binding a variable taking Plato as a value must be within the scope of a past-tense
operator. Assuming Susie does now exist, the quantifier ranging over her will not be within the
scope of such an operator. This may seem to lead to a problem (Sider 1999) (Sider 2006) (Szabo
2006). If we parse “Susie admires Plato” like so
∃x(x=Susie & P ∃y(y=Plato & x admires y),
the resulting sentence says that Susie admired Plato at a time long before she was born. The
problem is that the predicate ‘x admires y’ appears within the scope of the operator ranging over
Plato. If we remove the predicate from this position, we get
∃x(x=Susie & P ∃y(y=Plato) & x admires y),
which is ungrammatical, as the rightmost instance of ‘y’ is free.
Some philosophers have been led to try to analyze such sentences so as to eliminate the
relation (M. Davidson 2003) (T. M. Crisp 2005) (De Clercq 2006). This is not necessary. In fact,
there is a way to represent cross-temporal relations within a presentist formal language. We can
parse “Susie admires Plato” like so:
∃t(at t ∃x(x=Susie & P ∃y(y=Plato & F ∃t`(t`=t & at t`(x admires y))))).
This says
There is some time t, at t there is some x such that x is Susie and it was the case that there
is some y such that y is Plato and it will be the case that there is some time t` such that t` is
identical to t, and at t` x admires y.
Since in a presentist formal language a quantifier not in the scope of either ‘P’ or ‘F’ ranges over
things existing at the present time (or outside of time), t is the present time. Since t` is stipulated
to be the same time as t, the predicate ‘x admires y’ is assigned to the present time. Note
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importantly that this sentence assigns the 2-place predicate ‘x admires y’ to the time t`. It does not
assign the variable y to t`. Hence, while this says that Plato is admired at t`, it does not say that
Plato exists at t`.
Alternatively, another way to symbolize statements expressing cross-temporal relations in
our presentist formal language would be to introduce a new tense operator, ‘N’, for “It is now the
case that …” Any sentence within the scope of ‘N” is to be understood as a sentence about the
present time, no matter what tense operators precede ‘N’. The ‘N’ operator effectively makes
whatever is within its scope exempt from all previous tense operators. Using this operator, we
would symbolize “Susie admires Plato” as
∃x(x=Susie & P ∃y(y=Plato & N (x admires y))),
or, more simply, as
P ∃x(x=Plato & N(Susie admires x)).
Both of these say Susie exists at the present time, it was the case that Plato exists, and it is now the
case that Susie admires Plato.41 Note importantly that the former sentence assigns the 2-place
predicate ‘x admires y’ to the present time, and not the variable y, and the latter sentence assigns
the 2-place predicate ‘Susie admires x’ to the present time, and not the variable x. Hence, both
entail that Plato is admired at the present time, but not that Plato exists at the present time.

41

Using ‘N’ was the first solution that occurred to me for how to parse statements expressing cross-temporal
relations. The other solution, involving reference to previously quantified times was inspired by Prior (1968). Prior
notes that in a statement like “It will be the case that it is now the case that I am sitting down” (102) the word ‘now’
cannot be removed without altering the meaning of the sentence. However, Prior proposes that this sentence is
equivalent in meaning to “It is now the case that for some proposition p which is true at one instant only, (i) it will
be the case that [p and I am sitting], and (ii) it is now the case that p.” (106), and that ‘now’ can be eliminated from
this statement without loss of meaning. While Prior’s use of ‘proposition’ is idiosyncratic, the basic proposal is
straightforward, and we could easily replace “proposition which is true at one instant only” with “state of affairs
which obtains at one instant only.” I have chosen to first indicate the time at which x occurs or obtains, and then
refer back to that time, thus, “It is t and it will be the case that it was the case that t and I am sitting,” or “∃t F P
∃t`(t`=t & I am sitting).”
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Those philosophers who have discussed this sort of problem will likely reject my solution
on the grounds that it entails that objects which do not now exist can nonetheless now exhibit
properties or stand in relations: Plato is admired by Susie now, despite not existing now. In fact, it
is often assumed that presentism entails serious presentism, according to which only things
existing at the present time (or outside of time) can exhibit properties or stand in relations. Thus,
the serious presentist contends that only what exists at the present time (or, perhaps, outside of
time) can be a subject of predication at the present time. If correct, this would imply that if ‘Plato’
in the foregoing statements in our presentist formal language is intended to refer to the historical
philosopher, the presentist must denounce those statements as either false or meaningless.
If presentism is a substantive thesis, and if presentism entails serious presentism, then
perhaps my construal of “Susie admires Plato” is not available to the presentist. At this juncture,
however, our question is not whether the presentist can make sense of the claim that Susie admires
Plato, but rather whether this statement can be expressed in a formal language in which quantifiers
ranging over things existing at times other than the present are always within the scope of pasttense and future-tense operators. I have shown that they can be. If such statements are problematic,
it is not a problem of logical form.
Consider next the statement “John is better looking now than as a teenager.” This statement
differs from the last insofar as it relates not two things that exist at different times, but a single
thing as it is and was at different times. Brogaard (2006) (2013) suggests that such relations should
be taken as primitive. Using “My daughter is now taller than my son was,” as an example, Brogaard
writes:
Where the property of having been nice can be represented as λx(x has been nice), the
tensed binary relation ascribed by ‘My daughter is now taller than my son was’ can be
represented as λxλy(x is now taller than y was). The former reads: the property of being an
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x such that x has been nice; the latter reads: the relation between x and y such that x is now
taller than y was. (Brogaard 2006, 197)
That is, there are persons, my daughter and my son, such that there obtains between them the
relation of the first being taller than the second was.
In fact, such cross-temporal relations can be analyzed in a presentist formal language
without being taken as primitive. “John is better looking than he was as a teenager” could be
symbolized as:
∃x ∃t(x=John & P ∃t`(at t` x is a teenager & N ((x at t) is better looking than (x at t`)))).
That is, “There is (now) a person, John, and a time t, such that there was a time t` such that John
was a teenager at t`, and now, John at t is better looking than John at t`.” It is worth commenting
on the sentence “(x at t) is better looking than (x at t`).” This sentence is not to be read as meaning
that that there are entities, x at t and x at t`, such that one is better looking than the other. Rather,
it is to be read as saying x, given one set of circumstances (those that obtain when time t is present),
is better looking than itself, under a different set of circumstances (those that obtain when time t`
is present).
If the foregoing construal of “John is better looking than he was as teenager” seems odd,
we could also construe this statement as involving quantification over physical appearances, in the
sense of the way someone or something appears, as follows:
∃x ∃A ∃A`(x=John & A=a physical appearance & A`=another physical appearance & Ax
& P (A`x) & ∀y ∀z)((Ay & A`z)

y is better looking than z)

This says that there are two physical appearances, A and A`, such that John has A, it was the case
that John had A`, and someone who has appearance A is better looking than someone who had
appearance A`.
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Finally, “My daughter is now taller than my son was” could be symbolized:
∃x ∃y(x=my daughter & y=my son & P ∃tN(x is taller than (y at t))).
As before, the sentence “x is taller than (y at t)” is not to be read as indicating that there is an entity
y at t, such that x is taller than it. Rather, this says x is taller than y under a certain set of
circumstances (those which obtained at time t). Alternatively, we could construe this using
quantification over heights, as in
∃x ∃y ∃H ∃H`(x=my daughter & y=my son & H=a height & H`=another height & Hx &
P(H`y) & H is larger than H`).
That is, there are persons, my daughter and my son, and heights H and H`, such that my daughter
has H, it was the case that my son had H`, and H is a larger height than H`.
3.4.2 Plural Quantification Across Time
The second kind of statement that is thought to resist formulation in a presentist-friendly
formal language are statements containing plural quantification across time. A statement contains
plural quantification just in case it is used to assert that there are, were, or will be some plurality
of things, like “Mars has two moons.” A statement contains plural quantification across time just
in case it is used to assert that there are, were, or will be a plurality of things, at least some of the
members of which do or may exist, obtain, or occur at different times, like “There have been at
least forty U.S. Presidents.” Some statement containing plural quantification are ambiguous as to
whether or not they contain plural quantification across time. Consider for example the statement
“Jane has had three jobs,” which does not by itself imply whether Jane had all or some of these
jobs simultaneously or at different times.
The basic challenge is that in order to represent some statements involving plural
quantification across time in a presentist-friendly formal language, we need to utilize primitive
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span operators, and that such primitive span operators are unacceptable. Let us consider how the
need for primitive span operators arises, and why they are thought to be problematic.
Consider the statement “There have been two kings named Charles” (Lewis 2004, 5) We
cannot represent this statement with
P ∃x ∃y(x is a king named Charles & y is a king named Charles & x≠y),
since this says there were two kings named Charles simultaneously, which is not what we intended
to assert with the original. Nor can we represent this as
P ∃x(x is a king named Charles) & P ∃y(y is a king named Charles),
since there is nothing here to indicate that x and y range over two distinct individuals.
Lewis suggests that this statement be represented using nested tense operators, writing:
So we have this nested translation, which I believe conforms to presentist strictures: ‘There
have been two kings named Charles’ means ‘It has been that (there is a king named Charles
and it has been that [there is another king named Charles]). (Lewis 2004, 6)
In the symbolism I have been using, this would be represented as
P ∃x(x is a king named Charles & P ∃y(y is a king named Charles & x≠y).
Here problems begin to arise.
The first issue Lewis raises is that we might want “There have been two kings named
Charles” to be ambiguous as to whether there were two such kings simultaneously or at different
times:
It’s a bit of good luck that kings persist through time, and that there are never two
simultaneous ones. Else to say that there have been two kings named Charles, we’d require
an extra disjunct to cover the case where there have been two, and they were instantaneous
and simultaneous. (Lewis 2004, 6)
Lewis thinks we can represent such a sentence, though awkwardly:
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A general translation of ‘There have been two so-and-sos’ should be: ‘It has been that
(there is a so-and-so, and either [there is another so-and-so or it has been that (there is
another so-and-so)])’. (Lewis 2004, 6)
In our symbolism:
P ∃x(x is a king named Charles & (∃y(y is a king named Charles & x≠y) v P ∃y(y is a king
named Charles & x≠y).
Though awkward, this is consistent with the requirements of our presentist-friendly formal
language.42
In fact, using the ‘N” operator we can represent “There have been two kings named
Charles” without relying on disjunction, like so:
P ∃x(x is a king named Charles & N P ∃y(y is a king named Charles & x≠y)).
Note that a statement of the form
P (P & N P P),
that is,
It was the case that: P and now it was the case that Q,
is consistent with but does not entail a statement of the form
P (P and Q),
that is,
It was the case that both P and Q.
Thus, the formula

42

Szabo (2006) objects that a statement like “There have been two kings named Charles” and “P∃x(x is a king named
Charles & (∃y(y is a king named Charles & x≠y) v P ∃y(y is a king named Charles & x≠y)” vary too much in semantic
form for the latter to be plausibly taken as given the meaning of the former. Since my claim is just that the fact
expressed by a statement like “There have been two kings named Charles” can be expressed in a presentist-friendly
language, I put this objection aside.
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P ∃x(x is a king named Charles & N P ∃y(y is a king named Charles & x≠y)
is consistent with but does not entail that it was ever the case that there are two kings named
Charles simultaneously.
Not all statements can be dealt with so easily, however. Lewis writes:
Not all numbers are finite. If the hypothesis of two-way eternal recurrence is true, there
have been infinitely many kings named John, and there will be infinitely many more of
them…. The presentist, if he sticks to the brute-force method we’ve been considering so
far, requires a construction with tense operators nested ad infinitum.
Further, some plural quantifiers do not specify a number, and some specify a number only
vaguely. There have been some kings named George, and indeed there have been several
of them; though never has it been the case that there are several kings named George.
(Lewis 2004, 6-7)
Lewis has identified two kinds of problem-cases worth considering: assertions involving infinite
quantification across time, like “There have been infinitely many kings named John,” and
assertions involving vague quantification across time, like “There have been several kings named
George.” Another kind of problem-case identified by Brogaard can be found in statement like
“When

I

was

a

child

I

was

usually

well-behaved”
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(Brogaard

2007,

77).

Why are such statements thought to resist formulation in a presentist-friendly formal
language? A statement of the form “There have been n Fs” would be represented with a sentence
containing n existential quantifiers each within the scope of a past-tense operator, like so
P ∃x1(x1 is an F & … & N P ∃xn(xn is an F)…).
Sticking to this method, “There have been infinitely many kings named John” would, as Lewis
points out, be represented by an infinitely long sentence. We cannot represent either “When I was

43

Sider (2006) claims similarly that ‘most’ must be treated as a primitive quantifier, and statements expressing plural
quantification across time containing ‘most’ cannot be represented with just the standard tense operators.
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a child I was usually well behaved” or “There have been several kings named George” using this
method at all, since there is no number n such that n is equal to ‘several’ or ‘usually’.
In order to represents statements such as these, one may feel compelled to adopt a primitive
span operator, ‘HAS’, read “It has been the case that,” such that
HAS (P & Q)
means it has been the case over a certain span of time that P and Q, without implying whether or
not P and Q were ever the case simultaneously. Thus, “There have been infinitely many kings
named John” might be represented
HAS(INFINITEx)(x is a king named John),
And “There have been several kings named George,” as
HAS(SEVERALx)(x is a king named George).
Why are such span operators thought to be problematic?
Says Lewis:
I object that span operators are so badly behaved that nobody should claim to have a
primitive understanding of them. For one thing, they create ambiguities even when prefixed
to a sentence that is not itself ambiguous. ‘It HAS been that (it is raining and the sun is
shining)’ might mean that there is some past interval throughout which rain fell from a
sunny sky—a ‘sun-shower’. Or instead it could mean that there is some past interval with
at least one rainy sub-interval and at least one sunny sub-interval…
For another thing, span operators can be prefixed to contradictions to make truths. ‘It HAS
been that (it rains and it doesn’t rain)’ is true, at least under one of its disambiguations –
the two-subinterval disambiguation. But span operators will make different truths when
prefixed to different contradictions, and sometimes will not make truths at all. Sometimes
they will even make new contradictions, as in the case of ‘It HAS been that (it rains nonstop
and it doesn’t rain nonstop)’ which cannot reasonably be given a two-subintervals
disambiguation. Therefore they are hyperintensional operators: the intension of a sentence
formed using a span operator is not a function of the intension of the embedded sentence.
(Lewis 2004, 13)
How dire a problem is this?
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I do not think the problem is that dire at all. It is true that prefixing the HAS operator to an
unambiguous sentence can yield an ambiguous sentence, but it is difficult to see why this is
problematic. Statements like “There have been two kings named Charles” are ambiguous: this
would be true whether there had been two kings named Charles simultaneously or successively.
Since our HAS operator is meant to allow us to formulate English statements about spans of time,
it is no surprise that the operator carries over this ambiguity. It is also true that prefixing the HAS
operator to a contradiction can yield a true sentence, but prefixing ‘not’ to a contradiction also
yields a true sentence. Prefixing HAS to the beginning of a sentence results in a new sentence with
a different meaning.
Is it worrisome that the HAS operator is hyperintensional? I do not think so. As Brogaard
(2007) points out, while standard modal operators are not hyperintensional, some operators are:
Story prefixes, such as according to the Conan Doyle Stories, are hyperintensional: the
intension of ‘according to the Conan Doyle Stories, Sherlock Holmes lives on Baker Street’
is not a function of the intension of ‘Sherlock Holmes lives on Baker Street’. (Brogaard
2007, 75)
An operator is not objectionable simply for being hyperintensional. So, span operators are not
objectionable.
We can stipulate that a quantifier within the scope of a span operator, is not existentially
committing just as a quantifier within the scope of a standard tense operator is not existentially
committing. Thus, in the same way in which the statement
P ∃x(x is a dinosaur)
does not imply existential commitment to dinosaurs, the statement
HAS(Infinitex)(x is a King named John)
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does not imply existential commitment to an infinite number of King’s named John, or indeed any
number of King’s named John. Consequently, we can incorporate primitive span operators into
our presentist-friendly language, and therefore statements which can only be expressed with such
operators can be included within such a language.
Having shown that a presentist-friendly formal language can incorporate primitive span
operators, we may wonder how much can be expressed in a presentist-friendly formal language
without span operators. Let us briefly consider this question.
In fact it is possible to represent the statement “There have been infinitely many kings
named John” in a presentist-friendly formal language without invoking primitive pan operators. If
we want to assert that there are an infinite number of something in standard, first order predicate
logic without introducing an ‘infinite’ quantifier, we would give a statement which could be
satisfied only by an infinite number of something.
There is some F.

(i)

∃xFx

(ii)

∀x ∀y(Rxy

(iii)

∀x(Fx

(Fx & Fy))

∃y(Fy & Rxy))

Only Fs stand in relation R to each other.
For every F there is some F, such that the first
stands in relation R to the second.

(iv)

~∃x(Rxx)

Nothing stands in relation R to itself.

(v)

∀x ∀y~(Rxy & Ryx)

For any x and any y, it is not the case that both
x stands in relation R to y and y stands in
relation R to x.
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(vi)

∀x ∀y ∀z((Rxy & Ryz)

Rxz)

For anything that stands in relation R to
anything, the first also stands in relation R to
anything the second stands in relation R to.

Together these statements entail there are an infinite number of Fs. According to (i) there is some
F, according to (ii) there is a relation R which only holds between things which are Fs, and
according (iii)-(vi), for every F, there is some other F` such that F stands in R to F`, and F` is
neither identical to F nor stands in R to anything which stands in R to F. Thus, if we were to list
all the Fs according to the R relation, for each F listed there would be another F later on the list.
The same approach can be used to state that there have been an infinite number of
something in our presentist-friendly formal language.
(i)

P ∃xFx

(ii)

P ∀x N P ∀y(N P(Rx)

(iii)

P ∀x(Fx

(iv)

H~∃x N P(Rxx)

(v)

H ∀x N H ∀y N H ~(Rxy & Ryx)

(vi)

P ∀x N P ∀y N P ∀z((N P(Rxy) & N P(Ryz))

(N P(Fx) & N P(Fy)))

N P ∃y(Fy & Rxy))

N P(Rxz))

Together these statements entail that there have been an infinite number of Fs, without specifying
whether or not any or all existed simultaneously. According to (i) there has been some F.
According to (2) there has been a relation R which has only held between Fs. According to (iii)(vi), for every F there has been, there has been some other F` such that F stood in R to F`, and it
was neither the case that F` was identical to F or that F` stood in R to anything else which stood in
R to F. Thus, if we were to list all the Fs there ever were according to the R relation, for each F on
the list there would be a different F` later on the list. Since every quantifier is within the scope of
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‘P’, existential commitment to things which do not exist at the present time is avoided, consistent
with the requirements of a presentist-friendly formal language.
What about a statement like “There have been several kings named George” (Lewis 2004,
7)? It is not clear how much a problem this statement poses even if it cannot be formulated without
span operators. After all, given the vagueness of ‘several’, this statement expresses no definite
fact. Thus, this kind of statement does not show that a presentist-friendly formal language without
span operators cannot be used to express all the facts. Moreover, it has already been shown that
for any finite number n, we can represent the statement
There have been n kings named George
in a presentist-friendly language without span operators. Thus, if we allow infinitely long
sentences, we could represent “There have been several kings named George” by the infinite
disjunct
There have been n kings named George v there have been n+1 kings named George v …,
where each ‘n+m’ is a possible meaning of ‘several’.
Consider also the statement “When I was a child I usually behaved well”44 (Brogaard 2007,
77). I take it that this statement has the same meaning as that expressed by
When I was a child, over half the time I behaved well.
This is vague, but not quite as vague as “There have been several kings named George.” Indeed,
there are definite conditions such that if they hold, “When I was a child I usually behaved well,”
is true. If we assume that one can only be well-behaved or not during some positive span of time,

44

Sider (2006) similarly that ‘most’ must be treated as a primitive quantifier, and statements expressing plural
quantification across time containing ‘most’ cannot be represented with just the standard tense operators.
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then we can represent this statement in a presentist-friendly formal language without span
operators, though the result is admittedly awkward.
It is possible, using just the ‘P’ and ‘N” operators, to assert that something was the case
during a certain period of time, at all times during that period. For example, consider the statement
“Obama was the President of the United States of America from 2008 to 2016.” We can represent
this with
P ∃t(t=2008 & N P ∃t`(t`=2016 & N ~P ∃t``(t`` is between t and t` & at t~(Obama is the
President of the United States of America.
In English, this says:
It was the case that there is a time, 2008, it was the case that there is a time, 2016, and it is
not the case that it was the case at some time between 2008 and 2016 that at this time it is
not the case that Obama is the President of the United States.
Thus, for every time there was between 2008 and 2016, Obama is the President of the United
States. We can abbreviate this as
P(2008-2016)(Obama is the President of the United States of America).
Let us then return to the statement “When I was a child I usually behaved well.”
One cannot, I think, behave well at an instant, except insofar as that instant is a part of a
larger period of time during which one is behaving well. Let ‘D’ indicate a small but positive
duration of time during which one could be or not be well-behaved. I represent the fact that I am
well-behaved during a certain period of time of duration D by
P(D)(I am a child & I am well behaved).
This sentence abbreviates:
P ∃t N P ∃t` N~P ∃t``(t`` is between t and t` & at t(I am a child & ~I am well-behaved)).
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In English, this says
It was the case that there is a time t, it was the case that there is a time t`, and it is not the
case that there was a time t`` between t and t` and such that I am a child at t`` and it is not
the case that I am well-behaved at.
In other words, at any time between t and t`, I am well-behaved. Hence, this picks out a period of
time, the entirely of which I am well-behaved.
Now, consider the following sort of formula:
P(D1)(I a child and I am well-behaved & N P(D2(I am a child and ~I am well-behaved & …
N P(Dn)(I am a child and I am well-behaved)…).
For each such period Di, either I was well-behaved or I was not. So, we can represent all the
different ways I could have been well-behaved for whatever proportion of my childhood we like,
using disjunction. For instance, if I am well-behaved once, I am either well-behaved during this
period and no other, or this period and no other, and so on. Since my childhood is finite in duration
and each Di is a positive period of time, each such sentence will be finite. Thus, I can express that
I was well-behaved for whatever proportion of my childhood we like, using only finitely long
sentences in a presentist formal language without span operators.
Suppose my childhood is composed of n periods of length D. If I usually behaved well
during my childhood, then either I behaved well during all n such periods, or all n periods but one,
or all n periods but two, and so on, so long as the periods during which I am well-behaved
outnumber those during which I am not. Generally, I behaved well during most of my childhood
just in case I am well-behaved during n-m periods of length D, where n is greater than m. I am
well-behaved during n-m periods of length D just in case either I am well-behaved during each of
these n periods but not these m periods, or each of these other n periods but not these other m
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periods or each of these still other n periods but not these m periods, and so on. Thus we could in
principle, using an incredibly long but finite sentence, express the general assertion that during my
childhood I am usually well-behaved. Of course this would not be practically feasible, and for that
reason we should utilize span operators.
On the other hand, consider the following statement:
For most of the time during the experiment there were particles that exist only for an
instant.
Since such particles do not exist for any positive span of time, the strategy utilized to represent
“When I was a child I usually behaved well” does not work in this case. Hence, it seems that this
kind of statement does create a problem for a presentist formal language without span operators.
Since there is no great reason a presentist formal language cannot incorporate span operators,
however, it is not a problem for presentist formal languages generally.
3.5

Concluding Remarks
In this chapter I have considered an argument for the conclusion that the debate over

presentism and eternalism must be substantive. The basic thrust of this argument is that by adopting
either a presentist formal language or an eternalist formal language you take on different
ontological commitments. I showed that those philosophers who do not think the debate is
substantive will object that the three languages considered in fact constitute different ways of
stating the same kinds of fact. Those who think that the choice of which formal language to use is
effectively a choice between different ontologies owe us an account of what the ontological
disagreement consists in. In other words, they owe us an explication of presentism and eternalism
as substantive, opposed metaphysical theses.
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A final closing comment is in order. If we want to understand presentism and eternalism
as substantive, opposed metaphysical theses, we should not want different languages such that you
take on different ontological commitments depending on which you adopt. Rather, we should want
a single language which has the expressive capacity adequate for describing the world according
to either presentism or eternalism. We would then need to a find an unambiguous statement in that
language such that presentists and eternalists disagree as to its truth. Those philosophers who
propose that presentism and eternalism are opposed theses about what falls within the range of the
most unrestricted quantifier are, in this respect at least, on the right track. Unfortunately, their
proposal presupposes that the debate is substantive, and does not explain it.
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CHAPTER 4. AN ANALOGUE WITH THE DEBATE OVER MODAL
ACTUALISM AND POSSIBILISM
The debate over presentism and eternalism is often said to be importantly analogous to the
debate over modal actualism and modal possibilism (Sider 1999), (M. Davidson 2003) (Franklin
2006), (Rea 2006), (McDaniel 2010), (Noonan 2013). Actualism is the view that only actual things
exist, and it is thought to be analogous to presentism. Possibilism is the view that there are nonactual (merely possible) things, and is thought to be analogous to eternalism.
In this chapter I am going to consider whether this analogy can be used to help us
understand presentism and eternalism substantively. If actualism and possibilism are substantive
theses, and if these are analogous to presentism and eternalism, then perhaps the latter theses can
be understood substantively as well, and the former will give us some idea of how to do this. I am
going to argue that this will not work: if we do not already understand the debate over presentism
and eternalism, looking to the debate over actualism and possibilism will not help us.
4.1 Analogues
Actualism, according to which only actual45 things exist, seems to be a straightforward
modal analogue of presentism, according to which everything that exists, exists at the present time.
Likewise, possiblism, according to which merely possible things exist, seems to be a
straightforward modal analogue of eternalism, according to which everything which ever did, does,
or ever will exist, exists. Let us survey some other points of analogy.
A core point of contention between presentists and eternalists is how to account for the fact
that many apparently true statements seem to be about persons and things which do not exist at the

45

For now, I intend ‘actual’ to be understood intuitively at this point. I think that the different parties to the dispute
disagree on the meaning of ‘actual’, and this will play an important role in the discussion later. I want to get the
views on the table before looking at the details, though.
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present time, like “Plato wrote The Republic,” and “Contemporary western philosophers owe a
debt to Plato and Aristotle.” An analogous point of contention between actualists and possibilists
concerns how to account for the apparent truth of statements about unactualized possibilities, as in
“Ludwig Wittgenstein’s possible child, Fritz, might have been a staunch metaphysical realist.”
Both actualists and possibilists typically account for statements about what is possible by
invoking possible worlds, where a possible world is, roughly, a way that things could be. The
concept of a possible world can be understood in both a formal and a more substantive way.
Formally, a possible world is just anything which is designated to stand for a way the
universe might have been. In this sense, possible worlds could be pencil marks on a sheet of paper,
or goldfish in a pond, or most anything else46 provided that we can assign certain statements to be
counted as true at each of those objects and we can stipulate that certain of those objects are
accessible from certain other of those objects. We can then define necessity and possibility as
follows. First,
S is possible at a world w just in case for some world w` such that w` is accessible from w,
S is true at w`.
Second,
S is necessary at a world w just in case for any world w` such that w` is accessible from w,
S is true at w`.
We can then consider what is possible or necessary, on different senses of ‘possible’, by varying
which worlds are accessible from which. If we are concerned with physical possibility, we will

46

Arguably, if we want to represent all the ways the universe could have been, we would need an infinite number
of such objects. In practice, though, we only need enough objects to represent the possibilities we are concerned
with.
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count as accessible all and only those worlds in which all the same laws of physics hold as in the
actual world. If we are concerned with metaphysical possibility, we will count as accessible all
and only those worlds adhere to whatever the correct principles of metaphysics are.
On the more substantive conception, a possible world is a way the universe might have
been. Actualists and possibilists disagree about the nature of other possible worlds in the
substantive sense. For a possibilist, a possible world (other than the actual world) consists of a set
of merely possible objects, and hence, invocation of possible worlds brings with it existential
commitment to possible objects.
I will take as my main example of possiblism the modal realism of David Lewis (1973)
(1986). Under modal realism a possible world is a spatially, temporally, and causally
interconnected collection of concrete things, which is spatially, temporally, and causally isolated
from every other possible world. On this view, the statement “Ludwig Wittgenstein’s possible
child, Fritz, might have been a staunch metaphysical realist” is true (if it is), because in some world
which is causally, spatially, and temporally disconnected from our world, the concrete person in
that world who is the counterpart 47 of Ludwig Wittgenstein, whom we might call Twudwig
Wittgenstein, has a child, Fritz, who is a staunch metaphysical realist. Unless our beliefs about
Ludwig Wittgenstein are hugely mistaken, however, Fritz has no counterpart in our world. Fritz
thus exists but is merely possible.48

47

For any person or thing P in a world w, a counterpart of P in a world w` is the person or thing, if any, in w` most
similar to P. Lewis thinks all individuals are world-bound, meaning they exist in only one world. The counterpart
relation consequently is thus used by Lewis in place of identity across possible worlds.
48
One might wonder whether modal realism is really a genuine version of possibilism. The objects populating other
worlds are every bit as concrete as those in our world. The people in other worlds have hopes and dreams just like
the people in our world. Rather than being a view according to which non-actual things exist, modal realism might
be interpreted as a view which dispenses of mere possibility altogether. According to Lewis, utterances of the word
‘actual’ function indexically to refer to things which exist at the world of the speaker. Consequently, objects in worlds
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Similarly, under eternalism there exist things at other times which do not exist at the present
time. Under eternalism, the statement “Plato wrote The Republic” is true because there is a time
before this one at which a person, Plato, is writing The Republic. The statement “Contemporary
western philosophers owe a debt to Plato and Aristotle” is true because there exist such persons as
Plato and Aristotle at times before this one, and the development of philosophy in the intervening
period is heavily influenced by what they are doing (at the times at which they are located), with
the consequence that philosophers today owe a debt to them.49
For an actualist, a possible world is something abstract (Van Inwagen 1986), though
different actualists disagree as to how possible worlds are to be construed. According to
combinatorialists, like Armstrong (1986) and Wittgenstein of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
(2001), possible worlds are possible combinations of actual objects. On this view, the statement
“Ludwig Wittgenstein could have had a child, Fritz, who was a staunch metaphysical realist” is
true just in case existing objects could have been arranged so as to form a child of Ludwig
Wittgenstein, whom we can call ‘Fritz’, and who would have been a staunch metaphysical realist.
Alternatively, an actualist might construe a possible world as a maximally consistent
proposition, that is, the conjunction of either P or ~P for every atomic proposition P, where a
proposition is the abstract, non-linguistic entity expressed by sentences with the same meaning.50
On this account, “Ludwig Wittgenstein could have had a child, Fritz, who was a staunch

other than ours are non-actual, and hence merely possible. Thus, as Lewis construes it, modal realism is a version of
possibilism. I will follow his lead.
49
Whether or not the presentist could also accept this explanation for why “Plato wrote The Republic” is true is, of
course, not something we should presuppose an answer to at this point.
50
One problem with identifying possible worlds with maximally consistent propositions is that there are presumably
possible propositions which cannot be expressed in some worlds; specifically, those singular propositions containing
terms which directly refer to things in other possible worlds. I will not bother with pursuing this objection further or
considering how advocates of this account of possible worlds might respond, since it is beyond the scope of my
discussion.
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metaphysical realist,” is true just in case some maximal proposition contains as a constituent the
proposition that Ludwig Wittgenstein has a child who is a staunch metaphysical realist, who for
convenience we can call ‘Fritz’. Note that this proposition cannot have as a constituent Fritz
himself, as that would entail the existence of a merely possible person, contrary to actualism.
One of the best worked out versions of actualism is Plantinga’s (1974). Plantinga’s version
of actualism identifies possible worlds with maximal states of affairs. One example of a state of
affairs is Trump being the President of the United States. Another example would be Clinton being
the President of the United States. The former is, unfortunately, an actual state of affairs, while the
latter is not (here, ‘actual’ means the state of affairs obtains). A maximal state of affairs is one
such that for every proposition P, that state of affairs makes either P or its negation true (or it
would, were that state of affairs to obtain).
Along with states of affairs, Plantinga’s theory invokes essences, where a particular
essence E is some feature such that, if anything has E it has E essentially, and necessarily nothing
else has it. Every maximal state of affairs contains certain essences, so that were that maximal state
of affairs to obtain, there would exist objects with those essences. Consequently, on Plantinga’s
view “Ludwig Wittgenstein could have had a child, Fritz, who was a staunch metaphysical realist”
is true just in case there is a state of affairs containing an essence which includes being a child of
Ludwig Wittgenstein, and the child who would exist if this state of affairs had obtained would be
a staunch metaphysical realist. The name ‘Fritz’, then, is a kind of indefinite description used to
indicate a certain class of essences, such that had any of these essences been instantiated, Ludwig
Wittgenstein would have a child.51

51

I am here assuming that not only is it possible that Wittgenstein could have had children, but that he could have
had different children, even if he only had one. Any of these could be designated with ‘Fritz’.
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Some presentists, those who contend that only things existing at the present time can have
properties or stand in relations, likewise typically make metaphysical posits to account for the
truth of past-tensed statements. “Plato wrote The Republic” is true because, say, there is a primitive
tensed fact that Socrates drank hemlock (Bigelow 1996),52 or an abstract object which has as its
constituents Socrates and drinking hemlock (Bourne 2006), or something like that. Invocation of
such objects by these presentists is at least apparently analogous to the modal actualist’s use of
possible worlds.53
A final point of analogy is worth drawing attention to. In the first chapter, I argued for the
conclusions that presentism and eternalism are not substantive theses, and consequently that the
debate over presentism and eternalism is not substantive. The basic thrust of these arguments was
that presentism and eternalism are both ambiguous, and once they are disambiguated there is
nothing for any reasonable person to disagree about.
A parallel argument can be given for the conclusion that actualism and possibilism are not
substantive, opposed philosophical theses.54 Consider actualism, the thesis that only actual things

52

What is a primitive tensed property? Bigelow claims it is a property an object has concerning what used to be the
case, as a patch of ground might have the property being where a dinosaur roamed. These properties are primitive
because they cannot be analyzed in terms of what obtains at non-present times. For instance, for a patch of ground
to have the property being where a dinosaur roamed is not to be explained by claiming that a dinosaur is roaming
on that patch of ground in the past.
53
Meyer (2005) (2013) argues that whatever the presentist posits to account for the truth of past-tensed statements
cannot be analogous to possible worlds, since possible worlds must account for the truth of statements about all
possibilities, but the presentist does not want to account for the truth of all possible pasts. This is correct, but it does
not show that there is no useful analogy between actualism and possibilism. An analogy need not be complete to be
useful, after all.
54
Meyer (2005) (2013) likewise notes this, but argues that the essence of actualism and possibilism is not captured
by such proclamations as “everything that exists is actual” or “merely possible things exist,” but rather by their
different conceptions of possible worlds, thus undercutting the supposed analogy with presentism and eternalism.
I have shown, however, that the different ways actualists and possibilists construe possible worlds in fact provides
a basis for at least an apparent analogy with presentism and eternalism.
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exist. This could be read as only actual things actually exist, which is trivially true, and only actual
things possibly exist, which seems obviously false. I could have had an older sister, after all.
Possibilism, the thesis that there are non-actual (merely possible) things could be read as there
actually are non-actual (merely possible) things, which is contradictory, or there could be (could
have been) things which in fact are non-actual, which seems to be obviously true.55
Ultimately, my point in bringing up this skeptical argument for the conclusion that
actualism and possibilism are not substantive metaphysical theses is not to endorse it. Rather, I
intend to offer a response to it, and then see if a parallel response can be given to the skeptical
argument for the conclusion that presentism and eternalism are not substantive metaphysical
theses.
4.2

How to Understand the Debate Over Actualism and Possibilism
In the previous section, I pointed out some ways in which actualism is analogous to

presentism and possibilism is analogous to eternalism. One apparent point of analogy is that there
is a straightforward argument for the conclusion that the debate over actualism and possibilism is
not substantive, paralleling the argument for the conclusion that the debate over presentism and
eternalism is not substantive. If we are going to use the debate over actualism and possibilism to
help us understand the debate over presentism and eternalism substantively, we had better be able

55

Someone might object that the skeptical line of argument does not really apply in the case of actualism and
possibilism. The basis of the argument in the case of presentism and eternalism is that English verbs are tensed, and
thus the tense of ‘exists’ in the definition of presentism needs to be clarified. But English contains no equivalent to
tense in the modal case. Thus, Lombard (2010) claims that whereas ‘exists’ can mean ‘exists now’, or ‘did exist, does,
exist, or will exist,’ it cannot mean ‘possibly exists’, and so the basis for denying that the debate over presentism and
eternalism is not substantive does not apply to the case of actualism and possibilism: the actualist and possibilist are
using ‘exists’ in the same way, and genuinely disagree as to what that includes. I am going to set this aside. Assuming
there is such an analogy can only strengthen the case that the debate over actualism and possibilism can be used to
help us better understand the debate over presentism and eternalism.
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to understand the former debate substantively. In this section I want to show how to understand
the debate over actualism and possibilism.
I said that actualism is ambiguous between the trivial thesis that only actual things actually
exist, and the obviously false thesis that only actually things possibly exist. The actualist and the
possibilist both agree that the first thesis is true. Regarding the second thesis, some actualists may
indeed think that nothing could possibly exist other than what in fact does (or did or will) exist,
but that is not what actualists typically think. Most actualists agree that there could have existed
objects other than those which there actually are. So, actualists and possibilists typically agree that
only actual things actually exist, but that there could have possibly existed other things.
In order to understand modal actualism and modal possibilism as substantive, opposed
philosophical thesis, we have to understand how advocates of these positions can disagree as to
whether or not everything is actual, that is,
∀x Actually ∃y(y=x)),
where the outermost quantifier ‘∀’ does not mean either every actual thing or every actual or
possible thing. On the first reading we would have
∀actualx Actually ∃y(y=x)),
that is, every actual thing is identical to some actual thing, which is trivial. On the second reading
we would have
∀possiblex Actually ∃y(y=x),
that is, every possible thing is identical to some actual thing, which is obviously false.
The question of how to understand the claim that everything is actual as a substantive
philosophical thesis is equivalent to the question of how to understand the claim that there exist
merely possible things as a substantive philosophical thesis. Of course, this is not a disagreement
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over whether there actually exist non-actual things, since proponents of both views agree that this
is false. Nor is this a disagreement over whether there could have possibly existed things which do
not actually exist, since proponents of both views agree that this is true. What we will find is that
actualists and possibilists offer different kinds of explanations as to why a statement of the form
It could have possibly been the case that F,
are true, as well as different analyses of such concepts as possibility and actuality. As a result of
these diverging explanations, a statement like
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s possible child, Fritz, might have been a staunch metaphysical
realist,
is reckoned true by the possibilist but false by the actualist. To see how this works, we will have
to look more closely at the underlying points of contention between actualists and possibilists.
First, however, I want to briefly discuss something which may seem to be a point of contention
between actualists and possibilists: The Barcan formula.
4.2.1 The Barcan Formula
The Barcan formula is an axiom in an early system of modal logic with quantification
theory, developed by Ruth Barcan (Barcan 1946). Letting ‘◇’ stand for such clauses as “It is
possible that” and “It could have been the case that,” and letting ‘α’ stand for any formula, the
Barcan formula is:
◇ ∃x α

∃x ◇ α,

that is, if there could possibly be something such that α, then there is something such that possibly
α.
According to a temporal analogue of the Barcan formula, if there did or will exist
something such that α, then there exists something which was or will be such that α. That is:
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(P ∃x α v F ∃x α)

∃x(P α v F α).

Thus, if the Barcan formula in the modal case helps to understand the debate over actualism and
possibilism, perhaps the temporal version will help us to understand the debate over presentism
and eternalism.
Consider the claim that Wittgenstein could have had a child, Fritz, who was a staunch
metaphysical realist. If the Barcan formula is correct, then there exists something which could
have been such a child of Wittgenstein. That is,
◇ ∃x(x is a child of Wittgenstein & x is named ‘Fritz’ & x is a staunch metaphysical
realist)

∃x ◇(x is a child of Wittgenstein & x is named ‘Fritz’ & x is a staunch

metaphysical realist).
Yet it may seem that no actual entity is such that it could have been a child of Wittgenstein.
It may seem that, other than denying the Barcan formula, there are two ways of responding
to this problem.56 One is to deny the antecedent, and claim that in fact it is not possible that
Wittgenstein could have had a child, Fritz, who was a staunch metaphysical realist. This would
amount to endorsing a very strict version of actualism according to which only what actually exists
could possibly exist. While this is perhaps not quite as absurd as the thesis that everything which
ever did exist or will exist, exists now, I presume that the typical actualist does not believe this.
The other option is to accept that although no actual thing could have been Wittgenstein’s
child, Fritz, some possible thing is such that it could have been Wittgenstein’s child. Thus, there
exist merely possible things.

56

In fact, I believe this is false, a point I will come to later.
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The actualist, if she does not wish to deny that Wittgenstein could have had a child, may
wish to deny the Barcan formula. Indeed, Kripke (1963) provides a semantics for quantified modal
logic on which the Barcan formula comes out false. In this system we have a class of possible
worlds and a function which assigns to each predicate a unique57 extension in each possible world,
where the extension of a predicate in a world are the things in that world which said predicate
correctly applies to. So, the predicate ‘is a cat’ has a certain extension in our world, specifically,
all the cats, and a different extension in certain other worlds: those which contain more or less cats
than there are (in our world). The predicate ‘is a child of Ludwig Wittgenstein’ has an empty
extension in this world, but a non-empty extension in some other possible worlds. Since the
extension of a predicate can vary from world to world, and since the extension of a predicate is a
domain, this is called variable domain semantics.
Thus, it would seem that actualists and possibilists can disagree as to the truth of the Barcan
formula. If presentism and eternalism are substantive, opposed metaphysical theses, perhaps
presentists and eternalists disagree as to the truth of the temporal version of the Barcan formula.
As I will show, it is not clear that presentists and eternalists do disagree as to the truth of the Barcan
formula, and it is not clear that the Barcan formula by itself really helps us understand the debate
over actualism and possibilism, independent of some further account of what it is for something
merely possible to exist.
Recall that the temporal version of the Barcan formula goes like this:
(P ∃x α v F ∃x α)

57

∃x(P α v F α).

I do not mean to say that a predicate P has a different extension in every possible world: it may be that P has the
same extension in w and w`. Rather I mean to say that not all w and w` are such that P has the same extension in
both.
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In English:
If there ever did or ever will exist something such that α, then there exists something such
that it either was or will be the case that α.
Do presentist and eternalists disagree as to the truth of this formula? Well, suppose that we are
adopting a presentist formal language58 in which the existential quantifier, when outside the scope
of any tense operators, ranges just over things existing at the present time (or possibly outside of
time). So interpreted, this says,
If there ever did or ever will exist something such that α, then there now exists something
such that it either was or be the case that α.
This, both the presentist and the eternalist should agree, is false. For suppose it is the case that
there will be a person born in the year 2050, that is,
F ∃x(x is born in the year 2050).
It surely does not follow that there is now someone who will be born in the year 2050, that is
∃x F(x is born in the year 2050).
Thus, if we adopt a presentist formal language, the temporal version of the Barcan formula comes
out as obviously false.
Alternatively, suppose we are adopting a single domain eternalist formal language, in
which tense operators are used to indicate when something is the case relative to the present time.
So interpreted, the temporal version of the Barcan formula ought to be read as follows:

58

See chapter 3.
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If it either was the case that at some time or other something is such that α or it will be the
case at some time or other than something is such that α, then at some time or other there
is something such that either it was that α or it will be the case that α.
Consider the claim that
It will be the case that at some time or other there is a person born in the year 2050.
This statement clearly entails:
There is at some time or other something such that (relative to the present time), it will be
the case that this person is born in the year 2050.
Both the presentist and eternalist should thus agree that the temporal version of the Barcan formula
is true under this reading. Perhaps there is another way of reading the temporal version of the
Barcan formula on which presentists and eternalists will disagree as to its truth. Unfortunately, we
do not know what it is.
The second point I want to make is that the Barcan formula by itself does not help us to
understand the debate over actualism and possibilism. The mere assertion that there exist merely
possible things does not by itself help me to understand possibilism as a substantive thesis. I need
to understand what it would be for a merely possible thing to exist. The Barcan formula by itself
does not help us in this respect.
I said earlier that if we accept the Barcan formula, it seems that there are two possible
responses to the problem that it seems like Wittgenstein could have had a child, Fritz, who was a
staunch metaphysical realist. In fact, I excluded a third option: deny the assumption that no actually
existing thing could have been such a person. An actualist could consistently accept the Barcan
formula and affirm that Wittgenstein could have had such a child, so long as she is willing to accept
that there is something which could have been that child. It seems obvious, of course, that no
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ordinary thing could have been such a person, but our actualist may insist that some unordinary
thing could have been. Perhaps there is some abstract entity which, had it been instantiated, would
have been Wittgenstein’s child Fritz.59
Nor does the variable domain semantics associated with Kripke’s semantics for modal
logic entail actualism. For the possibilist may insist that although different things exist in different
possible worlds, everything in any possible world exists, and thus that there exist merely possible
things. In order to understand the debate over actualism and possibilism, we need some idea of
what it means to assert (or deny) that merely possible things exist. It is to that task which I now
turn.
4.2.2 Making Sense of Possibilism
At this juncture, I intend to give an account of how there can be a substantive debate over
whether or not there exist merely possible things. Our challenge, recall, is how to make sense of
the claim that everything is actual, that is
∀x Actually ∃y(y=x),
as a substantive philosophical thesis. The short version of the answer to this challenge is that the
possibilist thinks the word ‘actual’ does not apply to everything that exists, whereas the actualist
does, because the possibilist and the actualist offer different accounts of possibility and necessity.
Actualism and possibilism each have three different underlying aspects: one metaphysical,
one conceptual, and one semantic. The metaphysical aspect concerns what exists. The semantic
aspect concerns why true statements about what is merely possible are, in fact, true. The conceptual
aspect concerns the proper analysis of such concepts as actuality and necessity. By considering all
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Williamson (1998) suggests such an interpretation of the Barcan formula.
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three aspects of actualism and possibilism we see how it is that whether or not non-actual things
exist can be understood as a substantive philosophical question. I will briefly discuss each of these
in turn.
By the metaphysical aspects of actualism and possibilism I do not mean the respective
claims that there do and do not exist non-actual things. What it means to say that non-actual things
do or do not exist is exactly what we are trying to understand. By the metaphysical aspects of
actualism and possibilism I mean the metaphysical commitments of these views insofar as they
can be described independently of the question of whether or not there exist non-actual things. The
metaphysical aspects of actualism and possibilism contain points of both agreement and
disagreement.
Actualists and possibilists agree that clearly actual things exist. Individual actualists and
possibilists may disagree as to what actual things there are, but this will be a result of philosophical
commitments independent of actualism and possibilism. For instance, an individual actualist may
be a mereological universalist, and an individual possibilist a mereological nihilist. So, the actualist
will believe that for any two objects, there is a third object which they compose, and the possibilist
will believe that no two objects ever compose another. Thus, this particular actualist and this
particular possibilist will disagree about what exists. That disagreement will be due to their
differing views on mereology, however, rather than modality. Setting aside independent
philosophical commitments, actualists and possibilists can both agree that rocks, trees, and people
all exist.
The possibilist at least, and many actualists, will go on to make further ontological claims,
however. In the case of Lewis’s modal realism, we have the vast number of worlds which are
spatially, temporally, and causally isolated from this world and each other. For their part, actualists
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will typically claim that there are, say, abstract combinations of actual objects, or abstract states of
affairs.
It is worth noting that though the actualist in fact likely denies that the entities posited by
the possibilist exist, she does not have to. A typical actualist probably does not think there are any
concrete worlds spatially, causally, and temporally isolated from ours,60 and, therefore, does not
think any of these worlds contains a concrete counterpart of Ludwig Wittgenstein with a son, Fritz,
who is a staunch metaphysical realist. None of the actualist’s commitments qua actualist, however,
forbid her for granting that there may for all she knows exist such spatially, causally, and
temporally isolated worlds. Similarly, nothing prevents the possibilist qua possibilist from
granting that there are facts such that certain objects could compose another object, or abstract
states of affairs containing unrealized essences, and so forth. Thus, while it is likely actualists and
possibilists in fact disagree about ontology, this disagreement is not essential.
The conceptual aspect of actualism and possibilism consist in how, according to each view,
we are to analyze such concepts as possibility and actuality. It is here where the essential
underlying point of contention between actualists and possibilists begins to appear. According to
possibilism, the concept of actuality is analyzed so that it does not apply to everything that exists,
whereas under actualism, actuality is analyzed so that everything whatsoever that exists counts as
actual.
According to Lewis, the word ‘actual’, in its contexts of use, is restricted in an indexical
way, such that any utterance of a sentence containing it refers to the Lewisian world in which it is
uttered. Lewis (1970) writes
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I am of course assuming that there is no sound argument for the conclusion that all spatial things must be spatially
connected. If such an argument can be found, modal realism will be refuted.
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I suggest that ‘actual’ and its cognates should be analyzed as indexical terms: terms whose
reference varies, depending on relevant features of the context of utterance. According to
the indexical analysis I propose, ‘actual’ (in its primary sense) refers at any world w to the
world w. (Lewis 1970, 184)61
Similarly, the word ‘possible’ functions indexically so that any utterance of a sentence containing
it refers to some set of Lewisian worlds other than the world of utterance.
While the existence of worlds like Lewis describes is consistent with the actualist’s beliefs
qua actualist, it is inconsistent with those beliefs that such worlds play the role Lewis utilizes them
for in his analysis of our concepts of actuality and possibility. 62 It is consistent with actualism that
there is some concrete world, isolated from our own, populated by people very much like us, such
that the person in that world who most resembles Ludwig Wittgenstein in our world has a child
who is a staunch metaphysical realist. As far as the actualist is concerned, this would have nothing
to do with whether Wittgenstein might have had a child, Fritz, who was a staunch metaphysical
realist. If the actualist did believe in worlds like Lewis describes, she would claim they were actual.
This is not a peculiarity of modal realism. It seems to me that any version of possibilism
must make an analogous conceptual claim. Unless we have been fooled, it seems clear, says the
actualist, that no child of Ludwig Wittgenstein exists. The possibilist will retort that in fact a great
many such children exist, but not actually. Whatever could this mean? Presumably it means there
are things with some feature F, in virtue of which the possibilist says that they are non-actual, and
one of these things is what we are talking about with the sentence “Ludwig Wittgenstein’s possible
child, Fritz, might have been a staunch metaphysical realist.” As far as I can see, for any such
proposal, so long as the feature F is not inconsistent, the actualist could concede that there may,
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Lewis (1986) quotes this passage approvingly in On the Plurality of Worlds, p. 93.
Indeed, Van Inwagen (1980) argues that if we understand possible worlds as actualists want us to, then we should
not treat ‘actual’ as an indexical at all.
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for all she knows, exist things with the feature F. As an actualist, however, she would deny that
the Fs are merely possible things.
The semantic aspect of actualism and possibilism consists of the explanation for what it is
in virtue of which statements about mere possibility are true or false. For the actualist, such
statements are true or false in virtue of facts about abstract possible worlds. The possibilist will
deny, however, that such things can adequately ground our talk involving possibility and necessity
(Lewis 1986). Consequently, actualists and possibilists disagree as to why a statement like
Ludwig Wittgenstein could possibly have had a child, Fritz, who would have been a
staunch metaphysical realist
is true. According to the actualist, this statement is true in virtue of some actual abstract fact, and
not in virtue of any such person as Fritz. According to the possibilist, this is true because Fritz
exists, but lacks the features requisite for being actual.
We can see now why the statement that
There exist non-actual things
comes out true under possibilism but not under actualism. In order to have a substantive
disagreement over whether or not non-actual things exist, however, it must be the case that
actualists and possibilists are offering different analyses of the very same concepts of possibility
and actuality, rather than discussing different concepts with the same words ‘actuality’ and
‘possibility’. For comparison, the claim that there are married bachelors would not become a
substantive thesis if someone decided to define ‘bachelor’ as ‘a man who is missing a toe’. Nothing
prevents someone from using the word ‘bachelor’ in this way, but whether or not bachelors can be
married would not thereby become a topic of reasonable debate. Rather, we would have two
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different concepts which, unfortunately, are both expressed by the same word ‘bachelor’, and one
of these applies only to unmarried men whereas the other may apply to married persons.
Lewis’s modal realism, and any other version of possibilism, is a substantive contribution
to philosophical thinking about possibility only insofar as it can be seen as offering a way of
analyzing the concept being actual which we already have, rather than supplying a new concept
called by the same name. Wondering what could have been, as opposed to what is actually the case
is a part of everyday life, not a creation of philosophers.
To his credit, Lewis (1986) argues that our usage of ‘actual’ does not rule out as incoherent
the claim that there are non-actual things. Says Lewis:
Suppose we interviewed some spokesman for common sense. I think we would find that
he adheres firmly to three theses:
(1)
Everything is actual.
(2)
Actuality consists of everything that is spatiotemporally related to us, and nothing
more (give or take some ‘abstract entities’). It is not vastly bigger, or less unified,
than we are accustomed to think.
(3)
Possibilties are not parts of actuality, they are alternatives to it.
The first two theses cannot both be mere matters of meaning, trivial analytic truths. Taken
together, they say too much for that. My critics claim that the first is analytic, its denial is
paradoxical or ‘mere noise’; whereas the second is up for grabs. But I think that the two
theses, indeed all three are on equal footing. (Lewis 1986, 99)
I understand Lewis to be arguing as follows. We are inclined to think both that everything is actual
and that every actual thing is spatially and temporally continuous with us. But it cannot be the case
that both of these are analytic truths, since together they would imply the logical impossibility of
worlds disconnected from ours. Since as far as we can tell there could be such worlds, we must
conclude that the meaning of the word ‘actually’ is not fully determined by our linguistic practice.
Lewis’s modal realism, then, if it succeeds in making the debate over actualism and
possiiblism substantive, does so by utilizing a certain indefiniteness in the meaning of ‘actual’ in
ordinary language. The word ‘actual’ is sometimes intended to cover everything, but, according to
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Lewis it also is presumed to apply only to things spatially and temporally continuous with us.
Consequently, if there are things which are neither spatially or temporally continuous with us, it is
not clear whether ‘actual’ should apply to them, or whether they have anything to do with the truth
or falsity of our modal claims. Other versions of possibilism must likewise exploit some
indefiniteness in the meaning of ‘actual’.
4.3

Presentism and Eternalism
In the previous section, I made a proposal for how to understand the debate over modal

actualism and modal possibilism. The short version of this response was that the possibilist agrees
that only actual things actually exist, but insists that what actually exists is less than what exists.
Following this lead, the short version of our response to the skeptic who believes presentism and
eternalism are not substantive metaphysical theses is that the eternalist agrees that only present
things exist now, but contends that what is expressed by the phrase ‘exists now’ does not apply to
everything that exists.
The proposal seems to go like this. The presentist accepts, whereas the eternalist rejects,
the claim that everything that exists, exists now, that is,
∀x(now ∃y(y=x)).
The presentist claims that this is true even if the outermost quantifier is taken as unrestricted, so
that everything falls within its domain. The eternalist, likewise interpreting the outermost
quantifier as unrestricted, claims this is false, because among those things which are included in
the range of the outermost quantifier, are things which do not exist at the present time.
In order for this to amount to a satisfactory response to the skeptic, we have to fill out the
details. The skeptic will claim that the presentist and the eternalist are not really using the quantifier
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in the same way. The claim that everything that exists, exists now is trivially true if it is read as
the claim that everything that exits now, exists now, that is
Now ∀x(Now ∃y(y=x)).
This claim is obviously false, however, if read as the claim that everything that ever did exist, does
exist, or will exist, exists now, that is
Ever ∀x(Now ∃y(y=x)).
The skeptic will insist that those philosophers who believe the debate over presentism and
eternalism to be substantive owe us an account of how to understand the thesis that everything that
exists, exists now, so that it is not equivalent to either of the above readings. Let us see if our
approach to making sense of the debate over actualism and possibilism in the previous section will
help us.
We saw that actualism and possibilism each has a metaphysical aspect consisting in a claim
about what exists, a conceptual aspect consisting in a claim about how to analyze such concepts
as actuality and possibility, and a semantic aspect consisting in a claim about what it is in virtue
of which statements about possibility are true or false. Altogether, these three aspects provided us
with a way of understanding the debate over whether there exist non-actual things.
If the debate over presentism and eternalism is to be understood analogously, both
presentism and eternalism will have a metaphysical, conceptual, and semantic aspect, such that
altogether these three aspects provide us a way of understanding the debate over whether things
which did exist in the past and things which will exist in the future, exist. The metaphysical aspect
of presentism cannot just be the claim that only things that exist at the present time exist, and the
metaphysical aspect of eternalism cannot just be the claim that things which did or will exist, exist.
These views are, after all, precisely what we are trying to understand. Unfortunately, it is not at all
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clear what else the metaphysical aspects of presentism and eternalism might be, other than the fact,
which both agree on, that things existing at the present time exist.
Previously, I said that the possibilist posits a class of entities the existence of which is
consistent with actualism, although the typical actualist probably does not believe that such entities
exist. The possibilist claims that these entities are merely possible, and that statements about
possibility and necessity are true or false in virtue of facts about them. The actualist denies this. If
presentism is analogous to actualism, and eternalism analogous to possibilism, then it should be
the case that the eternalist posits a class of entities the existence of which is consistent with
presentism, although the typical presentist does not believe that such entities exist. Presentists and
eternalists will then disagree as to whether these entities are things which did exist in the past or
will exist in the future, and whether they explain the truth and falsity of statements about what was
or will be the case in the past or future.
The entities which eternalists posit, however, are not consistent with presentism. When the
eternalist asserts that dinosaurs exist, she is not asserting the existence of a kind of entity which
the presentist can accept may exist for all he knows, and then making the further assertion, which
the presentist rejects, that those things are dinosaurs. Rather, the eternalist simply asserts that there
are dinosaurs, which exist in the past. If there is a substantive disagreement between presentists
and eternalists, then it cannot be the case that the existence of the entities posited by the eternalist
could exist according to presentism. Thus, the way we made sense of the debate over actualism
and possibilism does not apply in the case of presentism and eternalism.
Here is another way of challenging the idea of making sense of the debate over presentism
and eternalism by treating these as temporal analogous of actualism and possibilism. Recall that
earlier I quoted David Lewis’s claim that the following three theses are a part of common sense:
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(1)
(2)

(3)

Everything is actual.
Actuality consists of everything that is spatiotemporally related to us, and nothing
more (give or take some ‘abstract entities’). It is not vastly bigger, or less unified,
than we are accustomed to think.
Possibilities are not parts of actuality, they are alternatives to it. (Lewis 1986, 99).

If presentism and eternalism can be understood as substantive, opposed metaphysical theses by
analogy to actualism and possibilism, then we should expect some parallel set of theses of common
sense with respect to time.
What might the three parallel theses be? Perhaps the following:
(1`)
(2`)
(3`)

Everything that exists, exists at the present time.
The present time consists of everything simultaneous with us now, and nothing
more (give or take some ‘abstract entities’).
Other times are not parts of the present time, they are alternatives to it.

Are all of these common sense?
Is it a piece of common sense that everything that exists, exists at the present time? Well,
this is trivially true if ‘exists’ is in the present-tense, and obviously false if ‘exists’ is used to be
mean did exist, does exist, or will exist. Is it a piece of common sense if ‘exists’ is meant in some
other way? But we do not what this other way of understanding ‘exists’ is, or even if there is one.
Now, (2`) is surely a piece of common sense. Indeed, it just seems trivial. On the other hand, while
(2) also seems like common sense, it does not seem trivial: there could, as far as I know, be objects
with spatial properties which do not stand in any spatial relations to us.
Is (3`) a piece of common sense? We need to get clear on what (3`) says. In (3), by an
alternative to the actual world is meant, presumably, a way the world could have been instead of
the way the world is actually. Thus, ‘alternatives’ is used in a modal sense. If I were to speak of
alternative times to the present in this sense, I would not mean past and future times, but other
ways the world could be at the present time. Now, it is a piece of common sense that things right
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now could have been different than in fact they are. The eternalist, however, does not intend to
deny this, and it has nothing to do with whether or not past and future times or things exist..
Lewis thinks that the possibilist will reject (3) in favor of the claim that
Possibilities are not parts of actuality, they are other than it,
where ‘other’ just means different: there are different worlds than the world which we consider to
be actual. The temporal analogue of this statement would seem to be as follows:
(3``)

Other times are not parts of the present time, they are other than it,

where this is to be understood equivalently to the following:
Past and future times are not part of the present time, they are other times.
It does not seem that either the presentist or eternalist should disagree with this. The presentist and
eternalist both think that there was a time, 1776, which is not a part of the present time, and that
there will be a time, 2050, which is also not a part of the present time. We have yet to clearly
identify a point of disagreement.
Lewis responds to the three original theses of common sense with respect to modality like
so:
The first two theses cannot both be mere matters of meaning, trivial analytic truths. Taken
together, they say too much for that. My critics claim that the first is analytic, its denial is
paradoxical or ‘mere noise’; whereas the second is up for grabs. But I think that the two
theses, indeed all three are on equal footing. (Lewis 1986, 99)
That is, first, (1) and (2) cannot be analytic truths, because they together entail a non-analytic
thesis: everything (other than abstract objects) is spatially and temporally contiguous with us.
Second, Lewis claims that all three are substantive claims which might be denied. We arrive at
modal realism in three steps. First, we reject the consequence of conjoining (1) and (2), and thus
posit the existence of worlds which are temporally and spatially disconnected from ours. Second,
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we affirm (2) and thus conclude that these other worlds are non-actual. Third, we therefore reject
(1), and then replace (3) with the claim that possibilities are other worlds rather than alternatives.
Turning to our parallels, if (1`) is read as the thesis that everything that exists now exists at
the present time, then it and (2`) tougher do not entail anything controversial at all. If (1`) is read
as the thesis that everything that ever did exist, does exist, or ever will exist, exits now, then it and
(2`) together entail that everything (other than things outside of time) consists of whatever exists
simultaneously with the present time. This is clearly, and unsurprisingly, too strong a consequence
to make (1`) so read an analytic thesis, but neither common sense, the presentist, or the eternalist
endorses this thesis.
If eternalism is analogous to possibilism, we might expect that the steps taken to arrive at
the latter theses, possibilism, from our three theses of common sense about modality will parallel
the steps taken to arrive at the former theses, eternalism, from our three parallel theses about time.
So, we should expect the eternalist to deny the consequence of (1`) and (2`), accept (2`), and reject
(1`).
Presumably the eternalist will not deny the claim that everything that exists now exists at
the present time, so we ought to assume the other reading of (1`). Thus, the eternalist denies the
thesis that everything (other than things outside of time) consists of whatever exists simultaneously
with the present time. This would apparently make the eternalist’s positive thesis into the claim
that there did and will exist things which do not exist simultaneously with the present time. This
is obviously true. We have already noted that both the presentist and the eternalist will accept (2`),
and neither reading of (3`) seems to be a point of contention. Again, we have yet to arrive at a clear
point of disagreement.
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Perhaps there is some other way of understanding the theses (1`) – (3`), on which we can
make out a substantive point of disagreement between the presentist and the eternalist.
Unfortunately, it is not yet clear what this might be.
What if, instead, we treat actualism as analogous to eternalism and possibilism as
analogous to presentism? As discussed previously, advocates of serious presentism posit the
existence of entities that exist either at the present time or outside of time to explain why statements
like “Dinosaurs roamed the earth” and “Plato wrote The Republic” are true. Perhaps the serious
presentist also thinks these posits are to be used in analyzing our concepts of having existed and
going to exist. Serious presentism, then, seems to have metaphysical, semantic, and conceptual
aspects, some of which are inconsistent with eternalism. The main question of this dissertation is
not whether serious presentism is a substantive thesis, however, but whether presentism is. Even
if we agree that serious presentism is a substantive thesis, it does not follow that presentism is,
unless series presentism helps us to understand the thesis that everything that exists, exists at the
present time. I consider this possibility in the next chapter.
4.4 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter I have considered the claim that presentism and eternalism are analogous to
actualism and possibilism, respectively, and hence that we can look to the debate over actualism
and possibilism for a key to understanding the debate over presentism and eternalism. I have
described some ways in which the respective positions do seem to be analogous. Ultimately I
argued, however, that we cannot use the analogy with actualism and possibilism to help us
understand presentism and eternalism as substantive theses.
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CHAPTER 5. PRESENTISM AS SERIOUS PRESENTISM
In the last three chapters I have considered several ways of either trying to understand
presentism as a substantive thesis, or trying to show that the debate over presentism and eternalism
is substantive. I have argued that each of these attempts fails. In those chapters I have had occasion
to mention serious presentism, according to which only things existing at the present time (or
outside of time) can exhibit properties or stand in relations.63 In this chapter I want to see if we
can use serious presentism to help us understand presentism as a substantive thesis. Of course, it
will not help us to simply add to presentism the additional thesis that only things existing at the
present time can exhibit properties or stand in relations, for what we want to understand is the
thesis that everything exists at the present time, and the addition of a further thesis does not help
us do that.
What I want to explore here is whether presentism plausibly entails serious presentism. A
thesis T entails a thesis T* just in case there is no way for T to be true and T* false. If T is not
possibly true, then it entails any thesis T*. On the other hand, if T entails some T* but not others,
it must be conceivable that T be true in some possible case. In the first case, let us say that T
vacuously entails T*, and in the second case that T non-vacuously entails T*. If we know that a
thesis T vacuously entails a thesis T*, then we know that T is not possibly true, and so T is not a
substantive thesis. (That a thesis T is not possibly true does not automatically make it not a
substantive thesis, but that we know it is not possibly true does).
On the other hand, suppose that we know that a thesis T non-vacuously entails a thesis T*,
and suppose that T* is a substantive thesis. Recall from chapter 1 that a thesis is philosophically
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I am being intentionally silent as to the tense of ‘bear properties’ and ‘stand in relation’. These tense ambiguities
will have an important role to play in this chapter.
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substantive just in case philosophers can reasonably disagree as to whether it is true or false. If T*
is substantive, for any thesis T such that T non-vacuously entails T*, it must be conceivable that T
be either true or false as well. After all, if T were obviously necessarily true, it would only entail
other theses which were necessarily true, but by hypothesis T* is not. Hence, if we know that T
non-vacuously entails T*, and T* is substantive, T must be substantive as well.
Consequently, if we can show both that presentism non-vacuously entails serious
presentism and that serious presentism is a substantive thesis, then we will be justified in
concluding that presentism is a substantive thesis as well.64 Furthermore, if we can understand
serious presentism as a substantive thesis, perhaps we can use it as a guide to help us understand
presentism substantively as well.
In this chapter I am going to consider some arguments for the conclusion that presentism
entails serious presentism. I will show that the basic strategy used in chapter 1 to argue for the
conclusion that presentism is not a substantive metaphysical thesis can be used to undermine such
arguments. For all I say here, it may in fact be the case that presentism, understood substantively,
entails serious presentism. If we do not already understand presentism substantively, however, we
have no reason to assume such an entailment.
Afterwards I will discuss one interpretation of the thesis that everything exists at the present
time which plausibly does entail serious presentism: everything that ever did or ever will exist,
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Another possibility, suggested by Lawrence Lombard, is that presentism and serious presentism are derived
(whether legitimately or fallaciously) from some further thesis, perhaps the thesis that an object x can be a member
of a class or a constituent of a proposition at a time t only if x exists at t. I discussed this sort of view in chapter 2,
section 2.4. If presentism and/or serious presentism are derived from such a thesis, then it would seem to be based
on a mistake.

115

exists at the present time. I will briefly discuss the prospects of taking this as a substantive construal
of presentism.
To begin, however, I want to briefly comment on the name ‘serious presentism’ as well as
make a case that serious presentism is indeed a substantive thesis.
5.1

Serious Presentism, Terminology, and Substance
Here I want to briefly discuss the name ‘serious presentism’, and make a case that serious

presentism is a substantive thesis. Recall that serious presentism is the thesis that only things
existing at the present time (or outside of time) can exhibit properties or stand in relations. This is
contrasted with non-serious presentism, according to which things which merely did or will exist
at past or future times can exhibit (some) properties and relations, despite the fact that they do not
exist (whatever that means).
It may be useful to say a bit to help clarify serious and non-serious versions of presentism.
Advocates of both versions of presentism claim to agree that, with the possible exception of things
that exist outside of time, everything that exists, exists at the present time (though whether this is
an interesting thesis at all is precisely what we wish to know). What they disagree about is what
sorts of things can exhibit properties or stand in relations. We can thus construe the difference
between serious and non-serious versions of presentism as a disagreement concerning what can be
the subject of a predicate at the present time. According to serious presentism, the domain of those
objects which can be subjects of predication at the present time is the domain of objects which
exist at the present time (or possibly outside of time). According to non-serious presentism, the
domain of those objects which can be subjects of predication at the present time is the domain of
all objects which ever did, do, or will exist at all times (plus anything outside of time).
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The names ‘serious presentism’ and ‘non-serious presentism’ are unfortunate. The label
‘non-serious presentism’ suggests that this is not a genuine version of presentism at all, and thus
that only serious presentism counts as presentism. For all we know at this point, it may turn out
that presentism, correctly understood, does entail serious presentism. But that is something to be
decided by argument.
I would prefer to call the view according to which only things existing at the present time
can exhibit properties or stand in relations relationally conservative presentism. The view
according to which everything exists at the present time, but things which merely did exist or
merely will exist can nevertheless exhibit (some) properties and stand in (some) relations, I would
prefer to call relationally liberal presentism. These names express in a straightforward way the
central theses of these versions of presentism (assuming that both are legitimate versions of
presentism), without any suggestion that only one really counts as presentism. However, the terms
‘serious presentism’ and ‘non-serious presentism’ are established in the literature: the name
‘serious presentism’ appears, for instance, in Bergmann (1999), Davidson (2003), Baron (2013a)
(2013b) (2014), and Torrengo (2014), and the name ‘non-serious presentism’ appears in Hinchliff
(1988) and Inman (2012).65 To avoid confusion, I will follow the literature.
Is the claim that only things existing at the present time (or outside of time) can exhibit
properties or stand in relations philosophically substantive? By the standards given in chapter 1, it
is indeed substantive. In that chapter I said that a thesis is philosophically substantive just in case,
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Hinchcliff (1988) claims that the names ‘serious presentism’ and ‘non-serious presentism’ are based on the named
‘serious actualism’ and ‘non-serious actualism’. The former is actualism together with the thesis that only actual
things can exhibit properties or stand in relations. The latter is actualism together with the thesis that merely possible
things can exhibit (some) properties and stand in (some) relations. The naming convention behind serious and nonserious presentism is thus based on a presumed analogy with actualism.
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There is an unambiguous statement of the thesis such that philosophers could reasonably
disagree as to its truth.
I submit that on at least one reading, serious presentism meets both conditions.
First, what is distinctive of serious presentism can be stated unambiguously. Of course, the
claim that only things existing at the present time can exhibit properties or stand in relations is in
fact ambiguous to tense, but if either or both disambiguations are substantive, then so is serious
presentism.
Let us consider the two readings of serious presentism. First, it could mean
Only things existing at the present time can now exhibit properties or stand in relations.
That is, if something does not exist now, it cannot exhibit properties or stand in relations now. For
instance, since Plato does not now exist, he cannot now exhibit the property being the author of
The Republic. Alternatively, it could mean
Only things existing at the present time can ever exhibit properties or stand in relations.
That is, if something does not exist now, it cannot ever exhibit any properties or stand in any
relations. For instance, since Plato does not now exist, he cannot ever exhibit the property of being
the author of The Republic.
If either of these disambiguations is philosophically controversial, meaning that
philosophers could disagree as to its truth, then serious presentism is a substantive philosophical
thesis. Our first disambiguation of serious presentism, according to which
Only things existing at the present time can now exhibit properties or stand in relations,
is, I submit, philosophically controversial. It is neither so obviously true that no philosopher could
disagree with it, nor so obviously false that no philosopher could fail to disagree with it.
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The thesis that only things existing at the present time can now exhibit properties or stand
in relations is not so obviously true that no one could deny it. Indeed, it seems false. Someone
might reasonably insist that Plato now has the property being the author of the Republic, even
though Plato does not now exist. Or consider the reference relation between a name and what it
names. Someone might reasonably insist that the name ‘Plato’ in the statement “Plato wrote The
Republic” now refers to a person who existed long ago. Yet if only things existing now can stand
in relations now, then only what exists now can stand in a reference relation now, and thus only
what exists now can be referred to. Thus, the thesis that only things existing at the present time
can now exhibit properties or stand in relations entails ‘Plato’ does not refer to any such person as
Plato.66
On the other hand, some philosophers claim to endorse serious presentism: for

instance,

Bigelow (1996), Markosian (2004), De Clercq (2006), Bourne (2006), and Crisp (2005) (2007). If
actual philosophers believe the thesis that only things existing at the present time can now exhibit
properties or stand in relations, it is not the case that this thesis is so obviously false that no
philosopher could believe it. Thus, the thesis that only things existing at the present time can now
exhibit properties now or stand in relations is philosophically substantive.
Or perhaps this is too fast. Suppose the skeptic is correct and presentism is not a substantive
thesis. Some philosophers who mistakenly believe presentism is a substantive thesis go on to
fallaciously derive serious presentism. A philosopher might reasonably insist that, if this is the
case, serious presentism is not a substantive thesis.
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If you think that there is an afterlife, replace “Plato wrote The Republic” with “Paul the pot was smashed,” and
consider the reference relation between the name ‘Paul’ and its referent, if anything.
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In the first chapter, I claimed that a thesis is philosophically substantive just in case it can
be stated unambiguously, and so stated the truth of this thesis is something over which
philosophers could debate. Serious presentism is substantive by this standard. Of course, this very
example may compel another philosopher to reject my account of philosophical substance. In
developing my account of philosophical substance, I sought to make it so that not just any thesis
would be substantive, but also that a substantive thesis could turn out to be either necessarily true
or necessarily false, and that a thesis could be substantive even if the arguments for it are in fact
fallacious. This was because it seems to me that at least some theses endorsed by philosophers are
in fact necessarily false and supported by arguments that are ultimately fallacious. Perhaps there
is a better account of what it is for a philosophical thesis to be substantive than the one I endorsed
in chapter 1. Indeed, I take my proposal of what it is for a thesis to be philosophically substantive,
to itself be philosophically substantive: philosophers may reasonably disagree with it. I will,
however, assume the account of philosophical substance I offered is correct, because I do not have
an alternative account to work with.
My intention in this chapter is to argue for the conclusion that serious presentism does not
help us understand presentism as a substantive thesis. If we conclude at the outset that serious
presentism is not a substantive thesis, then will have already rejected using serious presentism to
help understand presentism as a substantive thesis. Thus, it is worthwhile to suppose, at least for
sake of argument, that serious presentism is a substantive thesis, and see if we can make sense of
presentism as a substantive thesis on that assumption.
5.2

Identification or Entailment?
The primary question I take up in this chapter is whether we can use serious presentism as

a way to help us understand presentism. One option would be to simply identify presentism with
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serious presentism. Indeed, some philosophers seem to presuppose that presentism simply is
serious presentism. Thus, Markosian (2004) writes:
If there are no non-present objects, then no one can now stand in any relation to any nonpresent object. Thus, for example, you cannot now stand in the relation of being an admirer
of to Socrates, I cannot now stand in the relation being a grandson of to my paternal
grandfather, and no event today can stand in any causal relation to George Washington’s
crossing the Delaware. (Markosian, A Defense of Presentism 2004, 51).

The move from presentism to serious presentism occurs in the first sentence, and is asserted as if
no justification for the inference is required. Indeed, Markosian does not so much argue that
presentism entails serious presentism, as he uses serious presentism to explicate presentism.
Stoneham (2009) identifies presentism with a consequence of serious presentism, though
he is more conscientious about this than Markosian. After rehearsing the argument that I outlined
in chapter 1 for the claim that the thesis that everything exists at the present time is not substantive,
Stoneham proposes the following definition of presentism:
If <p> is true, then there now exists some object x, such that <x exists> strictly implies
<p>. (Stoneham 2009, 212)
Here, ‘<p>’ refers to the proposition that P.
What does this amount to? Unfortunately, Stoneham does little to elaborate on this
proposal. He does offer the following comment, in which ‘existence*’ is understood to express a
tenseless sense of ‘exists’:
Given [this principle] the presentist must either deny that <There was a British Empire> is
true or give a semantics according to which its truth neither presupposes nor entails the
existence* of the British Empire… [W]e can see that even though [this principle] still uses
the dubious tenseless concept of existence*, it does reveal something important: the
disputants disagree as to the relation between what exists now and what is true now.
(Stoneham 2009, 211-212)
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I will presume that Stoneham is using ‘object’ in a loose sense that includes states of affairs and
facts.
This thesis of Stoneham’s is admittedly not the same as the thesis that only things existing
at the present time can now exhibit properties or stand in relations. However, the latter thesis entails
Stoneham’s, given the reasonable assumption that for a statement to be true requires it stand in
some relation to that in virtue of which it is true.
We should not simply identify presentism with serious presentism, or with a consequence
of serious presentism. First of all, to simply identifying presentism with serious presentism, or one
of its substantive consequences, begs the question against advocates of non-serious presentism,
like Hinchliff (1988) Inman (2012).
A second reason against simply identifying presentism with serious presentism is that in
doing so we risk changing what presentism means. The thesis that, with the possible exception of
things existing outside of time, everything exists at the present time, is apparently a thesis about
what exists. The thesis that, with the possible exception of things existing outside of time, only
things existing at the present time can exhibit properties or stand in relations, is apparently a thesis
about what sorts of things can exhibit properties and stand in relations. Although there is plausibly
a relation between what exists and what can exhibit properties and stand in relations, we should
not assume that a given theses about what exists is identical to a given theses about properties and
relations.
We want to see if we can make sense of presentism as a substantive thesis, rather than some
other thesis that goes by that name. Whatever manner we might use serious presentism to argue
that presentism is a substantive thesis, we ought to establish rather than simply assert that the two
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theses are related in the required way. I think that the question of whether or not presentism entails
serious presentism deserves more careful attention than that.
In the following sections I want to consider three arguments for the conclusion that
presentism entails serious presentism. If there is such an entailment, this will establish that
presentism has a substantive consequence, and hence is a substantive thesis.
I will argue, however, that the same line of argument used in chapter 1 to argue for the
conclusion that presentism is not a substantive thesis can be used to refute each of the arguments
I will consider here for the conclusion that presentism entails serious presentism.
A brief clarificatory comment is in order. I am not really interested, in this chapter, in
determining whether or not presentism, understood as a substantive thesis, entails serious
presentism. At this juncture, we have not yet decided if presentism can be understood as a
substantive thesis at all, and therefore we cannot productively investigate this question. My interest
in this chapter, rather, is to look at some of the main lines of argument for the conclusion that
presentism entails serious presentism, and see if they help us come to see that presentism is in fact
a substantive thesis, despite the argument for the contrary conclusion in chapter 1.
5.3

First Argument
The first argument for the conclusion that presentism entails serious presentism is of my

own creation. I think it captures in a straightforward way what I take to be the main motivation for
accepting the inference from presentism to relationally conservative presentism. The argument
goes like this:

67

(1)

Everything exists at the present time,

(2)

Only existing things can bear properties or stand in relations,67

I intentionally leave the tense of this statement unspecified.
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(3)

Only things that exist at the present time can bear properties or stand in relations.

Non-serious presentists will of course deny (2). Serious presentists will retort that (2) is a
conceptual truth; that is, we can see that (2) is true by carefully reflecting upon the concepts it
expresses. If (2) is a conceptual truth, this is a compelling argument for the conclusion that
presentism entails serious presentism.
5.3.1 An Initial Defense of the Main Premise
Is (2) a conceptual truth? I want to briefly consider and reject three classes of apparent
counterexamples. The first of these comes from myth and fiction: Pegasus is the steed of
Bellerephon, but Pegasus does not and never did exist. 68 The second is that (2) is false if
Meinongianism is true, and so some things can have properties and stand in relations which have
some ontological status other than existence. The third concerns relations to mere possibilia: it
seems I could have had an older sister, and someone might think I stand in the younger than
relation to this non-existent person.
I do not think any of these really constitute genuine counter-examples to (2), and I hope by
rejecting them to strengthen the intuitive support for (2). I must confess, though, that they do raise
problems worthy of philosophical discussion. I cannot give a full account of truths involving myth
and fiction, a comprehensive refutation of Meinongianism, or a robust account of modality here.
My discussion will therefore be brief and incomplete, but I hope to establish that a reasonable
person who thought (2) was a conceptual truth need not be overly troubled by such apparent
counterexamples.

68

It occurs to me that the stories of Bellerphon and Pegasus might in fact trace back to a real person and a real horse.
Perhaps stories of the horse’s unusual swiftness evolved into fantastic tales of its ability to fly. In any case, no such
horse ever existed that meets the description assigned to Pegasus in the myth.
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Before looking at these three classes of apparent counter-examples to (2), I want to briefly
mention and set aside a different class of possible counter-examples: those expressed by such
statements as “Plato is now the author of The Republic,” “The name ‘Plato’ now refers to Plato,”
“Susie admires Plato,” and “Plato is dead.” Each of these would appear to be a counter-example
to (2). Advocates of serious presentism propose that such statements can be construed so that they
do not really imply that non-existing things bear properties or stand in relations.69 If some such
proposal is successful, then such statements are not really counter-examples to (2). If all such
proposals fail, statements like this would constitute a powerful reason to think serious presentism
is false, and likewise presentism, if it entails serious presentism. If presentism does not entail
serious presentism, then whether or not such statements pose a problem for serious presentism
does not matter as far as the truth of presentism is concerned. In any case, serious presentists do
not think such statements constitute genuine counter-examples to (2). I am doubtful that the
proposals offered by serious presentists are successful, but now is not the time to consider them. I
simply point out that serious presentists are aware of these apparent counter-examples, and reject
them. If we wanted to assess the viability of serious presentism, it would be important to consider
cases like these, but I put them aside here. Let us, then, turn to our other examples.
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One may of course wonder what could motivate someone to deny that Plato now exhibits such properties as being
the author of The Republic, being admired by various philosophers and philosophy students, and being dead. The
most straightforward answer is that he or she is convinced that presentism is true, and that presentism entails
serious presentism. Another possibility, suggested by Lawrence Lombard, is that these are consequences of the
thesis that an object can be a member of a class at a time t only if x exists at t, or a constituent of a proposition at a
time t only if x exists at t. I am inclined to think that it is by accepting presentism that some philosophers are
motivated to accept this principle of class membership. Lawrence Lombard has commented that he suspects that
philosophers start with the principle of class membership, and that assumption motivates the debate over
presentism and eternalism. I will not try to resolve this disagreement here. In any case, I rejected this principle of
class membership in chapter 2, section 2.4.
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We can begin with myth and fiction, which strike me as the least problematic of the list.
Either we think fictional entities exist or we do not. If we think fictional entities exist as, for
instance, Kripke (2013) argues, it will not constitute a counterexample to (2) if fictional entities
can bear properties or stand in relations, either to other fictional things or to non-fictional things.70
If we think, as I do, that fictional entities do not, never did, never will exist,71 and indeed
could not exist,72 then we should deny that fictional things can have properties or stand in relations.
There neither is nor ever was any such horse as Pegasus, but neither did anyone ever tame or have
such a steed as Pegasus. There are really no facts about Pegasus at all. Nor are there facts about
Sherlock Holmes, Luke Skywalker, or Spiderman. Instead, there are facts about various sources
of Greek myth, like The Iliad, and various fictional stories, like the works of Sir Arthur Conan
Doyle, the Star Wars films, comic books, and so on (Bigelow 1996). Thus, a statement like
“Pegasus is the steed of Bellerephon” is false if considered without qualification, but true if taken
as a statement about the myth. The statement “Spiderman lives in New York” is false if taken
without qualification, but true if considered as a statement about stories found in comic books,
movies, etc. In any case, whether we think there exist fictional entities exist or not, there is no
reason to think fictional entities provide any counterexamples to (2).
Let us turn next to Meinongianism. According to Meinongianism, there are some things
which do not exist. If Meinongianism were true, then non-existent things could have properties

70
Kripke thinks fictional objects are abstract entities. Michael McKinsey has pointed out in lectures that it seems
absurd to think the ancient Greeks were worshipping abstract entities, and one similarly wonders how an abstract
entity could have such properties as being a horse or being tamed by someone. I put this aside.
71
Of course, real things can appear in works of fiction, but I mean purely fictional things.
72
To be clear, I do not deny that there could exist entities which would be very much like things in fiction, such as
winged horses and giant, flying, fire-breathing reptiles. I claim rather that if such things did exist, they would not be
fictional.
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and stand in relations. I think Meinongiasm is not true, though admittedly nothing I will say against
it need force an advocate of the view to give it up. I hope in my brief discussion to cast sufficient
doubt on Meinongianism that (2) is able to retain its intuitive strength.
First, if in the statement, there are things which do not exist, the words ‘are’ and ‘exist’ are
synonymous, then this statement is contradictory. For in that case, this statement will be equivalent
to there exist things which do not exist, or, there are things which there are not. The Meinongian
will of course insist that ‘are’ and ‘exist’ are not synonymous, and that the former has a wider
extension than the latter. But this seems to be contrary to the linguistic evidence. Furthermore,
even if we set that linguistic evidence aside, the Meinongian has a burden of explicating just what
‘are’ means other than ‘exists’.73
Second, Van Inwagen (2009) points out that it seems plausible to interpret the claim
“Unicorns do not exist” as equivalent to “the number of unicorns is zero.” If this is right, then on
whatever sense of ‘are’ in which, according to the Meinongian, there are non-existent unicorns,
there can be no number of non-existent unicorns. So, there are non-existent unicorns, but no
number of them. Not even zero. This is absurd. Perhaps the Meinongian will respond by claiming
that the statement “Unicorns do not exist” is really equivalent to “The number of existing unicorns
is zero,” which leaves unspecified the number of subsisting unicorns. But again, this seems
contrary to the evidence: if you ask someone how many chairs there are in a room you expect that
person to count the existing chairs.
Finally, we can cast doubt on Meinongianism by undermining motivation for the view.
The Meinongian reasonably insists that some statements appear to be about non-existent things.

73

Of course, I mean when ‘are’ functions as a quantifier. The word ‘are’ can also function as a plural copula
connecting a series of nouns to a predicate, whereas the word ‘exists’ has no such function.
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For instance, “The golden mountain does not exist” appears to predicate non-existence of the
golden mountain. Russell’s (1905) theory of definite descriptions effectively gives us an
alternative analysis of such statements. “The golden mountain does not exist” really means
“Nothing is such that it is a golden mountain.”74
What about possibilia? In chapter 4, I discussed the debate between modal actualists and
possibilists. According to possibilists, merely possible things exist.75 If this is right, then it does
not violate (2) to suppose that something stands in some relation to a possible object, since merely
possible objects exist. According to actualists only actual things exist, and hence there are no
merely possible objects. If actualism is correct then it would violate (2) if any merely possible
entities have properties or stand in relations.
Actualists will, I presume, try to give an account of statements which appear to treat mere
possibilia as having properties or standing in relations such that these statements can be understood
without such consequences. 76 Bergmann (1999) challenges such efforts, but I think those
challenges can be met. Roughly, I would suggest that statements which appear to treat mere
possiblia as having properties or standing in relations as in fact indicating what properties would
be borne and what relations would obtain if, counterfactually, there were to be certain things which
in fact do not exist. So, the claim that I could have had an older sister does not indicate that I stand
in the younger than relation to a merely possible person, but rather that if I had an older sister, then

74
Kripke (1980) famously argues that names, at least typically, are not short for definite descriptions. Were this true
universally, then true statements containing non-referring names would constitute a case in which the theory of
definite descriptions does not resolve the motivation for Meinongianism. However, Michael McKinsey in lectures
has argued that while in typical cases a name functions to introduce its referent, in certain special cases names do
function as short for descriptions.
75
The actualist, of course, will deny that these objects are really merely possible. See my discussion in 4.2.2.
76
Hinchliff (1988) argues that non-actual things can exhibit properties and relations, denying the inference from
actualism to serious actualism. In my discussion I assume the actualism does entail serious actualism.
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I would stand in the younger than relation to who, in that case, would be an actual person. Hence,
the actualist will claim this is not a case of genuinely attributing a property to a merely possible
entity.
But how do we talk about mere possibilia at all? Different actualists could try to answer
this question in different ways depending on their account of possible worlds, some of which I
discussed briefly in chapter 4. I would propose that talk that is apparently about mere possibilia be
understood in terms of actual things and their modal capacities. To say I could have had an older
sister, for instance, is to indicate a certain capacity my parents had before I was born; specifically,
to have a baby girl. By an object’s modal capacities, I mean those facts concerning different ways
that object could be, different kinds of states of affairs in which it could be a constituent, and
different kinds of events of which it could be the subject. The modal capacities of an object thus
include but are not limited to its causal capacities. The causal capacities of an object determine the
kinds of causal processes in which the object could be involved given the features it actually
exhibits, whereas its modal capacities determine the kinds of states of affairs and events in which
it could be a constituent or a subject independently of what features it in fact exhibits.
If this proposal is going to work, then to say of something x that it has the modal capacity
to Φ had better not be tantamount to saying that x stands in some relation to a merely possible Φing. Prior (1962b) argues the claims about capacities do not need to be analyzed in terms of
relations to possible events, by pointing out first, that the gap in “is capable of _ing” is to be filled
with a verb rather than a noun, and second, that,
In the strict sense of “are,” there “are” no actions and no capacities, but things that act and
things that are capable of acting. (Prior 1962b, 60)
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However, Davidson’s (2001) discussion of action statements provides some reason to think that
there are actions.77
Fortunately, an initial defense of the claim that a modal capacity is not a relation between
a thing and a possible action can be given that does not require that there are no actions. We have
simply to give a workable analysis of what it is for something to have a modal capacity. As a rough
start, we might claim that a statement of the form “S has the modal capacity to Φ” is true just in
case it is consistent with all the essential facts about S that S Φs. A statement of the form “S has
the physical capacity to Φ” is true just in case it is consistent with all the essential facts about S
and the laws of physics that S Φs, excluding the fact, if it is a fact, that S does not actually Φ. Other
senses of possibility can be accounted for in a similar way.
For instance, the statement “I am at home” while not consistent with my actual property of
being in a coffee shop, is consistent with all my essential properties. Hence, I have the capacity to
be at home, and consequently it is possible for me to be at home. I could have had an older sister
because my parents were capable of conceiving before I was born, and it is consistent with all the
intrinsic facts about them at the time that my mother could have given birth to a girl. This is a
sketch, and clearly more would need to be said for a full account of possibility, but this is not the
place for it.
So far I have tried to defend (2) by challenging four kinds of counterexample. Although I
am not personally convinced by any of these counterexamples, I do not pretend to think that my
brief discussion has wholly resolved all the issues involved. If some such counterexample is
successful then (2) is not a conceptual truth and then consequently presentism does not

77

Chapter 3, section 3.1. I summarize Davidson’s basic argument in a footnote.

130

conceptually entail relationally conservative presentism. However, I am going to proceed as if
these counterexamples fail. I want to challenge this argument that presentism conceptually entails
relationally conservative presentism in a different way.
5.3.2 Responding to the First Argument
Our first argument for the conclusion that presentism entails serious presentism, recall,
goes like this:
(1)

Everything exists at the present time,

(2)

Only existing things can bear properties or stand in relations,

(3)

Only things that exist at the present time can bear properties or stand in relations.

In this section I will argue that we should not accept this inference.
Before giving my argument that we should reject (2), to help avoid confusion it may be
useful to outline the argument first. The basic idea is this. Premise (2) is ambiguous to tense. On
some readings, (2) is plausibly a conceptual truth. On those readings, however, it does not seem
that presentism entails serious presentism unless we interpret presentism as the thesis that
everything which ever did exist or ever will exist, exists at the present time. On the other readings,
(2) is not a conceptual truth, and hence those readings do not show that presentism by itself entails
serious presentism. Thus, if we disambiguate the tense on (2), this argument for the conclusion
that presentism entails serious presentism breaks down. With that, I turn to the details.
Premise (2) is ambiguous between four different readings, depending on how we specify
the tense of ‘exists’ and ‘bear properties or stand in relations’. These readings are:
(2a)

Only things that did, do, or will exist can bear properties or stand in
relations now.
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(2b)

Only things that did, do, or will exist can ever bear properties or stand in relations
at any time.

(2c)

Only things that exist now can ever bear properties or stand in relations at any
time.

(2d)

Only things that exist now can bear properties or stand in relations now.

This raises two questions. First, which of (2a) through (2d), if any, is a plausible candidate for a
conceptual truth, even setting aside the potential counterexamples discussed in the previous
section? Second, which of (2a) through (2d), if any, justifies the inference from (1) to (3)?
I submit that (2a) and (2b) are good candidates for being conceptual truths, at least if we
exclude from consideration things, if any, which exist outside of time. (2a) is just the claim that an
object which does not, never did, and never will exist does not, never did, and never will bear any
properties or stand in any relations. If we exclude from consideration objects outside of time, this
seems obviously true, since there never was nor will be such an object to have any properties or
stand in any relations.
I think (2a) does fail if we include for consideration objects which exist outside of time,
which is why I made the exception. Someone might think such objects do not constitute a
counterexample to (2a). Perhaps such a person thinks timeless objects do not exist. I explained in
chapter 2 why I do not see any good reason to think timeless objects cannot exist. Alternatively,
someone might claim, as does Abouzahr (2013), that timeless objects may exist, but that they
cannot stand in relations to things existing in time. But this seems wrong: the number 2 might be
someone’s favorite number one day, and cease to be so the next.78

78

I got this example from Lawrence Lombard.
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For our purposes, we will simply understand (2a) and (2b) to be applicable only to objects
that exist in time. With that restriction,
(2b)

Only things that did, do, or will exist can ever bear properties or stand in relations
at any time,

seems obviously true. Note that (2b) entails
(2a)

Only things that did, do, or will exist can bear properties or stand in
relations now.

That which cannot ever have properties or stand in relations, certainly cannot have properties or
stand in relations now.
Does
(1)

Everything exists at the present time,

(3)

Only things that exist at the present time can bear properties or stand in relations.

entail

when conjoined with either (2a) or (2b)? It does if (1) is interpreted as
(1*)

Everything that ever did or will exist, exists at the present time

As pointed out in chapter 1, however, this is presumably not what the presentist thinks. Presumably
the presentist does not believe (1*), but rather:
(1**) Everything exists at the present time, but there did and will exist things at other
times.
But (3) does not follow from either (2a) or (2b) conjoined with this thesis. According to (1**) there
were and will be things which do not exist now, and according to both (2a) and (2b), things which
did or will exist can have properties and stand in relations. So even if we suppose (2a) and (2b) are
conceptual truths, it is not at all clear that they can be used to show that presentism conceptually
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entails (3), unless we interpret presentism in a way which is contrary to how presentists intend it
and which also seems obviously false.
Does (1) conjoined with either
(2c)

Only things that exist now can bear properties or stand in relations ever,

(2d)

Only things that exist now can bear properties or stand in relations now,

or

entail (3)? Recall that earlier I pointed out that the thesis only things that exist at the present time
can have properties or stand in relations is ambiguous between only things that exist at the present
time can bear properties or stand in relations now, and, only things that exist at the present time
can ever have properties or stand in relations at any time. Thus, (3) is ambiguous between (2c)
and (2d). Hence, one of the inferences, either from (2c) to (3) or (2d) to (3), must be circular.
Furthermore, on the plausible assumption that whatever exists necessarily exhibits some
property when it exists, (2c) would entail that everything that ever did or will exist, exists at the
present time. For suppose something x exists at some time other than now. Since x exists, x must
exhibit some property, and then by (2c) x exists now. Presumably, however, this is not what the
presentist believes.
Let us drop the assumption that everything which exists exhibits some property (other than
existence, if that is a property) when it exists. Now, (2c) entails (2d) independently of (1), but (2c)
is clearly not a conceptual truth. Given this, we should concern ourselves with the following two
questions. First, do (1) and (2d) in conjunction entail (2c)? If yes, then is (2d) plausibly thought to
be a conceptual truth?
Let us begin with the first question, do (1) and (2d) in conjunction entail (2c)? In other
words, is the following argument valid?
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(1)

Everything exists at the present time.

(2d)

Only things that exist now can bear properties or stand in relations now.

(2c)

Therefore, only things that exist now can ever bear properties or stand in relations
at any time.

This inference is valid if (1) is interpreted as
(1*)

Everything that ever did or will exist, exists at the present time.

The inference is not valid, however, if (1) is interpreted as
(1**) Everything exists at the present time, but there did and will exist things at other
times.
For it is consistent with both (1**) and (2d) that there was a person, Plato, who had the property
of being a philosopher, and this is inconsistent with (2c).
Hence, (1) conjoined with (2a), (2b), or (2d) entails (3) only when interpreted as (1*), but
not as (1**), and (2c) obviously fails to be a conceptual truth. Thus, what I take to be the basic line
of argument for the conclusion that presentism entails presentism is undermined by the same basic
strategy used in chapter 1 to argue for the conclusion that presentism is not a substantive thesis. In
the next two subsections I will briefly examine two other arguments for the conclusion that
presentism entails serious presentism, and show that they are problematic in the same way.
5.4

A Second Argument
The second argument I want to consider for the conclusion that presentism entails serious

presentism comes from Bergmann (1999). The setup for the argument goes like this. Bergmann
formulates presentism as
(P) □(∀x)[x exists

x is present]. (Bergmann 1999, 125)
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That is: necessarily, for any x, if x exists then x is present. Then Bergmann formulates (one version)
of serious presentism as
(SP2) □(∀x)(∀t)(∀P)[x exemplifies P at t

x is present at t]. (Bergmann 1999, 125)

That is: necessarily, for any x, for any time t, and for any property P, if x exemplifies P at t, then
x is present at t. Finally, Bergmann gives the following principle of cross-temporal relation
exemplification:
(◇CPE) ◇(∃x)(∃t)(∃P)[(x exemplifies P at t) & ~(x exists at t)]. (Bergmann 1999, 127)
That is, possibly there exists some x, there exists some time t, and there exists some property such
that x exemplifies P at t & x does not exist at t.
With this setup, Bergmann proceeds to argue that given (P), (◇CPE) must be false.
Bergmann’s argument is as follows:
(P1) [(P) entails (SP2)] is false only if (◇CPE) is true.
(P2) If (◇CPE) is true then (RESULT-P) is true:
(RESULT-P) ◇ (∃t)(∃P)(It is true at t that there is an instance of P being
exemplified by something but not by anything that exists at t).
(P3) □(∀t)(It is true at t that there is nothing except what exists at t).
(P4) If (RESULT-P) and (P3) are true then (RESULT-P)NEW is true.
(RESULT-P)NEW ◇(∃t)(∃P)(It is true at t that there is an instance of P being
exemplified by something, but not by anything at all).
(P5) Thus, if (◇CPE) is true then (RESULT-P)NEW is true.
(P6) But (RESULT-P)NEW entails that a contradiction is possible.
(P7) Hence, (◇CPE) is false.
(P8) Hence, (P) entails (SP2). (Bergmann 1999, 127)
Is this argument valid?
I think the inference from (RESULT-P) and (P3) to (P4) is problematic. The phrase “It is
true at t that there is nothing except what exists at t” in (P3) is ambiguous. It could be read as
It is true at t that there is nothing at t except what exists at t,
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which makes it trivial. So read, (RESULT-P)NEW does not follow, since this is consistent with the
claim that there were and will be things that exist at other times, and one of those things could be
what exemplifies P. (RESULT-P)NEW does follow from (RESULT-P) and (P3) if the latter is read
as
It is true at t that there never was nor will be anything except what exists at t,
but this is just the claim that we have said the presentist presumably does not believe, and which
also seems obviously false.
5.5

A Final Argument
The final argument I want to consider for the conclusion that presentism entails serious

presentism is from Davidson (2003). Davidson writes:
I think that there is a strong argument that presentism entails serious presentism. Consider
the following argument.
[4]79 Necessarily, for any time t, whatever there is (in as temporally-neutral sense as one
likes) exists at t. (presentism)
[5] Necessarily, for any property F or relation R and time t, if F or R is exemplified at t,
there is/are (in as temporally-neutral a sense as one likes) something or things that
exemplifies or exemplify F or R at t.
[6] Therefore, necessarily for any property F or relation R and time t, if F or R is
exemplified at t, then F or R is exemplified by something or some things that exists or exist
at t.
[7] Therefore, necessarily, objects exemplify properties or stand in relations at a time only
if they exist at that time. (M. Davidson 2003, 87)
What should we say about this argument?
The basic idea here is that, if a property or relation is ever exemplified, it must be
exemplified by something. If presentism is true, then at any time only things that exist at that time
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I have changed the numbering of Davidson’s argument to avoid confusion.
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exist. So, at any time, only things which exist at that time can exemplify properties and relations.80
The success of this argument hinges on how [4] is interpreted. Momentarily setting aside the
parenthetical qualification, [4] is ambiguous. It could be read as
Necessarily, for any time t, whatever there is at t exists at t,
which is trivial. Alternatively, it could be read as
Necessarily, for any time t, whatever ever did or ever will exist, exists at t,
which seems obviously false. [4] and [5] together entail [6] if [4] is interpreted the latter way, but
not the former.
What about the parenthetical qualification on [4]? Probably Davidson includes it to prevent
[4] from being read as
[4*] Necessarily, for any time t, whatever there is then exists at t,
which would be trivial.
In chapter 2, I discussed the idea that presentism is a thesis about what exists in a temporally
neutral sense, and in chapter 3 I discussed the idea that presentism is a thesis about what falls
within the range of the most unrestricted temporal quantifier. I argued that, unless we are given
some positive construal of how to understand this sort of claim, it might mean that everything that
ever did or ever will exist, exists at the present time, or its meaning is too unclear to be helpful.
On the first interpretation, [4] becomes
[4**] Necessarily, for any time t, whatever ever did or will exist, exists at t.
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Inman (2012) responds to the argument by following Hinchliff (1988) in distinguishing between an existential
quantifier and a particular quantifier. To express that something which does not exist has properties or stands in
relations we use the particular quantifier but not the existential quantifier.
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Presumably this is not what the presentist thinks. Perhaps there is some other reading of the
qualification, but what that reading is we do not know. Thus, this argument for the conclusion that
presentism entails serious presentism, like those before, can be undermined using the same strategy
we used in chapter 1 to argue that presentism is not a substantive thesis.
Another approach to responding to Davidson’s argument for the conclusion that presentism
entails serious presentism is to focus not on [4], but
[5] Necessarily, for any property F or relation R and time t, if F or R is exemplified at t,
there is/are (in as temporally-neutral a sense as one likes) something or things that
exemplifies or exemplify F or R at t.81
The most obvious reading of the parenthetical clause makes [5] into the following:
[5*] Necessarily, for any property F or relation R and time t, if F or R is exemplified at t,
there is, was, or will be something or things that exemplify or exemplifies F or R at t.
If we are excluding from consideration things existing outside of time, this seems obviously true.
Is
[6] Therefore, necessarily for any property F or relation R and time t, if F or R is
exemplified at t, then F or R is exemplified by something or some things that exists or exist
at t,
entailed by [4] and [5*]? It is if [4] is read as
Necessarily, for any time t, whatever ever did or will exist, exists at t.
However, this is presumably not what the presentist thinks.
Alternatively, [5] could be read as:
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Eric Hiddleston pointed out that the non-serious presentist might challenge premise [5].
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[5**] Necessarily, for any property F or relation R and time t, if F or R is exemplified at t,
there is/are at the present time something or things that exemplifies or exemplify F or R at
t.
Now, this together with [4] would entail [6]. However, [5**] is just an assertion of serious
presentism. Thus, construed in this way, the argument just begs the question.
5.6

A Possibility for Understanding Presentism?
We have seen that it is possible to infer from the claim that
Everything exists at the present time

to the conclusion that
Only things that exist at the present time can exhibit properties or stand in relations,
if we interpret the former claim as
Everything that ever did or ever will exist, exists at the present time.
I claimed in chapter 1, and several times in this chapter, that this seems obviously false, and
presumably it is not what the presentist intends by her thesis.
In chapter 4, I pointed out that philosophers posit special entities, possible worlds, to
explain why true statements about possibility and necessity are true. For a possibilist, a possible
world might be a set of possible entities, perhaps members of a concrete world which is causally,
spatially, and temporally isolated from this one, as in Lewis (1986). For an actualist, a possible
world is something abstract (Van Inwagen 1986), like a possible arrangement of the fundamental
entities which compose the world (D. M. Armstrong 1986) (Wittgenstein, Pears and McGuiness
2001), or a maximally consistent set of propositions, or a maximal states of affairs (Plantinga
1974). In any case, possible worlds are posited as explaining how some statements about what is
merely possible can be true.
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Along these lines, we might imagine a view according to which everything which ever did
exist or ever will exist, exists at the present time, and at the present time (or outside of time) there
exist certain objects in virtue of which some statements about ‘the past’ and ‘the future’ are true.
To the objection that the thesis that
Everything that ever did or ever will exist, exists at the present time
Is obviously false, someone who adopted this view might retort that this seems obviously false
only because it is taken to entail that statements like “Dinosaurs roamed the earth” and “Plato
wrote The Republic” are untrue. This assumption, however, is incorrect: although everything that
ever did exist or ever will exist, exists at the present time, included among these things are entities
which make these and various other statements about ‘the past’ and ‘the future’ true.
I must confess to finding this view unbelievable. It may not be impossible for everything
which ever did exist, obtain, or occur to exist, obtain, or occur at a single time, for it may not be
impossible for there to only ever be a single moment of time. However, I do not think a world like
that could also contain entities like us. However, we should consider if any presentists might in
fact believe just this.
In fact, serious presentists do rely on what exists at the present time (or outside of time) to
explain why statements like “Dinosaurs roamed the earth” and “Plato wrote The Republic” can be
true. I will briefly survey some of the proposals in the literature. It is not my intention here to either
endorse or challenge any of these proposals. My intention, rather, is to see if it is likely that any
presentists believe that everything that ever did or will exist, exists now, but some statements
apparently about the way things were or will be, like “Dinosaurs roamed the earth,” and “There
will be human colonies on Mars” are nonetheless true. I will conclude that there is no good reason
to think that any actual presentists believe this.

141

Ludlow (1999) claims that the truth-maker for a given past-tensed statement is the presently
existing evidence associated with that statement:
[W]hen we say that a proposition was true or will be true, exactly what are we getting at?
… [A] semantic theory that accounts for an agent’s semantic knowledge must show how
portions of that language are learned from the evidence available to the language learner.
But now consider how we learn the use of past-tense expressions such as…
Dinosaurs roam the earth.
We do not evaluate this sentence by imagining some time earlier than now and determining
whether at that time [this sentence] is true. Rather, we evaluate [this sentence] by right now
conducting a sort of investigation that is appropriate for past-tensed statements like [it].
(For example, we might study fossil records). (Ludlow 1999, 98-99).
Ludlow goes beyond the epistemic claim that we look at presently existing evidence to decide the
truth of past-tensed and future-tensed statements; rather, Ludlow claims that such evidence is what
makes such statements true or false.82
According to Lucretian presentism (Bigelow 1996), the truth-makers for past-tensed
statements are the tensed properties of presently existing objects. On this view, “Dinosaurs roamed
the earth is true because the earth, or various locations on the earth, have the property being where
some dinosaur roamed. The statement “Plato wrote The Republic” is true because some location
has the property being where Plato wrote The Republic.
Some philosophers (Bourne 2006) (T. Crisp 2007) propose that the truth-makers for pasttensed statements are abstract objects, ersatz times, which stand in ersatz before and after relations
to one another. These ersatz times are supposed to be somewhat analogous to propositions or
possible worlds.
The versions of ersatzer presentism offered by Bourne and Crisp differ slightly. Crisp
(2007) writes that an ersatz time is:
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Eric Hiddleston points out that this is just verificationism.
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A certain sort of maximal abstract object: intuitively, an abstract representation of an
instantaneous state of the world. (T. Crisp 2007, 99)
Crisp expounds upon this as follows:
Let us think of a time as any proposition that satisfies the following definition:
x is a time = df. For some class C of propositions such that C is maximal and consistent, x
= [∀y(y ϵ C ⊃ y is true)],
where (i) a class C of propositions is maximal iff, for every proposition p, either p or its
denial is a member of C, (ii) a class C of propositions is consistent iff, possibly, every
member of C is true, and (iii) ‘[∀y(y ϵ C ⊃ y is true)]’, I assume, denotes a tenseless
proposition. (T. Crisp 2007, 99-100)
Thus, for Crisp an ersatz time is a maximally consistent set of tenseless propositions which are
true.
Bourne’s (2006) explication of his conception of ersatz times begins with a distinction
between two types of present-tensed propositions. Those which contain past or future-tense
operators, like “It is now the case that it was the case that Socrates is sitting” (Bourne 2006, 53),
he calls embedded propositions or e-propositions. Those which do not contain past or future-tense
operators, like “Socrates is sitting” (Bourne 2006, 53) he calls unembedded or u-propositions. On
Bourne’s view ersatz times are construed using u-propositions:
I propose we construct times using maximally consistent sets of u-propositions, which
intuitively we can see as those u-propositions that are true at that time. These propositions
I take to give a complete, maximally specific, description of what is true at that time…
Times I take to be more than sets of present-tensed propositions: first, they consist of sets
of u-propositions; second, they also contain a ‘date’. That is, I take times… to be ordered
pairs of the form t = <μ, n ϵ ℝ>, where μ is a set of u-propositions and n ϵ ℝ is a date.
(Bourne, A Future for Presentism 2006, 53-54)
Thus, for Bourne an ersatz time is a maximally consistent set of unembedded tensed propositions
and a date. On either construal, “Plato wrote the Republic” is true because a certain ersatz time
represents Plato’s writing of The Republic.
Rhoda (Rhoda 2009) claims that the truth-makers for past-tensed statements are memories
in the mind of God.
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Such examples illustrate how serious presentist try to account for the truth of statements
like “Dinosaurs roamed the earth” and “Plato wrote The Republic” utilizing only what exists at the
present time or outside of time. It does not follow from this, however, that these philosophers
believe that everything that ever did or ever will exist, exists at the present time. Indeed, Fiocco’s
(2007) account of the truth of past-tensed statements seems to directly contradict this idea. Fiocco
proposes that the truth-makers for past-tensed statements are a special class of timeless facts, which
have their natures in virtue of what occurs at each successive moment in time.
One can construe facts as simple, that is, non-structured entities that, being immutable, do
not exist in time. A specific fact would not have existed without the moment it is about; to
this extent, facts depend on moments… Atemporal facts of this sort are the basis of truths
about the past, as such they are the truth-makers of past-tensed statements. (O. M. Fiocco
2007, 193)
On this proposal, the truth-maker for “Plato wrote The Republic,” is an atemporal fact which exists
and has the nature it has because there was a person, Plato, who wrote The Republic. Fiocco’s
account for how past-tensed statements can be true thus appears to presuppose that there were
times before the present moment.83
The proposal that everything which ever did or ever will exist, exists at the present time,
but that some statements about ‘the past’ and ‘the future’ are still true seems absurd. It would be
uncharitable in the extreme to interpret a philosopher as endorsing a view which seems obviously
false, unless he or she endorsed that view explicitly, or unless it was a straightforward consequence
of what he or she endorsed explicitly. However, no construal of presentism I have encountered in
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Actually, I think Fiocco’s proposal is not really a version of serious presentism at all. For if “Plato wrote The
Republic” is true because of a timeless fact, which has the features it does because during some previous time, Plato
wrote The Republic, it seems that some relation holds between the sentence and Plato’s writing of The Republic,
which is not occurring at the present time. However, without the assumption that presentism entails serious
presentism, it is clear what would motivate Fiocco to posit such timeless facts as truth-makers.
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the literature contains explicit commitment to the view discussed here. This thesis is stark enough
that if anyone endorsed it, I suspect that he or she would be explicit about it. For that reason, I
reject this way of trying to understand presentism as a substantive thesis.
5.7

Concluding Remarks
My goal in this chapter was to see if we could use serious presentism, according to which

only things existing at the present time can exhibit properties or stand in relations, to help us
understand presentism, according to which everything exists at the present time, as a substantive
metaphysical thesis. I considered three arguments for the conclusion that presentism entails
presentism, and I showed that each of these arguments could be undermined by the same basic
strategy used in chapter 1 to argue for the conclusion that presentism is not a substantive thesis.
Then I considered the prospects for identifying presentism with the thesis that everything that ever
did exist or ever will exist, exists at the present time, but that some statements apparently about
the past and future are nonetheless true. I rejected construing presentism in this way, since it seems
obviously false and is not, to my knowledge, endorsed by anyone.
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CHAPTER 6. THE AS OF/AT DISTINCTION AND FORMULATING
PRESENTISM AND ETERNALISM
The main question of this dissertation is whether the debate over presentism and eternalism
is substantive. In previous chapters I have considered various proposals for how to understand
presentism as a substantive thesis, as well as a line of argument for the conclusion that it must be.
Each of these I have rejected as insufficient to show that the debate is substantive.
In this chapter I want to offer my own proposal for how to understand presentism and
eternalism. In the next chapter I will argue for the conclusion that presentism and eternalism so
construed are indeed substantive, and offer a rebuttal of the arguments for the conclusions that
presentism and eternalism are not substantive theses from the first chapter.
In order to state presentism and eternalism as substantive, opposed philosophical thesis, I
first introduce and explain a distinction between two ways of talking about what exists, obtains, or
occurs with respect to a given time, which I will refer to as the distinction between what exists,
obtains, or occurs as of a given time and at that time. Since this distinction is crucial to making
sense of presentism and eternalism as substantive thesis, most of this chapter is spend on explaining
it. To begin with, I illustrate the distinction in a general and rather informal way. Afterwards I
offer a formal semantics for the distinction. Finally, I offer statements of presentism and eternalism
utilizing the distinction.
6.1

The As of/At Distinction, Informally
I want to introduce the distinction between what is the case as of a time and what is the

case at a time in an informal way. I begin by explaining the as of/at distinction in a general way
that can apply to any coordinate system, or anything which can be represented by a coordinate
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system, using what colors objects have as my example. Then I will explain the distinction with
respect to time.
6.1.1 A Colorful Illustration
Here I illustrate the as of/at distinction in a general way. Take any coordinate system, or
anything which can be represented by a coordinate system: moments, locations, colors,
temperatures, and so on. We may associate some entity with the points in each of these coordinate
systems: events occurring at each moment, objects located at each location, the set of objects that
have a given color or a given temperature, and so on. Finally, we take some such set of points in
some coordinate system and all the objects assigned to the points in that set, and designate some
point in the set as being uniquely privileged. We say that as of P* there is an object x at P, just in
case in the set of coordinates with P* designated as uniquely privileged, x is assigned to the point
P in that set. Once a set with a uniquely privileged point is specified, we can assert that there is an
object x at any point within the set, meaning that x is assigned to that point, in that set.
For instance, we may have two sets S = [Red, Blue, Green] and S* = [ Yellow, Purple
Orange], such that blue is the uniquely privileged member of S and Orange the uniquely privileged
member of S*. Whatever it is in virtue of which blue and orange are the uniquely privileged
members of their respective sets need not concern us at this point, and may well be purely a matter
of stipulation. For each set we may suppose we have an associated board, and some tacks which
we can use to represent objects. The board associated with set S has sections colored red, blue, and
green. The board associated with set S* has sections colored yellow, purple, and orange.
The clause ‘as of blue’ picks out the set with blue privileged, or the associated board, and
the clause ‘as of orange’ picks out the set with orange privileged, or the associated board. Once a
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given set or board is specified, the ‘at’ clause is used to indicate the colors of objects. 84 To say
that there is some object as of blue is to say that some object has one of the colors included in set
S, that is, that the object is either red, blue, or green. Similarly, to say that there is some object as
of orange is to say that the object is one of the colors included in the set S*, that is, that the object
is either yellow, purple, or orange.
In set S, to Red is assigned all the red things, to Blue all the blue things, and to Green is
assigned all the green things. As of Blue, every red object is said to be at Red, every blue object is
said to be at Blue, and every green object is said to be at Green. So, if there is a red apple, we say
that as of blue there is an apple at red. We represent this by placing the tack standing for the apple
on the red portion of the blue board. If a certain leaf is green, we will say that as of blue the leaf is
at green. We represent this by placing the tack standing for the leaf on the green portion of the blue
board.
In set S*, to Yellow is assigned all the yellow things, to Purple is assigned all the purple
things, and to Orange is assigned all the orange things. On the corresponding board we place a
tack for a banana on the yellow section, and a tack for a plumb on the purple section. Thus, as of
Orange, at yellow there is a banana and at purple there is a plumb.
The statement,
As of blue there is an apple at red,
is, admittedly, not a piece of normal English. It is, however, a comprehensible statement given the
meaning which we have assigned to ‘as of’ and ‘at’. Used in this context, it means what we might
express with the statement
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For simplicity of presentation I make the assumption that everything is only one color.
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There is an apple on the red section of the blue board.
We use ‘as of’ to pick out a particular board, and then ‘at’ to talk about particular colors associated
with that board.
In other words, we can say that there are objects of a certain color as of a certain board just
in case that board contains the color of those objects. Since the board with the color orange
privileged contains the color yellow, we say that as of orange there are bananas. Since the board
with the color blue privileged does not contain the color yellow, we do not say that as of blue there
are bananas. Thus, as of Orange there are bananas, and in particular they are at Yellow; but as of
Blue it is not the case that there are bananas, since the color yellow is not associated with the board
with blue privileged.
6.1.2 Time
With this background, I turn to explain how the as of/at distinction applies to time. At this
juncture, the distinction is purely conventional and without metaphysical significance. This will
provide the reader a chance to understand the distinction between what is the case as of a time and
at a time in a metaphysically innocuous way. Later the distinction will take on metaphysical
significance, but I introduce it neutrally.
We assign objects, events, states of affairs, and propositions to times. An object, state of
affairs, event, or proposition is said to be at the time to which it is assigned, just as, in our earlier
example, a tack is at the color on which it is placed. We arbitrarily group some of these times
together into sets, similarly to the way we arbitrarily grouped colors together in our earlier
example. Each set of times is assigned a privileged member, as was each set of colors assigned a
privileged color. To say that as of a time t something exists, obtains, or is occurring is to assert that
the time to which the object, state of affairs, event, or proposition is assigned is included in the set
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with t privileged, just as to say that as of orange there is a banana is to assert that there is a banana
on the board with orange privileged. In other words, to say something exists, obtains, or occurs as
of a time t is just to say that it exists, occurs, or obtains at some time in the set which contains t as
the uniquely privileged member.
Suppose we take two arbitrary sets of times, each with a privileged member. One of these
sets is
[399 BCE; January 10, 49 BCE; September 17, 1787],
with January 10, 49 BCE privileged. The other set is
[August 25, 1776; June 18, 1851; 1931],
with June 18, 1851 the uniquely privileged time.
Given this assignment of times to sets, each with a privileged member, we may correctly
say that as of January 10, 49 BCE, Socrates drinks hemlock at 399 BCE, Caesar crosses the
Rubicon at January 10, 49 BCE, and that the Constitution of the United States is being signed at
September 7, 1787. However, it would be incorrect to say that as of January 10, 49 BCE that David
Hume is dying at August 25, 1776, that Napoleon is losing the battle of Waterloo at June 18, 1851,
or that the Gödel is publishing the first incompleteness theorem at 1931. That it is incorrect to say
these things is, of course, a consequence of stipulation: we have decreed that the times at which
these events take place be associated with June 18, 1851, rather than January 10, 49 BCE.
We may correctly say as of June 18, 1851, David Hume dies at August 25, 1776, Napoleon
loses Waterloo at June 18, 1851, and Gödel publishes the first incompleteness theorem at 1931.
However, it would be incorrect to say as of June 18, 1851, that Socrates is drinking hemlock at
399 BCE, that Caesar is crossing the Rubicon at January 10, 49 BCE, or that the Constitution of
the United States is being signed at September 17, 1787. As before, this is entirely a consequence
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of our stipulating that certain events should be associated with a certain time, and has no
metaphysical significance. Later, I will make the case for a metaphysical basis for assigning certain
times to certain sets in this way, which will make the distinction metaphysically significant.
Each set of times has a uniquely privileged member. We now give this a meaning: for each
set of times, the uniquely privileged member is to be considered present. Thus, if a certain set S
contains a time t as its privileged member, then S consists of the set of times which we have
associated with time t being present. Thus, the statement
As of t, I have a headache,
means that we are treating time t as the present time, and that I have, had, or will have a headache
at some time which is associated with t being the present time. Similarly, the statement
As of January 10, 49 BCE, Socrates is drinking hemlock at 399 BCE
means that we are treating January 10, 49 BCE as the present time, and that during a time which
we have arbitrarily associated with it, specifically, 399 BCE, Socrates is drinking hemlock.
As discussed briefly in chapter 1,85 philosophers disagree on what it is for a time to be
present. According to the tenseless theory of time, there is no interesting metaphysical feature,
being present, which each time successively acquires and loses. Rather, statements to the effect
that some time is present function to indicate the time during which the sentence is tokened. Thus,
to say that something is present is to say it exists, obtains, or occurs simultaneously with your
talking about it. On the tenseless theory of time, time is static in nature. According to the tensed
theory of time, each time acquires and then loses the feature being present, and this feature is not
logically reducible to facts about simultaneity. On the tensed theory of time, time is dynamic in
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nature. Fortunately, in order to understand the distinction that interests us, it is not necessary to
assume any particular account of what it is for a time to be present.86
6.1.3 Truth Conditions (Informal)
At this juncture, I will give informal truth conditions for statements containing as of and at
operators. Later I will give formal conditions for such statements being true in a model of a
temporal logic incorporating the as of/at distinction.
In general, we have the following schema. A statement of the form
As of t, P
is true just in case
In the set of times with t privileged, P is, was, or will be the case.
That is, when t is the present time, P is, was, or will be the case at some time associated with t.
A statement of the form
As of t, P at t`
is true just in case
In the set of times with t privileged, for some time t` in the set, P is the case at t`.
That is, when t is the present time, P is the case at some time t` associated with t.
Any statement without an ‘as of’ operator is to be understood as implicitly picking out the
set of times, the privileged member of which is the time of tokening. Thus,
P at t,
has the same truth-conditions as
As of the present time, P at t.
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I do not mean that presentism has no implications for what it is for a time to be present. I simply mean that the
as of/at distinction can be understood without taking a standing on what it is for a time to be present.
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In other words, it will be true just in case, in the set of times in which is privileged the time of
tokening, for some time t in that set, P is the case at t. Generally, a token
P at t
is true if uttered as of any time t` such that t is a member of the set of times with t` privileged, and
P is the case at t. If a token is uttered as of a time t` such that either t is not a member of the set of
times with t` privileged, or t is in that set of times but P is not the case at t, the token is not true.
A statement of the form
As of t, there exists some F
is true just in case
In the set of times with t privileged, there did, does, or will exist something which is an F,
That is, when t is the present time, there did, does, or will exist something at some time associated
with t, which is an F.
A statement of the form
As of t, there exists some F at t`
is true just in case
In the set of times with t privileged, for some time t` in the set, there exists something
which is an F at t`.
That is, when t is the present time, there is, was, or will be something at t` which is an F.
A statement of the form
As of all times, P
is true just in case
For any time t, in the set of times with t privileged, P is, was, or will be the case.
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That is, for any time t, when t is the present time, P is, was, or will be the case at some time
associated with t.
A statement may contain one ‘as of’ operator within the scope of another. Each occurrence
of an ‘as of’ operator picks out a set of times with a privileged member, and the set of times picked
out by each ‘as of’ operator may be different. Let us briefly go over how this works. We begin
with all ‘as of’ operators other than ‘as of the present time’, for which there are special rules. So,
the following discussion applies to such operators as ‘as of sometime there was’, ‘as of five
minutes ago’, ‘as of some time there will be’, ‘as of five minutes from now’, and so on. If one such
operator appears within the scope of another, the set of times picked out by the operator with
smaller scope will depend upon the set of times picked out by the operator with larger scope.87 I
will explain this through an example.
Consider the statement
As of ten years ago, Sally is beginning her studies and as of five years later, she is giving
a rousing speech.88
We can analyze this statement in a step-by-step fashion, as follows. First, the outermost operator
picks out a set of times in which a certain time is privileged, based on the time which is present
when the sentence is tokened. Thus,
As of ten years ago, Sally is beginning her studies,

87
More accurately, the set of times picked out by the operator with smallest scope will be a function of the set of
times picked out by the operator of next largest scope, and the set of times picked out by that operator will be a
function of the set of times picked out by the operator with next largest scope, and so on.
88
In this sentence, the scope of ‘As of ten years ago’ is the entire rest of the sentence: ‘Sally is beginning her studies
and as of five years later, Sally is giving a rousing speech’. If we wanted the scope of ‘As of ten years ago’ to be only
‘Sally is beginning her studies’, we would write (note the commas): ‘As of ten years ago, Sally is beginning her studies,
and, as of five years ago, Sally is giving a rousing speech’.
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means that in the set of times associated with some time ten years before the set of times associated
with the time this sentence is tokened, Sally is beginning her studies.
Second, the tense operator taking small scope will pick out a set of times based on the set
of times associated with the former operator. Thus, recall our original statement:
As of ten years ago, Sally is beginning her studies and as of five years later, Sally is giving
a rousing speech,
The clause ‘as of ten years ago’ picks out a set of times, the privileged member of which is ten
years before the privileged member of the set of times at which this is tokened. The clause ‘as of
five years later’, because it appears within the scope of this earlier ‘as of’ operator’, picks out a set
of times, the privileged member of which is five years after the time privileged on the set picked
out by the former operator.
The statement
As of ten years ago, Sally is beginning her studies and as of five years later, Sally is giving
a rousing speech,
entails
As of ten years ago, Sally is beginning her studies, and, as of five years ago, Sally is giving
a rousing speech.
In this latter sentence, the clause ‘as of five years ago’ is not within the scope of ‘as of ten years
ago’. So, it assigns ‘Sally is giving a rousing speech’ to a set of times the privileged member of
which is five years before the privileged member of the set associated with the time of utterance.
Clearly, for times t, t`, and t``, each of which is privileged on some set, if time t is ten years before
time t`, and time t`` is five years after time t, then time t`` will be five years before time t`. Thus,
the first indented sentence entails the second.
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Next we turn to statements in which ‘as of the present time’ appears within the scope of
another tense operator. An instance of ‘as of the present time’ will pick out the set of times in
which is privileged the time which is present when the sentence is tokened, even if ‘as of the
present time’ is within the scope of another ‘as of’ operator. In other words, an instance of ‘as of
the present time’ serves to shield off whatever appears within its scope from previous ‘as of’
operators. Thus, consider the statement
As of 50 million years ago, as of the present time the person who is President is supremely
unqualified.
In this sentence, the operator ‘as of the present time’ assigns ‘the person who is President is
supremely unqualified’ to the time which is present when this sentence is or was tokened.
Of course, in the previous indented sentence, ‘as of 50 million years ago’ is extraneous.
The very same thing could have bene expressed with
As of the present time, the person who is President is supremely unqualified.
Indeed, adopting the convention that statements without ‘as of’ operators are to be understood as
being about that set of times in which is privileged the time of tokening, ‘As of the present time’
is likewise extraneous. Thus, we could have simply said
The person who is President is supremely unqualified.
However, there are other statements in which ‘as of the present time’ appears within the scope of
a different ‘as of’ operator, where these operators are not extraneous.
Consider, for instance, the statement,
As of last November, I voted for the first woman candidate for President endorsed by a
political major party, and as of the present time, I wish that person would be the current
President of the United States.

156

In this sentence ‘I voted for the first woman candidate of the President endorsed by a major party’
is assigned to the set of times associated with some time last November being present, and ‘I wish
that person was the current President of the United states’ is assigned to the set of times, the
privileged member of which is present during the time of tokening. If we were to remove the clause
beginning with ‘As of last November’, the result would be
As of the present time, I wish that person would be the current President of the United
States,
which is ungrammatical. Thus, the outer ‘as of’ operator is not extraneous.
6.1.4 A Monstrous Objection?
At this juncture, I would like to respond to a potential objection that might be raised against
the distinction between what exists, obtains, and occurs as of and at a time. Following the above
stipulations, an appearance of ‘as of’ in a statement effectively functions as an operator treating
whatever moment of time is within its scope as the present, regardless of the time at which the
statement is tokened. This makes the ‘as of’ operator into what Kaplan (1989) calls a monster, 89
and Kaplan claims that monsters do not and cannot exist in English.90
According to Kaplan, sentences containing indexicals have two kinds of meaning, content
and character. The content is what a sentence containing an indexical is used to express on a given
occasion of use. For instance, if the sentence “There will be an exam on tomorrow” is uttered on
Wednesday, the content is there will be an exam on Thursday, but if it is uttered on Thursday, the
content is there will be an exam on Friday. The character of a sentence is rule, set by linguistic
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Thanks to Eric Hiddleston for bringing Kaplan’s discussion of monsters to my attention.
Kaplan admits that we can affect the scope of an indexical by putting it within quotations, thus mentioning it as
opposed to using it.
90
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conventions, which determines the content of a sentence on any occasion of use. To continue the
example “There will be an exam tomorrow” expresses a truth on a given time of utterance just in
case there is an exam on the day after.
On Kaplan’s picture, indexical terms and phrases act on content: what is expressed by the
sentence “It is raining” can be altered by prefixing ‘yesterday’. Indexical terms and phrases cannot,
according to Kaplan, act on character. Such operators Kaplan calls monsters. As a possible
example he offers the following, where a context is a possible context of utterance:
In some contexts it is true that I am not tired now. (Kaplan 1989, 510)
Were ‘in some contexts’ legitimately a monster, this sentence would mean that there are, were, or
will be times such that I am not tired at those times. Kaplan rejects as illegitimate this reading of
the sentence, insisting that the indexical ‘now’ always take primary scope. Thus, ‘now’ introduces
the time of utterance, making the indented sentence equivalent to “I am not tired now,” and hence
rendering ‘in some contexts’ otiose.
My ‘as of’ operates on character. For in the statement
As of some time, I am not tired now,
‘now’ is within the scope of ‘As of some time’, and so refers to the time being treated as present.
Thus, this has the same meaning as:
When a certain time t is present, I am not tired then.
Is it a problem that the ‘as of’ operator is a monster? I do not think so. Even if it were a fact that
English does not contain monsters, I see no good reason why monsters could not be introduced
into English with the appropriate stipulations. English is flexible and adaptable.
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Moreover, English already contains monsters. The following is an example of what
linguists call the historical present or dramatic present:91
I remember it like yesterday. There we are all then 92 sitting together at the table, the
professor goes up the board and starts writing. John is at my left, Sally at my right…
The second sentence (and presumably whatever material has been omitted) is grammatically
present tensed. Yet clearly the speaker is not intending to express the way things are during his or
her utterance. He or she is intending rather to describe how things used to be during the time
indicated by the first sentence. The word ‘then’ in the second sentence thus functions as a
Kaplanian monster in English, making the present-tensed clause “there we are all sitting together
at the table…” be about some time in the past.
Consider also a passage beginning like this:
Tomorrow will go like this. I am then sitting in class, nervously looking over my notes. It’s
pointless. I’m not going to become any more confident in the material now. The professor
calls me up to the board. Now the class will see that I don’t know what I’m doing….
Everything past the first sentence is grammatically present tensed, even containing multiple
occurrences of the word ‘now’, but the speaker is making a claim about the future.
Since English already contains Kaplanian monsters, there is no obstacle to introducing the
‘as of’ operator as I have explained it. Of course, it may not always be clear in English whether an
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My thanks to Ljiljana Progovac for drawing my attention to this concept. I seem to recall Jennifer Goossen also
referring to this phenomenon in discussion.
92
Originally, I had ‘then’ omitted in this example, and I claimed that “I remember it like yesterday” was a Kaplanian
monster. Lawrence Lombard pointed out that my original statement had a suppressed ‘then’, so I changed the
example, and my discussion of it, accordingly.
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occurrence of ‘now’ takes large or small scope relative to a previous tense operator. The clauses
‘as of’ and ‘at’ are helpful here. In the statement
As of any time t, as of now, I am typing this sentence,
the word ‘now’ refers to the time of typing (or, more precisely, the time which is present when this
sentence was typed). Thus, ‘now’ effectively removes “I am typing this sentence” from the scope
of “As of any time t,” and consequently this says that I am typing this sentence at some time in the
set associated with the present time. In the statement
As of any time t, at the present time, I am typing this sentence,
The description ‘the present time’ refers to each time t, when t is treated as present. Thus, ‘the
present time’ takes small scope relative to ‘As of any time t’, and this says that I am typing this
sentence eternally. So long as we take care to be clear whether we are talking about what is the
case as of a time or at a time, we can avoid scope ambiguities.
6.2

The As of/At Distinction, Formally
Having explained the distinction between what is the case as of a time and what is the case

at a time informally, I now give a formal account of the distinction. What I will do is give the
semantics of a temporal logic incorporating this distinction. Such a temporal logic I will call a
presentist-eternalist temporal logic (PETL), since this distinction is, I believe, crucial for stating
presentism and eternalism as substantive theses.
I will suppose that we have a language containing some syntactical apparatus for distinctly
symbolizing “As of some time, there is an F” and “At some time, there is an F.” Perhaps the former
could be represented using tense operators, as in
∃x Fx v P ∃x Fx v F ∃x Fx.
The latter could perhaps be represented using quantification over times and an ‘at’ operator, as in
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∃t (at t (∃x(Fx))).
For our purposes, it is not necessary to actually give a syntax for PETL. We can simply suppose
we have one.
Given that we have some syntactic means of symbolizing “As of some time, there is an F”
and “At some time, there is an F,” we need a semantics which captures this distinction. Such a
semantics will consist of two parts. The first is a specification of the kind of model to which the
distinction applies. The second is a set of criteria specifying the conditions under which such
statements as “As of some time, there is an F” and “At some time, there is an F” are true in such a
model. I will give both. First, though, as a preliminary, I briefly introduce models for a simple
temporal logic which does not incorporate the as of/at distinction.
6.2.1 Models for Simple Temporal Logic
Before giving models for a temporal logic which incorporates the as of/at distinction, it
will be useful to give models for a simple temporal logic (STL) which does not incorporate this
distinction.
Intuitively, we want our model to consist of some set of objects standing for moments of
time, which we may treat as either instants or periods of time depending on our interests. We
arrange these times so that for any two moments of time, one is before the other, and we mark
exactly one time as the present time. Intuitively, we can think of such a model as a time-line or
history composed of different moments and containing a privileged present. We then assign
objects, properties, and relations to these times.93 Particular models vary with respect to what is
assigned to each time. I turn now to the technical details.
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A slightly more complicated temporal logic might contain branches in the future direction, with the consequence
that there are times τ and τ` such that neither τ < τ` nor τ` < τ. For sake of simplicity we ignore this here.
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A model for STL consists of a triple (T, τ*, <), where T is a set of times, τ* is a privileged
member of T, and < is a transitive, irreflexive, asymmetric relation T, such that for any τi and τj,
either τi < τj or τj < τi. Intuitively, the privileged member τ* ϵ T is the present time, and for times
τ1 and τ2, τ1 < τ2 just in case τ1 is earlier than τ2. We populate such a model by assigning to each
time τ ϵ T some subset of a universal domain D(U) of objects, properties, and relations, resulting
in a domain D(τ) for each τ ϵ T.
6.2.2 Models for Presentist-Eternalist Temporal Logic
With that background, let us turn to presentist-eternalist temporal logic (PETL). Intuitively,
instead of just a set of times, a model of PETL will consist of a set of sets of times, which we will
call leaves. Each leaf will contain at least one time, exactly one time on each leaf will be designated
as the present time, and no time will be designated as the present time on more than one leaf. The
leaves, and the times on each leaf, are arranged so that for any two leaves or times on leaf, one is
before the other, where a leaf Li is before a leaf Lj just in case the time privileged on Li is before
the time privileged on Lj. We then assign objects, properties, and relations to these times. Particular
models vary with respect to what is assigned to each time and which times are assigned to which
leaves. I now turn to the technical details.
A model for PETL consists of a triple (L, L*, <L). L is a set of sets of times L1, …., Ln ϵ
L. Each such set of times L ϵ L we will call a leaf. L* is a function on L assigning as privileged
exactly one τ ϵ L for each L ϵ L, such that for any Li, Lj ϵ L, τ*ϵ Li ≠ τ* ϵ Lj. Finally, <L is a
transitive, asymmetric, irreflexive relation on each L ϵ L and each τ ϵ L.
We populate such a model by assigning to each τ ϵ L for each L ϵ L some subset of a
universal domain D(U) of objects, properties, and relations, resulting in a domain D(t) for each
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τ ϵ L and a domain D(L) for each L ϵ L, where D(L): (D(τ1) ∪ … ∪ D(τn)) for each τi ϵ L. For
each time τ, the associated domain D(τ) consists in whatever exists in τ. For each leaf L, the
associated domain D(L) consists in whatever exists in L.94
Intuitively, each leaf represents the way things are when the time privileged on that leaf is
present. In a model of PETL, each leaf may contain times other than the privileged time.
Consequently, in a model of PETL, the way things are when a time τ is present may include more
than just what exists, obtains, or occurs at τ. Whether or not each leaf contains just the time
privileged on that leaf, or other times as well, is what determines whether a particular model of
PETL is a presentist or eternalist model (or no-futurist model), as will be discussed shortly. What
exists as of a given time τ consists in the domain D(L) for the leaf L such that τ is privileged in L.
That is, given a specified leaf L with time τ privileged, what exists at τ is just what exists at τ, but
what exists as of τ is everything on that leaf with τ designated present.
6.3

Presentism and Eternalism (And No-Futurism)
Having explained the distinction between what is the case as of a time and what is the case

at a time, we are now in a position to state presentism and eternalism (and, for completion, nofuturism) as substantive, opposed metaphysical theses. First I will offer a statement of each of
these views, and then I will show how presentist, eternalist, and no-futurist models differ in PETL.
6.3.1 Stating Presentism and Eternalism (And No-Futurism)
Suppose that for each moment in time t, there is a corresponding set containing t as the
unique privileged member. For each t, the corresponding set constitutes what the world includes
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I intend the use of a universal domain D(U) to be a matter of convenience. I suspect that we could dispense with it
and have only domains associated with each leaf and each time, though I have not worked out the details.
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when t is present. Presentists and eternalists disagree as to what the world includes when a given
time t is present. With this background, presentism and eternalism can be stated as follows.
Presentism is the thesis that
As of any time t, everything that exists as of t exists at t.95
Or, equivalently,
As of the present time, everything that exists as of the present time exists at the present
time; as of any time there was, everything that exists as of that time exists at that time; and,
as of any time there will be, everything exists as of that time exists at that time.
Eternalism is the thesis that
As of any time t, for anything that exists at any time t`, as of any time t*, it exists at t`.
Or, equivalently,
As of any time t, for anything that exists at any time t`, as of the present time, it exists at t`.
In other words, presentist and eternalist disagree as to what times, objects, states of affairs, and
events exist, obtain, and occur as of a given time being present.
In chapter 1, I introduced a third view which is treated as an alternative to presentism and
eternalism, no-futurism. I will construe no-futurism as the thesis that
As of any time t, everything exists at t or at some t` before t, and as of every time t` there
was, for anything that exists at t`, as of t it exists at t`.
Or, equivalently,
As of the present time, everything exists at the present time or at some time before the
present time; as of every time t` there was, for anything that exists at t`, as of the present
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Or outside of time. I adopt the convention that if anything exists outside of time, it exists as of every time t but at
no time t, since an object outside of time has no temporal location.
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time it exists at t`; and as of every time t`` there will be, as of any previous time t```, for
anything that exists at t```, as of t``, it exists at t```.
In other words, as of each time being present, there exist things at that time and at previous times,
but nothing exists at any future time.
Presentists and eternalists (and no-futurists) thus believe that it is part of the temporal
nature of the universe that for each time t, whenever t is present t is associated with a set of times,
but they disagree as to what times t is associated with in this way. According to the presentist, each
time t is associated only with itself, and consequently all the objects, events, and states of affairs
existing, occurring, or obtaining at t, as well as whatever exists outside of time, if anything.
According to the eternalist, each time t is associated with every time whatsoever. According to the
no-futurist, each time t is associated with itself along with every previous time.
Earlier, I illustrated the distinction between what is the case as of a time and what is the
case at a time through arbitrarily stipulating that January 10, 49 BCE and September 17, 1787
should be associated with 399 BCE, and that August 25, 1776 and 1931 should be associated with
June 18, 1851. If the distinction as it appears in the above statements of presentism and eternalism
(and no-futurism) were likewise matters of arbitrary stipulation, this would mean we had not
succeeded in expressing presentism and eternalism as substantive metaphysical theses.
Presentism and eternalism are not, however, consequences of arbitrarily stipulations.
Rather, presentism and eternalism are two theses about the nature of time. According to the thesis
about time endorsed by the presentist, time has such a nature that each moment, when it is present,
is in an important sense associated only with itself. That is, the presentist believes that it is part of
the nature of time that as of each time t, everything that exists as of t exists at t. According to the
thesis about time endorsed by the eternalist, time has such a nature that each moment, when it is
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present, is associated with every other moment, in the very same sense in which the presentist
thinks each time is only associated with itself. In the next chapter I will give an argument for the
conclusion that presentism and eternalism, as construed using the distinction between what is the
case as of a time and what is the case at a time, are indeed substantive metaphysical theses.
At this juncture, it is worth responding to a potential line of objection to the proposal so
far. That objection goes like this. I have proposed that presentism is the thesis that
As of any time t, everything that exists as of t exists at t.
Included under ‘any time’ would be all times there ever were or will be. Hence, this statement
appears to quantify over times other than the present. However, the presentist disavows
quantification over times other than the present. Hence, this is not an acceptable formulation of
presentism. Moreover, this shows that ‘as of’ locutions do not really help us to distinguish
presentism from eternalism.
My response to this objection has two parts. The first part is to observe that, if non-serious
presentism is a viable version of presentism, then it is possible to talk about times without implying
that those times exist. Hence, the clause “As of a time t” does not entail the existence (as of the
time of utterance) of t. Rather, it entails that as of t, t exists. The second part of my response is to
observe that, if we assume serious presentism, though we cannot genuinely talk about non-present
times, we can still model ways the world might have been or might be going to be. Hence we can
represent the world as being such that a certain time is present, even if we cannot talk about actual
times other than the time which, in fact, is present. With that, let us turn to the task of showing
how to model presentism and eternalism in PETL.
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6.3.2 Modeling Presentism and Eternalism in PETL
We are now in a position to explain how the difference between presentism and eternalism
is reflected in our models. In a presentist model, each leaf contains exactly one time, the privileged
time designated present. In an eternalist model, each leaf contains every time in the model (see
Figure 1).
Modeling Presentism and Eternalism in PETL
τ3*

τ3*
τ3

τ2
τ3
τ2*

τ2*
τ1
τ2
τ1
τ1*

τ1*

Presentism

Eternalism
Figure 1

Each leaf represents the way the universe is when the privileged time in that leaf is present. As we
can see, under the presentist model when a given time is present everything exits at that time. On
the eternalist model, when a given time is present there exist things at other times as well.
In a no-futurist model, each leaf contains the time which is designated present on that leaf
along with all previous times (see Figure 2).
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Modeling No-Futurism in PETL

Figure 2
Thus, as of τ1, everything exists at τ1. As of τ2, everything exists at either τ1 or τ2, as of τ3, everything
exists at either τ1, τ2, or τ3, and so on.
Recall the definitions for presentism, eternalism, and no-futurism offered previously.
Presentism is the thesis that
As of the present time, everything96 exists at the present time; as of any time there was,
everything exists at that time; and, as of any time there will be, everything exists at that
time.
By contrast, eternalism is the thesis that
As of any time t, for anything that exists at any time t`, as of the present time, it exists at t`.
Finally, no-futurism is the thesis that
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Excluding things existing outside of time, which we count as existing as of every time.
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As of the present time, everything exists at the present time or at some time before the
present time; as of every time t` there was, for anything that exists at t`, as of the present
time it exists at t`; and as of every time t`` there will be, as of any previous time t```, for
anything that exists at t```, as of t``, it exists at t```.
We can see these theses represented in these models.
It is also easy to verify, using these models, that presentists, eternalists, and no-futurists
will genuinely disagree about what exists as of a given time. Let us suppose that τ2 is the present
time, τ1 is some moment in time 80 million years ago, and τ3 is some moment in time 100 years
from now. Furthermore, suppose that some of the things in τ1 are dinosaurs, and in τ3 there is a
colony on Mars. Presentists, eternalists, and no-futurists will disagree as to what exists as of τ2 (see
Figure 3).
Modeling Existential Commitment for Presentism, Eternalism, and No-Futurism

τ3
Martian colony

τ2*

Presentism (as of τ2)

τ2*

τ2*

τ1

τ1

Dinosaurs

Dinosaurs

Eternalism (as of τ2)

No-Futurism (as of τ2)

Figure 3
The way in which presentists, eternalists, and no-futurists disagree about what exists as of
τ2 is clearly expressed in our models. In this case, on the eternalist model, as of τ2, both dinosaurs
and a Martian colony exist. On the presentist model, by contrast, as of τ2, neither dinosaurs nor a
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Martian colony exist. In contrast to both of these, on the no-futurist model, as τ2, dinosaurs exist,
but Martian colonies do not.
6.3.3 A Comment on the Chosen Approach
I have chosen to let the difference between presentism, eternalism, and no-futurism in our
models be a function of which times are assigned to each leaf. On presentism, only a single time
is assigned to each leaf, the time which is designated as the present time. On eternalism, every
time is assigned to every leaf, with individual leaves differing only with respect to which time is
designated as the present time. On no-futurism, for each leaf, along with the time privileged on the
leaf, only times past relative to the privileged time are assigned to that leaf.
We might have tried a slightly different approach.97 On this alternative approach, we let all
times be assigned to every leaf on any model. Models diverge as to what objects are assigned to
the domain of each time in each leaf. On presentism, each time is assigned a non-empty domain
on the leaf on which it is privileged, and an empty domain on all other leaves. On eternalism, each
time is assigned a non-empty domain on the leaf on which it is privileged and all subsequent leaves,
and an empty domain on all leaves prior to the leaf on which it is privileged.
Let us call the approach I have opted to use the selected approach and the other the
alternative approach. On both approaches, the presentist believes that as of the present time,
neither dinosaurs nor human colonies on Mars exist. The central difference between the selected
approach and the alternative approach concerns the existence of times other than the present. On
the alternative approach, as of the present time there exist other times. On the selected approach,
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This approach was suggested by Eric Hiddleston.

170

by contrast, as of the present time only the present time exists. I think the selected approach better
captures what the presentist thinks, which is why I have opted for it.
One benefit of the alternative approach is that on this approach we may refer to non-present
times directly, so that ‘399 BCE’ can function as a proper name in
At 399 BCE, Socrates is drinking hemlock.
Since as of the present time the domain assigned to 399 BCE is empty, this is false. On the selected
approach, if ‘399 BCE’ functions as a directly referring expression then it fails to refer, and thus
this statement is arguably without truth-value. To avoid this problem, I will treat names for times
as descriptions on the selected approach. Thus, the presentist will construe the previously intended
statement as
There is a time, 399 BCE, such that at that time Socrates is drinking hemlock.
If as of a time this statement is tokened, there is no time, 399 BCE, then that token will be false,
rather than without truth-value.
6.4

Truth in a Model and Serious and Non-Serious Presentism in PETL
I now turn to give the conditions under which statements containing ‘as of’ and ‘at’ are

true in a model of PETL. Specifically, I will consider the statement forms “As of tj, Fa” and “As
of tj, ∃x Fx,” and, given that some leaf has been specified, either implicitly or explicitly, the
statement forms “Fa at tj,” and “at tj, ∃x Fx.” In the process of doing this, I will give two
interpretations of predicates, which I call the conservative interpretation and the liberal
interpreation. After explaining truth-conditions for statements in a model of PETL, I will show
how the distinction between serious and non-serious versions of presentism follows from these
two interpretations of predicates.
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6.4.1 Truth in a Model of PETL
The basic idea behind giving the conditions in which a statement is true in a model of PETL
is that a statement of the form “As of tj, Fa” is used to express the proposition that a is an F on the
leaf with the time τj privileged, and, given some leaf being specified, a statement of the form “Fa
at tj” is used to express the proposition that at time τj on the specified leaf, a is an F. In other words,
the clause ‘As of’ is used to specify a leaf, whereas ‘at’ is used to specify a time on a specified
leaf.
I give interpretations of constants and predicates in PETL, and then give conditions for
truth in a model of PETL. I begin with the interpretation of constants. We let an interpretation of
PETL assign each constant c on a leaf to some member of the universal domain:
I(c, Li) ϵ D(U).
For predicates, we have two interpretations, which I call the conservative interpretation and the
liberal interpretation. On the conservative interpretation, we assign each predicate F on a leaf to a
function from a time on a leaf to the power set98 of objects in the domain assigned to that leaf:
I(F, Li): (τj, Lj) → P(D(Lj)).
On the liberal interpretation, we assign each predicate F on a leaf to a function from a time on a
leaf to the power set of objects in the universal domain:
I(F, Li): (τj, Lj) → P(D(U)).
I will discuss the importance of these two interpretations of predicates shortly.
Let us, then, turn to truth-conditions in a model of PETL. These conditions hold for serious
presentism, non-serious presentism, and eternalism. A statement of the form “As of tj, Fa” is true
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The power set of a set S is the set containing all the combinations of all the members of S. So, if S=(A, B, C), the
power set of S, P(S) = (A, B, C, AB, AC, BC, ABC).
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on a leaf Li in a model of PETL just in case the model makes true “Fa” on a leaf Lj such that Lj is
the leaf with τj privileged:
M ⊨Li “As of tj, Fa” if and only if M ⊨Lj “Fa”, where Lj = the leaf with τj privileged.
In other words, a statement of the form “As of tj, Fa” is true just in case “Fa” is true on the leaf
containing τj as its privileged member. For instance, the statement,
As of 80 million years ago, Ralph is a dinosaur,
is true just in case as a given time τ, which is privileged on a leaf representing the way things were
as of 80 million years ago, “Ralph is a dinosaur” is true.
A statement of the form “As of tj ∃xFx” is true on a leaf Li in a model of PETL just in case
under some interpretation the model makes true “Fa” on a leaf Lj, for some α on Lj, where Lj is the
leaf with τj privileged:
M ⊨Li “As of tj ∃x Fx” if and only if M ⊨I Lj “Fa” for some α ϵ D(Lj), where Lj = the leaf
with τj privileged.
For instance, the statement,
As of 70 million years ago, there are dinosaurs,
is true just in case on the leaf containing the time 70 million years ago, “a is a dinosaur” is true for
some α on that leaf.
A statement of the form “Fa at tj” is true on a leaf Li in a model of PETL just in case the
interpretation of a in Li is a member of the interpretation of F on τj on Li:
M ⊨Li “Fa at tj” if and only if I(a, Li) ϵ I(F(τj, Li).
In other words, “Fa at tj” comes out true just in case in τj α satisfies the predicate F. For instance,
a token of
At 70 million years ago, Ralph is a dinosaur,
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is true just in case there is a time τ in the leaf containing the token, such that τ is 70 million years
prior to the time containing the token, and on τ Ralph satisfies the predicate is a dinosaur.
A statement of the form “∃xFx at tj” is true on a leaf Li in a model of PETL just in case
under some interpretation the model makes true “Fa at tj” in Li:
M ⊨Li “∃xFx at tj” if and only if M ⊨I “Fa at tj” for some α ϵ D(Li).
For instance, a token of
There is a dinosaur at 70 million years ago,
is true just in case there is a time τ on the leaf contain the token, such that τ is 70 million years
prior to the time containing the token, and “There is some dinosaur” is true on τ.
For the remainder, we let ‘P’ be any statement. A statement of the form “As of any time
there was, P” is true on a leaf Li in a model of PETL just in case for any leaf Lj such that Lj is
before Li, “P” is true on Lj:
M ⊨Li “As of any time there was, P” if and only if for all Lj such that Lj <L Li M ⊨Lj “P”.
For instance, a token of
As of any time there was, there is some dinosaur,
is true just in case for every leaf before the leaf containing the token, “There is some dinosaur” is
true on that leaf.
A statement of the form “As of some time there was, P” is true on a leaf Li in a model of
PETL just in case for some leaf Lj such that Lj is before Li, “P” is true on Lj:
M ⊨Li “As of some time there was, P” if and only if M ⊨Lj “P” for some Lj such that Lj
<L Li.
For instance, a token of
As of some time there was, there is a dinosaur,
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is true just in case on some leaf before the leaf containing the token, “There is some dinosaur” is
true on that leaf.
A statement of the form “As of any time there will be, P” is true on a leaf Li in a model of
PETL just in case for any leaf Lj such that Lj is after Li, “P” is true on Lj:
M ⊨Li “As of any time there will be, P” if and only if for any Lj such that Li <L Lj M ⊨Lj
“P”.
For instance, a token of
As of any time there will be, there is some dinosaur,
is true just in case for every leaf after the leaf containing the token, “There is some dinosaur” is
true on that leaf.
A statement of the form “As of some time there will be, P” is true on a leaf Li in a model
of PETL Justin case for some leaf Lj such that Lj is after Li, “P” is true on Lj:
M ⊨Li “As of some time there will be, P” if and only if for some Lj such that Li <L Lj M
⊨Lj “P”.
For instance, a token of
As of some time there will be, there is some dinosaur,
is true just in case for some leaf after the leaf containing the token, “There is some dinosaur” is
true on that leaf.
A statement of the form “As of the present time, P” is true on a leaf Li in a model of PETL
just in case “P” is true on a leaf Lj, such that the whole statement containing “As of the present
time, P” is on Lj:
M ⊨Li “As of the present time, P” if and only if M ⊨Lj “P”, such that the whole statement
containing “As of the present time, P” is on Lj.
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This warrants some clarification.
If “As of the present time, P” is on a leaf Li, and is not a component of a larger statement
containing it, then it is true in a model of PETL just in case “P” is true on Li. Instead, “As of the
present time, P” may appear as a part of a larger sentence, such as “As of some time there was, Q,
and as of the present time, P,” on Lj. This will be true on Lj in a model of PETL just in case, first,
on some Li such that Li is before Lj, “Q” is true, and second, on Lj “P” is true. That is:
M ⊨Lj “As of some time there was, Q, and as of the present time, P” if and only if, (i) M
⊨Li “Q” where Li <L Lj, and (ii) M ⊨Lj “P”.
For instance, a token of
As of some time there was there are people, and as of the present time there are dinosaurs,
is true just in case for some leaf before the leaf containing the token, “There are people” is true on
that leaf, and on the leaf containing the token “There are dinosaurs” is true.
By contrast, a token of
As of some time there was, there are people, and as of some time there will be, there are
dinosaurs,
is true just in case for some leaf Lj before the leaf containing the token, “There are people” is true
on Lj, and on some leaf Lk after Lj, “There are dinosaurs” is true. That is, the clause “As of some
time there will be, there are dinosaurs” is within the scope of “As of some time there was,” and
hence indicates that there are dinosaurs on a leaf after the time at which “There are people” is true.
In the previous intended statement, “As of the present time there are dinosaurs” indicates what is
the case on the leaf on which the sentence is tokened, and does not indicate what is the case on the
leaf on which “There are people” is true. Clauses of the form “As of the present time” effectively
bring us back to the leaf on which we started.
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A statement of the form “As of all times, P” is true on a leaf Li in a model of PETL just in
case the model makes true “P” on every leaf in the model:
M ⊨Li “As of all times, P” if and only if ∀Lj, M ⊨Lj “P”.
For instance, a token of
“As of all times, there is some dinosaur”
is true just in case for every leaf, there is some time τ on that leaf such that “There is some dinosaur”
is true on τ.
In other words, a statement of the form “As of all times, P,” is true on a leaf Li in a model
of PETL just in case “As of all times there were, P,” “As of the present time, P,” and “As of all
times there will be, P” are all true on Li in the model.
6.4.2 Serious and Non-Serious Presentism
Previously, I gave two interpretations of predicates in PETL, which I called the
conservative interpretation and the liberal interpretation. I now turn to explain the importance of
this distinction. Under the conservative interpretation of predicates, a predicate on a leaf is a
function from a time on a leaf to the power set of objects in the domain assigned to that leaf:
I(F, Li): (τj, Lj) → P(D(Lj)).
Suppose a statement of the form “As of the present time, a is an F” is true in a model of PETL. In
that case, the model makes true “a is an F” in a leaf Lp with the present time privileged. Since the
interpretation assigns ‘F’ to the power set in the domain D(Lp) of that leaf, there must be some
object (or group of objects) α ϵ D(Lp) in the domain of that leaf such that “a is an F” is true of α.
Thus, “∃xFx” is true as of the present time, and so “As of the present time, there exists something
which is an F” is true.
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Hence, if we adopt presentism and the conservative interpretation of predicates, we are
committed to serious presentism, according to which only things existing at the present time (or
outside of time) can exhibit properties or stand in relations. Using the as of/at distinction we can
give a better formulation of serious presentism: As of any time t, properties and relations can only
be exhibited by what exists at t (or outside of time).
Serious presentism has an important consequence for truth. By ‘truth’ here I do not mean
truth in a model, but rather the conditions under which an arbitrary statement would be true, if
serious presentism were to be the case. Suppose that for a statement S to be true because of M, S
must stand in some relation to M, the is made true by or is true because of relation. Given the
foregoing, under serious presentism M must exist as of the time S is tokened. Hence, under serious
presentism, a statement S can be true as of a time t only in virtue of what exists at t or outside of
time. Consequently, serious presentism seems to involve a sort of semantic paradox: in a world in
which serious presentism holds there were and will be moments other than the present, but it is not
clear how denizens of such worlds can talk about them. Some possible responses to this problem
were surveyed in chapter 5.99
Under the liberal interpretation of predicates, a predicate on a leaf is a function from a time
on a leaf to the power set of objects in the universal domain:
I(F, Li): (τj, Lj) → P(D(U)).
Suppose a statement of the form “As of the present time, a is an F” is true in a model of PETL. In
that case, the model makes true “a is an F” in the leaf Lp with the present time privileged. Since
the interpretation assigns ‘F’ to the power set of objects in the universal domain, the object α such
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that “a is an F” is true of α may exist in some leaf other than Lp. If this is the case, it will not be
the case that the model makes true “a is an F” in Lp for some α ϵ D(Lp). But then “∃xFx” will
come out false in Lp, and thus, “As of the present time, there exists something which is an F” can
be false even though “As of the present time, a is an F” is true.
Hence, if we adopt presentism and the liberal interpretation of predicates, we may adopt
non-serious presentism, according to which things which merely did or will exist at past or future
times can exhibit (some) properties and relations, despite the fact that they do not exist. Using the
as of/at distinction, we can give a better formulation of serious presentism: As of any time t, for
some things, as of some other times t` when they do not exist, they may exhibit (some) properties
and stand in (some) relations. In other words, as of a time t, at least some properties and relations
can be exhibited by things which as of other times exist, but as of t do not. A straightforward
consequence of this is that under non-serious presentism, a statement uttered as of the present time
can be true in fact (to contrast with being true in a model) in virtue of what is the case as of other
times.
Consequently, serious and non-serious presentist agree on what it takes for an arbitrary
statement to be true in a model, but they disagree on what it takes for some statements to be true
in fact. Since we can capture the distinction between what is the case as of a time an at a time using
only truth in a model, we can ignore the distinction between serious and non-serious presentism
when formulating presentism and eternalism as substantive theses.
On eternalist models of PETL, the domain of an arbitrary leaf D(L) is the same as the
universal domain D(L). Hence, on eternalist models, the conservative and liberal interpretations
of predicates are equivalent.
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6.5

Concluding Remarks
In this chapter I introduced and explained a distinction between two ways of saying that

something is the case with respect to a time: that some object, state of affairs, or event exists,
obtains, or occurs as of a time, and that some object, state of affairs, or event exists, obtains, or
occurs at a time. Using this distinction, I offered formulations of presentism and eternalism (and
no-futurism). In the next chapter I will argue for the conclusion that presentism and eternalism so
formulated are indeed substantive, opposed metaphysical theses.
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CHAPTER 7. THE CASE FOR SUBSTANCE AND RESPONDING TO THE
SKEPTIC
In chapter 6, I introduced a distinction between what is the case as of a time and what is
the case at a time, and used this distinction to give formulations of presentism and eternalism. In
this chapter I will argue for the conclusion that presentism and eternalism so formulated are indeed
substantive, opposed philosophical theses. Then I will give my response to the argument from
chapter 1 for the conclusion that presentism and eternalism are not substantive philosophical
theses.
7.1

A Spatial Analogy
To help us conceive of presentism and eternalism as substantive metaphysical theses, I will

describe an analogous pair of theses about the nature of space. According to what I will call
hereism, everything that exists, exists here. Shortly I will describe a version of hereism which is
analogous to presentism, as I am proposing that presentism should be understood. According to
what I will call anywhereism, some things exist here, some things exist at distant locations, and
everything which exists locally or exists at a distant location, exists.100 Anywhereism I offer as a
spatial analogue of eternalism. In order to explicate the difference between anywhereism and
eternalism, and to create a lucid picture of the version of hereism which is analogous to presentism,
I will tell a story about an interaction between a group of hereists and a group of anywhereists.
On a certain island, there is a group of people who have no knowledge of seafaring. The
waters around the island are treacherous, so they never swim far. These islanders believe that their
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I originally wanted to call these positions ‘hereism’ and ‘everywhereism’, but Lawrence Lombard pointed out that
‘everywhereism’ suggests the view that everything exists everywhere, that is, that everything is extended
throughout all of space. Hence ‘everywhereism’ became ‘anywhereism’. I later discovered that the terms ‘here-ism’
and ‘anywhere-ism’ appear in Lombard (2003) (starting at page 177) standing for basically the same positions as
they stand for here. Lombard discusses these views with relation to the problem of temporary intrinsics.
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island is the center of the world, and that world ends in every direction at the horizon. In the
morning, a sun is created on one horizon, travels across the sky during the day, and in the evening,
passes out of existence at the other horizon. The next day a new sun appears on the first horizon,
travels across the sky, and in the evening, passes out of existence at the other horizon like so many
before. Perhaps island philosophers have debates over whether a different sun appears every day
or if there is a single sun that is destroyed every night and the next day reincarnated.
One day a ship appears on the horizon, traverses the treacherous waters, and finally makes
anchor. The sailors come ashore and are greeted by the locals. The captain of the ship tells them
that they are from a faraway land over the horizon. The islanders reject this story as pure fantasy:
the ship and the sailors popped into existence on the horizon, perhaps with false memories of lives
in a land that does not exist.
I submit that the sailors are anywhereists, and that the islanders accept a version of hereism,
which I will call static hereism. The islanders genuinely believe that everything exists here, within
the visual horizon for people on the island. The disagreement between the islanders and the sailors
is real: the sailors believe that there exist places and things beyond what can be seen from the
island, whereas the islanders do not. Static hereism is a spatial analogue of the thesis that
everything that ever did or ever will exist, exists at the present time: according to the one view,
there is only one time ever, and according to the other there is only one location anywhere. I want
to make sense of presentism as being consistent with the thesis that there did and will exist things
which do not exist now. Hence, static hereism is not a good analogy for presentism. However, we
will soon come to a version of hereism which is analogous to presentism. Let us continue the story.
Suppose that the captain of the ship invites any islander curious and courageous enough to
go with them on the ship and see for him or herself that there are people, places, and things beyond
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the horizon. One of the islanders volunteers, and is taken on board. They set sail, and as they go
along the islander watches the island behind them get progressively smaller and further away, until
finally it vanishes at the horizon. The islander turns to see a new landmass appear in the distance
at the opposite horizon. This landmass gets progressively closer and closer until they are near
enough to dock and come ashore. The captain proudly pronounces that he has proved the existence
of things beyond the sight of the island, and thus not everything exists here, wherever that may be.
We may expect our islander to concede that the captain is correct, and begrudgingly accept
anywhereism. This is, surely, what the captain expects. Yet suppose the islander responds in this
way:
I was wrong that everything exists within sight of the island. But you are wrong to think
that things exist elsewhere than here. I see now that everything there is exists within sight
of this dock.
Stunned, the captain may ask whether the island from which the islander came exists, to which the
islander will answer: no.
Bewildered, the captain invites the islander back aboard the ship. They leave the dock and
sail away. As they travel, the islander sees the dock and mass of land grow gradually smaller and
further away, until at last it disappears on the horizon. Looking forward, the island appears on the
other horizon, and grows gradually closer and larger. Eventually they are close enough to drop
anchor and come ashore. The captain insists that he has now proved that the island exists, that not
everything exists within sight of the dock, and generally that there exist things elsewhere than here.
Our islander responds:
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You are right that the island exists, and you are right again that not everything exists within
sight of the dock. But you are wrong that there exist things elsewhere than here. Everything
that exists is within sight of this island.
Dumbfounded, the captain asks: what about the dock? To which the islander responds, with utmost
conviction: there is no dock. It does not exist. Apoplectic, the captain gives up the cause.
This islander believes what I will call dynamic hereism. According to dynamic hereism,
everything exists locally, but what is local can change. As you change location what exists changes
as well. You park your car and walk away. Go far enough and it vanishes, along with everything
around it. The grocery store comes into existence as you travel a certain direction, a certain
distance, and so too the bar, the park, and so on. Even the ground beneath your feet only exists
because you walked in this direction.
My proposal is that presentism is to be understood as a temporal analogue of dynamic
hereism, and eternalism is to be understood as a temporal analogue of anywhereism. According to
presentism, what time is present changes, and this change consists in the previous time ceasing to
exist and a new time coming into existence. According to eternalism, different times are like
different locations. Objects that exist at other times do not exist at the present time just like objects
at distant locations do not exist here. Nonetheless, objects at other times exist at those times, when
those times exist (are present), as objects at distant locations exist at those locations, when those
locations exist (are here).
I submit that we can understand the disagreement between an anywherest and a dynamic
hereist, and therefore that we can understand the disagreement between a presentist and an
eternalist.
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7.2

The Skeptic Responds
In the next section, I will turn to the task of defending the claims dynamic hereism and

anywhereism are indeed substantive theses, and that presentism and eternalism are analogous to
these two views about space. Before that, I want show how the skeptic might argue for the
conclusion that dynamic hereism and anywhereism are not substantive theses. If sound, such
arguments would undermine my attempt to use these theses to establish that presentism and
eternalism are substantive.
The starting point of the arguments for the conclusions that presentism and eternalism are
not substantive theses was that in English verbs are tensed, and where the tense on a verb is not
explicit it is ambiguous. Lombard (2003) points out, however, that while English verbs are tensed,
they are not similarly placed.101 Thus, dynamic hereism and anywhereism are not ambiguous in
ordinary English as are presentism and eternalism. If English verbs were placed, however, the
skeptic may argue, we could see straightforwardly that dynamic hereism and anywhereism are not
substantive theses.

101

Why are English verbs tensed but not placed? Suppose Sam has a red vase by the window in his kitchen. Sam
takes the vase to his garage and paints it blue, then returns it to its former place by the window. So, at time t1 the
vase is red and located in the kitchen, at t2 the vase is blue and located in the garage, and at t3 the vase is blue and
located back in the kitchen. Now, if we just say that the vase is red and blue, we have an apparent contradiction.
This apparent contradiction is not resolved by indicating where the vase is located when it has each color, since the
vase is both red and blue in the kitchen. However, it is resolved by indicating when the vase has each color: it is red
at t1 and blue at both t2 and t3. Since indicating the time is sufficient to resolve the contradiction the problem is
avoided by tensing the verb, and so placing the verb as well would be extraneous. It is a feature of ordinary objects,
like Sam’s vase, that they can have the same spatial locations at different times, but they cannot at any particular
time exist wholly at separate spatial locations. So, what holds for talk about Sam’s vase holds for talk about ordinary
objects. Presumably English developed by speakers communicating about ordinary objects. It is thus no surprise that
verbs are tensed but not placed.
If, however, we do want to talk about things which can be wholly located at different places simultaneously, we will
have to add spatial information to our verbs. For at a certain time Sam may hate the red of his vase (this is why he
paints it blue), but love the red of Jane’s sweater. So, redness is both loved and hated by Sam, and we have an
apparent contradiction. This apparent contradiction can be resolved by specifying that Sam hates the red as it is
instantiated in his vase but loves it as it is instantiated in Jane’s sweater, which is effectively to introduce spatial
information.
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Let us suppose that English verbs were placed, and consider an argument for the conclusion
that dynamic hereism is not a substantive thesis. What would it be like if English verbs were
placed? Instead of saying “John is eating lunch,” we might say “John here-is eating lunch,” if John
is close by and eating lunch. If John is far away and eating lunch we might say, “John there-is
eating lunch,” or “John elsewhere-is eating lunch.” Finally, we might say “John somewhere-is
eating lunch” if we did not wish to specify where John is eating lunch. Instead of saying “There is
a lion at the zoo,” we might say “Here-is a lion at the zoo,” if we are at the zoo, or “There-is a lion
at the zoo,” if we were somewhere else.
Here is an argument for the conclusion that hereism is not a substantive thesis:
(1H)

Hereism, the thesis that everything that exists, exists here, is ambiguous. It could
mean everything that here-exists, exists here. Alternatively, it could mean
everything that somewhere-exists, exists here.

(2H)

The thesis that everything that here-exists, exists here is trivially true.

(3H)

The thesis that everything that somewhere-exists, exists here is obviously false.

(4H)

For a thesis to be philosophically substantive it cannot be either trivially true or
obviously false.

(5P)

Therefore, dynamic hereism is not a philosophically substantive thesis.

Now, the static hereist could respond to this argument by rejecting (3H), for the static hereist does
think that everything that somewhere-exists, exists here. The dynamic hereist, however, does not
think this, since unlike the static hereist, the dynamic hereist believes that although nothing
elsewhere-exists, he or she could travel elsewhere and discover things which do not exist here.
The skeptic thus argues that the dynamic hereist is conflating “exists” with “here-exists,”
and forgetting “somewhere-exists.” It is true that things existing at distant locations do not here-
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exist, and so if we identify “exists” with “here-exists” it follows that things at distant locations do
not exist, and hence that everything exists locally. Later, I will give a response to the argument
from chapter 1 for the conclusion that presentism is not a substantive metaphysical thesis. My
response to that line of argument can, with the relevant changes, be turned into a response to the
argument considered in this section for the conclusion that dynamic hereism is not really a
substantive metaphysical thesis.
7.3

Responding to the Skeptic
In the sections to follow I will develop the case for the conclusion that presentism and

eternalism are substantive, opposed metaphysical theses, as well as give my response to the skeptic
who believes that they are not.
My basic argument for the conclusion that presentism and eternalism and substantive,
opposed metaphysical theses goes as follows:
(1) Dynamic Hereism and Anywhereism are substantive, opposed metaphysical theses.
(2) Presentism is importantly analogous to dynamic hereism and eternalism is importantly
analogous to anywhereism.
(3) Therefore, presentism and eternalism are substantive, opposed metaphysical theses.
In what follows I will defend premises (1) and (2), and then offer a refutation of the argument from
chapter 1 for the conclusion that presentism is not a perspicuous thesis.
7.3.1 Anywhereism and Dynamic Hereism are Substantive Theses
Here I will give two arguments for the conclusion that anywhereism and dynamic hereism
are substantive metaphysical theses.
The first argument for this conclusion is that there is a substantive disagreement between
the anywhereist and the static hereist, and therefore there is also a substantive disagreement
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between the anywhereist and the dynamic hereist. There is clearly a substantive disagreement
between the static hereist and the anywhereist. For we can suppose that our islanders believe that
nothing exists accept what is within sight of the island, and that by ‘exists’ they mean the same
thing as the captain of the ship. The islanders are not using ‘exists’ differently from the way the
captain uses that word, they simply think there is nothing out there past the horizon. This means
the disagreement between the anywhereist and the dynamic hereist must be substantive as well,
since the static and the dynamic hereist both use the word ‘exists’ in the same way. The dynamic
hereist believes that everything exists here, and that such things as did exist at other locations have
been snuffed out.
Of course, static hereism is obviously false, and for this reason we may think that it is not
a substantive thesis. Even if static hereism is not a substantive thesis, the hypothetical static hereist
does genuinely disagree with the anywhereist regarding what exists, in the very same sense of
‘exists’. Since the dynamic hereist, given that she has a particular location, believes the very same
things exist as would the static hereist at the same location, the dynamic hereist and the anywhereist
must genuinely disagree with the anywhereist regarding what exists, in the very same sense of
‘exists’. While I think that we have good reason to reject dynamic hereism as false, it is not quite
so absurd as static hereism.
Someone might object that the dynamic hereist will want to talk about the what there is at
locations other than here, and that such talk brings with it commitment to the existence of objects
existing elsewhere than here.
My response to this objection parallels my response to the analogous objection raised
against using ‘as of’ locutions to distinguish presentism from eternalism. We can distinguish
between what might be called serious dynamic hereism and non-serious dynamic hereism.
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According to serious dynamic hereism, only things which exist here can exhibit properties or stand
in relations here. According to non-serious dymamic hereism, at least some properties or relations
can be exhibited here by things which do not exist here. If non-serious dynamic hereism is the
case, then we can talk about other locations without implying that they exist. If we assume serious
dynamic hereism, although we cannot talk about other locations, we can represent locations other
than this one.
The second argument for the conclusion that anywhereism and dynamic hereism are
substantively opposed metaphysical theses is based on the fact that we can imagine a version of
dynamic hereism which is empirically distinguishable from anywhereism. Imagine that in fifty
feet in any direction, the world simply stopped. A useful image may be the view from atop a
building over an empty skyline on a starless night: there is nothing to see past the edge of the
rooftop. Instead of the edge of the rooftop, imagine the ground coming to an end. Instead of there
being simply nothing to see past that point, there is nothing at all. Now imagine stepping forward,
and as you walk new objects appear in front of you. Looking back, you see that old objects have
disappeared behind you. What exists depends on where you are, and wherever you are, you are at
the center of a world with a fifty-foot radius. Whether it is genuinely possible for such a world to
exist, I do not know. It is, however, in some sense conceivable that the world be this way.
Now push the edge of the world back to sixty feet, to seventy feet, and so on, finally
pushing it all the way to the horizon in all directions. We now have a world as described by
dynamic hereism.
Either the truth or falsity of what might be called fifty-foot-radius dynamic hereism is a
matter of linguistic convention, the placing of the edge of the world at the horizon turns a
metaphysical thesis into a linguistic convention, or the truth of dynamic hereism is not a matter of
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linguistic convention. Clearly the truth or falsity of fifty-foot-radius dynamic hereism is not a
matter of linguistic convention. We can clearly observe that it is in fact false. Given that we can
conceive of the world having a movable end in space, it is simply incredulous that this end in space
could not be located at the visual horizon. This is, however, what the skeptic must say if he insists
that by ‘exists’ the dynamic hereist means “exists here” (or “here-exists”), and thus that there is
no genuine metaphysical disagreement between the dynamic hereist and the anywhereist. This is
surely incorrect.102
We may thus conclude that anywhereism and dynamic hereism are substantive
metaphysical theses, and that the disagreement between anywhereists and dynamic hereists is not
merely a matter of linguistic convention.
7.3.2 The Analogy Holds
I now turn to the task of establishing that anywhereism and eternalism, and dynamic
hereism and presentism, are indeed importantly analogous.
According to dynamic hereism, wherever you are located, everything exists there. Were
you to move, however, the objects here would cease to exist, and the objects at your new location
would come into existence. Your moving has as a consequence the pushing of old objects and
locations out of existence, and the bringing of new objects and locations into existence. According
to presentism, whatever time is present, everything exists then. As the present time changes, old
objects cease to exist and new objects come into existence. The passage of time consists in the
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I note also that if I am right that dynamic hereism is a substantive thesis, then the view according to which a
statement such as “There is an x over there” has the same meaning as “If you/I/we were to go over there, you/I/we
would have such and such experiences” is false. After all, the dynamic hereist agrees that if she was go over there,
she would have such and such experiences, but she disagrees that as of here, there is anything over there.
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pushing of old objects and moments out of existence and the bringing of new objects and moments
into existence. Thus, dynamic hereism is analogous to presentism.
Admittedly, dynamic hereism and presentism are not analogous in all respects. For
instance, one can travel back to locations where one had been before, but it is at least extremely
difficult to travel to times there used to be. Although presentism and dynamic hereism are not
analogous in all respects, they are appropriately analogous in the respect that matters. According
to dynamic hereism, what exists changes as what location is here changes, and, analogously,
according to presentism, what exists changes as what time is present changes.
According to anywhereism, whatever would exist locally given any place which could
possibly be considered here, that thing exists at that location from where you are now. In other
words, your location has no impact on what other locations exist, and what exists at those other
locations. Local objects do not cease to exist as we move away from them, but become increasingly
more distant. Objects at places we travel to are not thereby brought into existence, but become
increasingly more near. According to eternalism, whatever exists as of any time t, as of any other
time, exists at t. What time is present has no impact on what other times exist, and what exists at
those other times. Speaking ordinary language, the eternalist may say that past objects no longer
exist. What she really means is that they are not temporally located at this time, and instead that
they are temporally distant. The eternalist may likewise say that in the future new objects will
come into existence. What she really means is that they will at that time be temporally near. Thus,
anywhereism is analogous to eternalism.
The point can be made in a different way. Suppose that, instead of letting as of be used to
treat a time t as the present time, we let it be used to treat a location L as local, and let each location
L be associated with a set of locations which includes at least L as a member. Thus, “As of Detroit,
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Michigan, …” is used to assert how things are (or would be) if the speaker is located in (or were
to go to) Detroit, Michigan. Instead of letting at be used to indicate the time at which something
exists, obtains, or occurs, we let use it to indicate the location where something exists, obtains, or
occurs, for some location in the set associated with L.
Given this, dynamic hereism can be stated as the thesis that
As of this location, everything exists103 at this location; as of any location I might go to,
everything would exist at that location.
Anywhereism is the thesis that
As of any location L, for anything that exists at L, as of this location L’, it exists at L.
In other words,
As of any location L, for anything that exists at L, as of here, it exists at L.
These are straightforwardly analogous to our earlier definitions of presentism and eternalism.
Finally, let us consider how the analogy between dynamic hereism and presentism and
between anywhereism and eternalism could fail to hold. Dynamic hereism and anywhereism are
two ways of conceiving of the nature of space. I have proposed that presentism and eternalism be
treated as two analogous ways of conceiving of the nature of time. It is possible either that one of
these analogies fails, or that both do. One of these analogies fails only if either time cannot
coherently be conceived of as being like space according to anywhereism, or if time cannot
coherently be conceived of as being like space according to dynamic hereism. As the anywhereist
conceives of space, what exists is not altered by my moving around; likewise, as the eternalist
conceives of time, what exists does not depend on which time is present. As the dynamic hereist
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The word ‘exists’ here is the placeless ‘exists’ of ordinary English.
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conceives of space, what exists is altered by my moving around; likewise, as the presentist
conceives of time, what exists does depend on what time is present. If we think at least one analogy
is acceptable and one is not, which analogy fails? Philosophers could surely disagree as to the best
answer to this question, making it philosophically substantive. Hence, we have a substantive
philosophical debate.
We are therefore left with the possibility that time cannot be conceived of as analogous to
space according to either anywhereism or dynamic hereism. Some convincing argument is needed
to establish that neither analogy is really apt to help us conceive of time. Until such an argument
is given, it is legitimate for philosophers to try to conceive of time according to either or both
analogies. Consequently, it is legitimate for philosophers to conceive of time according to
eternalism or according to presentism. As such, presentism and eternalism are substantive theses
about time, and the debate over presentism and eternalism is substantive.
7.3.3 Refuting the Skeptical Argument
In this section I will give my response to the argument from chapter 1 for the conclusion
that presentism is not a perspicuous thesis. My criticism of that argument can be applied, with the
relevant changes, to the arguments for the conclusions that eternalism, no-futurism, dynamic
hereism, and anywhereism are not perspicuous theses as well.
Recall that the skeptic argues as follows. Presentism, the thesis that everything exists at the
present time, is ambiguous. It could mean that
Everything that exists now exists at the present time.
This is trivial and hence not substantive. Alternatively, it could mean that
Everything that ever did exist and everything that ever will exist, exists at the present time.
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This is obviously false, and also, presumably, not what the presentist thinks. Both readings fail to
provide us with a way to understand presentism as a substantive thesis.
My response is that both the thesis that
Everything that exists now exists at the present time,
and the thesis that
Everything that ever did exist and everything that ever will exist, exists at the present time,
are ambiguous.
What makes the skeptical argument for the conclusion that presentism is not a substantive
thesis so persuasive is that disambiguating these claims requires the kind of distinction we made
previously using locutions involving as of and at, and, this distinction is easy to overlook.104 By
clarifying the distinction between what is the case as of a time and what is the case at a time, we
can show that the skeptic who argues as in chapter 1 for the conclusion that presentism is not a
substantive thesis makes a false dilemma.
Let us consider each thesis in turn. The thesis that
Everything that exists now exists at the present time
can be read in four ways. On three of these readings, it is trivial. On one, it is not. The three trivial
readings are as follows:
As of the present time, everything which exists at the present time exists at the present
time.
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In conversation, Michael McKinsey has pointed out that ordinary English does contain phrases containing ‘as of’,
like “As of yesterday, the team was two games behind.” I am not sure if ‘as of’ as it appears in such ordinary
statements has the same meaning as the ‘as of’ operator which I am using to state presentism and eternalism as
substantive metaphysical theses. Even if it did, it would not be too surprising that some philosophers overlook the
distinction.
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As of the present time, everything exists as of the present time.
As of the present time, everything that exists at the present time exists as of the present
time.
Both the presentist and the eternalist will agree to each of these claims. The non-trivial reading is
as follows:
As of the present time, everything exists at the present time.
This is not trivial, for it is true only if the set of times associated with the present time contains
only the present time. The presentist believes that this is true, but the eternalist does not. Eternalists
think that as of the present time, there are times other than the present time, and there exist things
at those other times. This is therefore a substantive thesis.
The skeptic may object as follows. The eternalist, I have claimed, believes that as of the
present time, there are times other than the present time. But, the skeptic will insist, this statement
is ambiguous as to the tense of ‘are’. So, this could be read as the thesis that as of the present time,
there are now times other than the present time. This, the skeptic avers, is obviously false.
Alternatively, this statement could be read as the thesis that as of the present time, there were, are,
and will be times other than the present time. This, the skeptic insists, is obviously true.
The basic response to this kind of objection goes like this. In the statement as of the present
time, there are times other than the present time, the word ‘are’ is within the scope of ‘as of’. So,
unless ‘are’ is within the scope of another, imbedded ‘as of’ operator, it ranges only over times in
the set of times associated with the present time. Thus, the statement as of the present time, there
were, are, are will be times other than the present, is not obviously true, because the presentist
rejects it. According to the presentist, only one time is in the set of times associated with the present

195

time, and thus, according to the presentist, it is not the case, as of the present time, that there were
and will be times other than the present time.
The thesis that
Everything which ever did exist and everything which ever will exist, exists at the present
time
can likewise be read in any of four ways. On one of these readings it is trivially true, on one it is
obviously false, and on two it is substantive. The trivial true reading is as follows:
As of the present time, for everything that exists at any time, it exists as of the present time.
Both the presentist and the eternalist will agree that what exists as of the present time is the same
as what exists as of the present time. The obviously false reading is:
As of any time there is, was, or will be, for everything which exists, as of the present time
it exists at the present time.
Both the presentist and the eternalist will agree that everything which exists as of any time contains
more than just what exists at the present time. The first substantive reading is:
As of any time there is, was, or will be, for everything which exists, as of the present time
it exists.
The eternalist will accept this, since according to eternalism whatever exists as of each time exists
as of any particular time. The presentist, however, will reject it, since according to presentism, as
of each time only that which exists at that time, exists. The second substantive reading is as
follows:
As of the present time, for everything that exists at any time, it exists at the present time.
The presentist will accept this, since, according to presentism, as of the present time, the present
time is the only time, and so everything that exists at any time exists at the present time. The
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eternalist will reject this, however, since, according to eternalism, as of the present time, there exist
times other than the present, and so not everything exists at the present time.
Finally, let us consider the statement of presentism offered previously in chapter 6:
As of the present time, everything exists at the present time; as of any time there was,
everything exists at that time; and, as of any time there will be, everything exists at that
time.
The skeptic may argue that the first clause is ambiguous between
As of the present time, everything that exists now exists at the present time,
and
As of the present time, everything that ever did exist or ever will exist, exists at the present
time.
The first reading is trivial. The second reading, however, is just what the presentist thinks, so long
as “everything that ever did exist and everything that ever will exist” is within the scope of “As of
the present time,” since according to presentism the only time which exists as of the present time
is the present time itself. Thus, we again arrive at a substantive thesis.
I thus conclude that the argument for the conclusion that presentism is not a substantive
thesis is fallacious. According to the first premise of that argument, presentism is either the thesis
that everything that exists now exists at the present time, or the thesis that everything which ever
exist, exists now, or will exist, exists at the present time. In fact, however, the thesis that everything
exists at the present time has four readings,105 one of which is substantive.
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I put aside tenseless readings, such as those discussed in chapter 2.
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7.3.4 Prospects for the Skeptic
At this juncture, I want to consider the prospects for the skeptic who believes presentism
and eternalism are not substantive philosophical theses. The indefatigable skeptic may persist in
claiming that the arguments for the conclusions that presentism and eternalism are not substantive,
opposed philosophical thesis are valid. Towards this end, what options does the skeptic have
available?
The skeptic cannot defend the claim that the arguments are not fallacious by rejecting the
distinction between what exists, obtains, or occurs as of and at a given time, as that distinction can
be understood conventionally, and so does not involve any controversial metaphysical
assumptions. Instead, the skeptic must deny that the distinction between what exists, obtains, or
occurs as of and at a given time is metaphysically significant. The skeptic will claim that drawing
a distinction between what is the case as of a time and what is the case at a time is like drawing a
distinction between a brother and a male sibling, or between a bachelor and an unmarried man of
marriageable status: such a distinction does not track with anything in reality.
To defend this claim, the skeptic must either deny that dynamic hereism and anywhereism
are substantive metaphysical theses, or deny the analogy between these views and presentism and
eternalism, or both. I have already defended both of these claims, however. Perhaps the skeptic
can show that my arguments in defense of either of these claims is unsound, and offer a
counterargument against one or both claims. What the skeptic cannot do, without begging the
question, is simply reaffirm the arguments from chapter 1. Those arguments have now been put in
doubt. Thus, even if I am wrong, the debate between those who think presentism and eternalism
are substantive theses and those who deny this has been pushed forward a step. This is real
progress.
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7.4

Is the As of/At Distinction Necessary?
In chapter 6, I explained the distinction between what is the case as of a time and what is

the case at a time, and gave statements of presentism and eternalism using this distinction. In this
chapter I have argued for the conclusion that presentism and eternalism so stated are substantive
philosophical theses. Assuming that I have established that presentism and eternalism are
substantive philosophical theses, one question which arises is whether we needed the as of/at
distinction to state them as substantive theses.106 To be clear, the question is not whether we need
the phrases ‘as of’ and ‘at’ themselves to give substantive statements of presentism and eternalism.
Rather, the question is whether we need the kind of distinction which I have used these phrases to
express to give substantive statements of presentism and eternalism. I think that we do.
In a way, chapters 1 through 5 of this dissertation together provide powerful inductive
evidence for the conclusion that we do indeed require the as of/at distinction. I would like to make
a further case for this conclusion here as well, however.
We want to avoid making presentism into the obviously false thesis that
Everything which ever did exist, does exist, or ever will exist, exists at the present time.
To do this, we need it to be consistent with presentism that there used to exist dinosaurs, and that
there will exist human colonies on Mars. However, we need a way to understand the claim that
dinosaurs used to exist so that it is not equivalent to the claim that there are dinosaurs in the past,
and we need a way to understand the claim that there will exist human colonies on Mars so that it
is not equivalent to the claim that there are human colonies on Mars in the future. Furthermore, we
need it to be the case that the way we understand this claim does not make presentism into an
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I want to thank Eric Hiddleston for useful comments which inspired me to address this question explicitly.
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obvious falsehood. For instance, we do not want to make presentism into the thesis that everything
that ever did exist or ever will exist, exists at the present time, but statements like “There were
dinosaurs,” “Plato wrote The Republic,” and “There will be human colonies on Mars” are
nonetheless true.
In order to meet these requirements, we need a way to distinguish the claim that dinosaurs
and human colonies on Mars exist when a given time is present, from the claim that dinosaurs and
human colonies on Mars exist during that time. The distinction between what is the case as of a
time and what is the case at a time, that is, the distinction between what exists, obtains, and occurs
at a time and what exists, obtains, and occurs when a time is present, allows us to make this
distinction. Thus, although someone might give a substantive statement of presentism without
explicitly utilizing the distinction between what is the case as of a time and what is the case at a
time, she must at least implicitly be utilizing the kind of distinction I use these operators to express.
I hence conclude that the as of/at distinction is necessary for formulating presentism and eternalism
as substantive, opposed philosophical theses.
7.5

Concluding Remarks
In this chapter I developed two views about space, dynamic hereism and anywhereism,

which I offered as spatial analogues of presentism and eternalism, respectively. I defended the
claim that dynamic hereism and anywhereism are substantive metaphysical theses and that they
are importantly analogous to presentism and eternalism. Finally, I argued that the skeptical
argument for the conclusion that presentism is not a substantive thesis from chapter 1 is fallacious.
I thus conclude that presentism and eternalism really are substantive, opposed philosophical theses.
I intend the case I have made here to be convincing even to the skeptic. Even if it is not,
however, I believe that what I have said is sufficient to show that the skeptical arguments for the
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conclusions that presentism and eternalism are not substantive philosophical theses are
questionable. Thus, even if I have not convinced the skeptic, I think genuine progress has been
made.
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Presentism is the view that, with the possible exception of things outside of time,
everything that exists, exists at the present time. It is contrasted with eternalism, the view that
everything which ever did exist or ever will exist, exists. Some philosophers argue that presentism
and eternalism are not really substantive, opposed metaphysical theses. I consider some attempts
in the literature to rebut this skeptical position, and argue that they are unsatisfactory. Then I make
my own case for the conclusion that presentism and eternalism are substantive metaphysical theses
by drawing a distinction between two ways of talking about what exists with respect to a time, and
imagining a hypothetical analogous debate about the nature of space.

209

AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL STATEMENT

Travis Figg was born and raised in Jefferson City, Missouri. He earned a B.A. at Westminster
College in Fulton, Missouri in 2008 where he double-majored in Philosophy and Religious Studies.
For his graduate work, he earned an M.A. in Philosophy at Cleveland State University in 2010,
and a PhD in Philosophy at Wayne State University in 2017. Figg’s interests reach across the
philosophical gamut, though his main research focus lately has been the philosophy of time. Figg
is currently at work preparing material for publication and seeking employment. He hopes to be
able to continue to teach, read, and write philosophy for a long time.

